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We started out as a campaign organisation, but we've had to start doing support work 
because people have got in touch who are in need. There were quite a few people, particularly 
older and disabled people, who described wanting to kill themselves as a way out of waking up 
and feeling so miserable… and being stuck at home all day in the cold thinking 
"There's nothing, what's the point in being alive?" 
 
Interviewee Sixteen - Policy Specialist, 
Energy Consumer Advocate NGO 
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Abstract  
Affordability of energy in the domestic sector is the product of three interrelated factors - level of 
household income, level of energy bills (which are a product of prices and levels of energy demand, 
mediated by tariffs and the retail market), and the amount of energy that a household needs to 
maintain a healthy living environment. This thesis focusses on the factors of affordability which are 
most relevant to the energy policy which are energy bills and energy efficiency, both of which are 
considered in the context of household income. 
Affordability of energy in Great Britain is important for separate, but over-lapping reasons. Firstly, it 
has important political impacts - as energy prices continue to rise, energy is repeatedly highlighted 
as one of the biggest financial concerns for households (uSwitch, 2013; YouGov, 2015; DECC, 2014f), 
leading affordability of energy to become an increasingly political issue (Lockwood, 2016). 
Secondly, affordability of energy has social implications which stem from the fact that the impact of 
rising energy bills is felt particularly strongly by those on low incomes and in inefficient homes – the 
fuel poor. In spite of it being twenty-five years since Brenda Boardman published her first book 
defining the issue of fuel poverty (Boardman, 1991), millions of households in Great Britain today 
still cannot afford adequate amounts of energy. This is significant because being able to afford 
access to basic levels of energy services such as warmth and light is essential for maintaining physical 
and mental health (Harrington et al., 2005; Stockton and Campbell, 2011).  
Thirdly, affordability has important implications for design of the energy system  –a system focussed 
on minimising long-term costs, both through micro-scale features such as efficient network revenue 
regulation which keep costs down on a year-by-year basis, and macro-scale aspects such as through 
the development of a low-demand, highly flexible energy system which has the potential to bring 
costs down in the long term (Sanders et al., 2016), is likely to differ from one which in which 
affordability is less of a focus, or only a focus over the short term. 
This thesis responds to a gap in the literature in relation to the role that governance plays in 
affecting levels of affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain. It examines the 
impact of governance on energy prices and tariffs, and the impact of governance on energy 
efficiency of the housing stock in Great Britain. Both of these are examined in the context of levels of 
household income. Greater insight is gained by examining the impact of the energy governance 
structure in Denmark on Danish domestic energy efficiency standards, which are widely accepted to 
be very good (IEA, 2011).  
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This thesis makes use of existing academic and policy literature in tandem with data from fifty-six 
interviews with individuals from across the energy sectors in Great Britain and Denmark. The 
governance structure of energy in Great Britain is shown to be, on balance, not supportive of 
delivering affordable energy to domestic consumers. A number of specific issues within the current 
governance structure in Great Britain are identified. These include the presence of a limiting 
narrative, whereby policymakers consider affordability to be achieved principally through delivery of 
low prices; insufficient institutional capacity within OFGEM to keep network prices low, and monitor 
suppliers’ costs and profits; lack of wholesale market transparency; an anti-interventionist ideology 
leading to weak energy efficiency requirements for new-build and private rental properties; 
suppliers as poor executors of energy efficiency policy; weak demand-side interests; tariffs designed 
around the needs of suppliers, not consumers; an over-reliance on an uncompetitive retail market; a 
lack of institutional capacity amongst policy makers regarding energy efficiency, and network 
regulation; and weak consumer representation.  
A number of recommendations are put forward, including the fostering of a new narrative centred 
on energy efficiency; the redesign of tariffs to better protect the interests of consumers; the 
reallocation of responsibility for energy efficiency to local authorities; the development of greater 
institutional capacity among policymakers; the support for a more interventionist ideology 
supporting use of regulation; financial support for energy efficiency retrofit; the fostering of greater 
policy stability; development of new tariff structures; and the formation of a new consumer 
representative. Overall this thesis demonstrates that affordability of energy in unlikely to be 
delivered to domestic consumers in Great Britain unless significant changes are made to the 
governance structure of the energy sector. 
 
  
8 
 
Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 6 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................ 15 
Acronyms .............................................................................................................................................. 17 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... 21 
Chapter 1 - Introduction: The Context of Governance and Affordability of Energy for Domestic 
Consumers in Great Britain ................................................................................................................... 22 
1.1 - Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 22 
1.2 - Thesis in Context ....................................................................................................................... 22 
1.3 - Why Does Affordability of Energy Matter in Great Britain? ..................................................... 23 
1.4 - What is 'Affordable'? ................................................................................................................ 25 
1.4.1 - Measuring Affordability ..................................................................................................... 26 
1.4.2 –Measuring Fuel Poverty ..................................................................................................... 27 
1.4.3 - Affordability in this thesis .................................................................................................. 34 
1.4.4 - Affordability vs. Fuel Poverty ............................................................................................. 35 
1.5 - The role of Governance ............................................................................................................ 36 
1.5.1 - Governance as Government .............................................................................................. 37 
1.5.2 - Institutions ......................................................................................................................... 37 
1.5.3 - Paradigms & Ideologies ..................................................................................................... 38 
1.5.4 - Power ................................................................................................................................. 39 
1.6 - Key Actors in the Governance Structure................................................................................... 41 
1.7 - Research Questions .................................................................................................................. 45 
1.8 - Thesis Overview ........................................................................................................................ 46 
1.9 - Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 48 
Chapter 2 – Governance Behind Energy Bills in Britain: Costs, Prices and Markets ............................. 49 
2.1 - Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 49 
2.2 - Energy Bills in Great Britain ...................................................................................................... 49 
2.2.1 - Makeup of Energy Bills ...................................................................................................... 49 
9 
 
2.2.2 - Comparing Energy Prices in Europe ................................................................................... 51 
2.2.3 - Energy Supply Chains ......................................................................................................... 53 
2.3 - Governance of Costs within the Domestic Energy Bill .............................................................. 56 
2.3.1 – Governance of Supplier Costs and Profits    ...................................................................... 56 
2.3.2 – Governance of Wholesale Costs  ...................................................................................... 60 
2.3.3 – Governance of Network Costs  ......................................................................................... 65 
2.3.4 – Governance of Environmental and Social Policy Costs   ................................................... 70 
2.3.5 – Governance of VAT   .......................................................................................................... 73 
2.4 – Governance of the Energy Retail Market ................................................................................. 74 
2.4.1 – Governance of Tariffs ........................................................................................................ 74 
2.4.2 – Governance of Switching .................................................................................................. 75 
2.4.3 – Governance and Meters ................................................................................................... 77 
2.4.4 – Governance of Price Comparison Websites ...................................................................... 78 
2.4.5 – Governance of Price Announcements .............................................................................. 79 
2.4.6 - Impact of Retail Market Governance on Affordability ...................................................... 81 
2.5 - Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 82 
Chapter 3 - Energy Demand & Energy Efficiency in Great Britain ........................................................ 85 
3.1 - Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 85 
3.2 - Levels of Energy Demand .......................................................................................................... 85 
3.2.1 - Drivers of Demand ............................................................................................................. 85 
3.2.2 – Energy demand over time ................................................................................................. 88 
3.3 – Governance and Established Barriers to Energy Efficiency ..................................................... 90 
3.3.1 - Cost .................................................................................................................................... 90 
3.3.2 - Principal-Agent Problem .................................................................................................... 91 
3.3.3 – Behaviours and Attitudes .................................................................................................. 91 
3.3.4 - Information ........................................................................................................................ 92 
3.4 –  Governance of Energy Efficiency and How Energy Efficiency Has Been Delivered ................ 92 
3.4.1 - The Green Deal – A Failure of Governance ........................................................................ 93 
10 
 
3.4.2 - Energy Company Obligation (ECO) .................................................................................... 99 
3.4.3 - Other Energy Efficiency Policies ....................................................................................... 105 
3.4.4 - Previous Supplier Obligations .......................................................................................... 111 
3.4.5 – Impact of Energy Efficiency Governance on Affordability .............................................. 114 
3.5 - Addressing Fuel Poverty ......................................................................................................... 115 
3.5.1 - Fuel Poverty Strategies .................................................................................................... 115 
3.5.2 – Targeting of Relief to the Fuel Poor ................................................................................ 117 
3.6 – Governance of Income Policies .............................................................................................. 119 
3.6.1 - Winter Fuel Payments ...................................................................................................... 119 
3.6.2 - The Warm Home Discount ............................................................................................... 119 
3.6.3 - Cold Weather Payments .................................................................................................. 120 
3.6.4 - Impact of Governance of Income Policy on Affordability ................................................ 120 
3.7 – Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 122 
Chapter 4 - Methods ........................................................................................................................... 123 
4.1 - Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 123 
4.2 - Literature ................................................................................................................................ 123 
4.3 - Research Questions ................................................................................................................ 123 
4.4 - Data Collection ........................................................................................................................ 124 
4.4.1 - Interviews ........................................................................................................................ 124 
4.4.2 - Identifying Interviewees .................................................................................................. 124 
4.4.3 - Carrying out interviews .................................................................................................... 129 
4.4.4 – Interview Questions ........................................................................................................ 131 
4.5 - Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 132 
4.6 - Methodological Dangers, and Solutions ................................................................................. 134 
4.6.1 - Objectivity ........................................................................................................................ 134 
4.6.2 - Validity and Reliability ..................................................................................................... 134 
4.6.3 - Interviewer Effect ............................................................................................................ 135 
4.6.4 - Reflexivity ......................................................................................................................... 135 
11 
 
4.6.5 - Power ............................................................................................................................... 136 
4.7 - Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................................ 136 
4.7.1 - Informed Consent ............................................................................................................ 136 
4.7.2 - Anonymity ........................................................................................................................ 136 
4.7.3 - Confidentiality .................................................................................................................. 137 
4.7.4 - Researcher Safety ............................................................................................................ 137 
4.7.5 - Boundaries to Research ................................................................................................... 137 
4.8 - Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 138 
Chapter 5 - Results 1: Effects of Governance on Affordability of Energy in Great Britain ................. 139 
5.1 - Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 139 
5.2 – Governance and Pricing, Tariffs, and the Retail Market ........................................................ 139 
5.2.1 – Prices ............................................................................................................................... 139 
5.2.2 – Regressive Charging ........................................................................................................ 141 
5.2.3 – Retail Market Engagement ............................................................................................. 143 
5.2.4 – Cutting The ECO: Politically Motivated ........................................................................... 145 
5.3 – Governance and Energy Efficiency ......................................................................................... 146 
5.3.1 – History of the Housing Stock ........................................................................................... 146 
5.3.2 – Barriers to Energy Efficiency Deployment ...................................................................... 147 
5.3.3 – Suppliers as Poor Executors of Energy Efficiency Policy ................................................. 150 
5.4 – Broader Governance Issues ................................................................................................... 158 
5.4.1 - Institutional Capacity ....................................................................................................... 158 
5.4.2 - Power of non-state actors ............................................................................................... 160 
5.4.3 – The Role of Regulation .................................................................................................... 161 
5.4.4 – Missing from the Governance Structure: Coordinated Representation ......................... 163 
5.5 – Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 166 
Chapter 6 - Results 2: Energy Efficiency in Denmark .......................................................................... 169 
6.1 – Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 169 
6.2 - Context of Energy Policy in Denmark ..................................................................................... 169 
12 
 
6.2.1 - Energy Prices .................................................................................................................... 170 
6.2.2 – Domestic Energy Demand & Energy Efficiency ............................................................... 172 
6.2.3 - Household Income ........................................................................................................... 173 
6.3 - Comparing Affordability .......................................................................................................... 174 
6.4 - History of Danish Energy Policy .............................................................................................. 175 
6.4.1 - The Oil Shocks .................................................................................................................. 175 
6.4.2 - History of the Housing Stock ............................................................................................ 177 
6.5 - Policies Supporting Domestic Energy Efficiency ..................................................................... 178 
6.5.1 - Taxation ........................................................................................................................... 178 
6.5.2 - Building Regulations ........................................................................................................ 179 
6.5.3 - Energy Efficiency Obligation ............................................................................................ 181 
6.5.4 - Information & Coordination ............................................................................................ 186 
6.5.5 – Finance ............................................................................................................................ 187 
6.6 –  Broader Features of Governance .......................................................................................... 189 
6.6.1 - Relationship Between Government and Industry ........................................................... 189 
6.6.2 - Political Consensus ........................................................................................................... 190 
6.6.3 - Developing Expertise ....................................................................................................... 191 
6.7 – Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 193 
Chapter 7 - Discussion: Proposed Solutions for Issues with Governance for Affordability ................ 195 
7.1 – Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 195 
7.2 - Changing the Narrative: ‘Affordability = Low Prices’ vs. ‘Affordability = High Efficiency’ ...... 195 
7.2.1 – Pathway to a New Narrative ........................................................................................... 198 
7.3 - Strong Consumer Representation .......................................................................................... 199 
7.4 - Responsibility for Energy Efficiency: Moving the Obligation to Higher Capacity Institutions 201 
7.4.1 – Local Authorities: Well Placed to Deliver and Facilitate Energy Efficiency ..................... 201 
7.4.2 - Improved Targeting for Fuel Poor Households ................................................................ 202 
7.4.3 - Able-to-pay households ................................................................................................... 203 
7.4.4 – Collaboration and Support .............................................................................................. 203 
13 
 
7.4.5 – Reduced Policy Complexity ............................................................................................. 204 
7.4.6 - Funding ............................................................................................................................ 204 
7.4.7 - Transition ......................................................................................................................... 204 
7.5 – A New Ideology: Ambitious Regulation for Retrofit & New-Build Home Energy Efficiency 
Standards, Backed by Affordable Finance ...................................................................................... 205 
7.6 – More Powerful Demand-Side Interests ................................................................................. 207 
7.7 - Tariffs & Charging: Designed for Affordability ........................................................................ 208 
7.7.1 - Tariff Reform: Rising Block Tariffs .................................................................................... 208 
7.7.2 – Limited Breadth of Tariffs ............................................................................................... 214 
7.7.3 – VAT and Environmental and Social Policy Charges in Energy Bills .................................. 214 
7.8 – Price Comparison Websites ................................................................................................... 215 
7.9 - Expanding Institutional Capacity ............................................................................................ 215 
7.10 - Policy Stability ....................................................................................................................... 216 
7.11 - Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 217 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 221 
8.1 - Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 221 
8.2 - Background to the Research ................................................................................................... 221 
8.3 - Answering the Research Questions ........................................................................................ 222 
1. Are current governance arrangements regarding pricing and tariffs supportive of affordability 
of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? .................................................................. 222 
2. Are current governance arrangements regarding domestic energy-efficiency supportive of 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? ............................................. 225 
3. What lessons may be learned from the Danish system of energy governance which may be 
beneficial to affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? ........................ 227 
4. How might the governance structure in Great Britain be reformed to improve affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers? ................................................................................................ 229 
8.4 - Contributions to Knowledge ................................................................................................... 231 
8.5 - Limitations of Research & Future Areas of Study ................................................................... 231 
8.6 - Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................... 233 
14 
 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................................... 234 
Appendix A - History of the Energy System .................................................................................... 234 
Appendix B – Targeting and Eligibility............................................................................................. 236 
Appendix C - Electricity & Financial Flows - Enlarged ..................................................................... 238 
Appendix D - Gas and Financial Flows - Enlarged ........................................................................... 239 
Appendix E - EDF Energy PPA Paper-trail ........................................................................................ 240 
Appendix F - Green Deal Institutional Arrangements ..................................................................... 241 
Appendix G - Supplier Obligations Timeline ................................................................................... 242 
Appendix H - ECO Target Calculation - Calculating a Supplier's Obligation .................................... 243 
Appendix I - History of Consumer Representation ......................................................................... 244 
Appendix J - Detailed Breakdown of Bill Costs ............................................................................... 246 
Appendix K – Codes for Interviews ................................................................................................. 249 
Reference List .................................................................................................................................. 250 
 
  
15 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1 - Average energy bills 2007-2015, non-E7 domestic consumers (assuming fixed demand), . 25 
Figure 2 - Overlaps Between Income Poverty and Fuel Poverty – Before Price Increase .................... 27 
Figure 3 - Overlaps Between Income Poverty and Fuel Poverty – After Price Increase ....................... 28 
Figure 4 - Low Income High Cost Threshold Diagram ........................................................................... 29 
Figure 5 - Overlap Between Income Poverty and Fuel Poverty Under LIHC Measure.......................... 30 
Figure 6 - Severity of Fuel Poverty in England Over Time by Indicator ................................................ 31 
Figure 7 - Impact of Price Increases on Different Households ............................................................. 32 
Figure 8 - Impact of Improved Energy Efficiency on Levels of Fuel Poverty Under LIHC Definition ..... 33 
Figure 9 - Fuel Poverty as a Nested Phenomenon ................................................................................ 36 
Figure 10 – IGov Understanding of Governance ................................................................................... 41 
Figure 11 - Cost Breakdown by Bill Type ............................................................................................... 50 
Figure 12 - Domestic Electricity Prices for European Household Consumers: Second Half 2015 ........ 53 
Figure 13 - Domestic Gas Prices for European Household Consumers: Second Half 2015 .................. 53 
Figure 14 - Electricity System: Flows of Energy & Money..................................................................... 54 
Figure 15 - Gas System: Flows of Energy & Money .............................................................................. 55 
Figure 16 - Aggregate Profits of Big 6 Energy Companies..................................................................... 57 
Figure 17 - Generation Profits in £Million by Supplier ......................................................................... 58 
Figure 18 - Domestic Supply Profits in £Million By Supplier ................................................................. 59 
Figure 19 - Electricity Transmission (Left) and Distribution Network (Right) Ownership ..................... 66 
Figure 20 - Gas Transmission (Left) and Distribution Network (Right) Ownership............................... 67 
Figure 21 - Gas and Electricity SVT Price Change Announcements: January 2004 - January 2014 ...... 80 
Figure 22 - EPC Distribution of English Housing Stock .......................................................................... 87 
Figure 23 - Total GB Final Domestic Energy Demand 1970-2014 ......................................................... 89 
Figure 24 - Distribution of GB Domestic Gas and Electricity Consumption with Typical Consumption 
Values (2014) ........................................................................................................................................ 90 
Figure 25 - Green Deal Institutional Arrangements .............................................................................. 95 
Figure 26 - Impact of a Green Deal Loan on an Average Energy Bill for Properties with Viable 
Packages of Measures at an 8% interest rate over 20 years ................................................................ 96 
Figure 27 - Total Progress Towards ECO2 Obligations (Surplus, Approved, and Notified) in November 
2016 .................................................................................................................................................... 103 
Figure 28 - Delivery Rates of Key Insulation Measures ....................................................................... 104 
Figure 29 - GB Interviews by Category ................................................................................................ 129 
Figure 30 - Denmark Interviews by Category...................................................................................... 129 
16 
 
Figure 31 - Timeline of Announcements Regarding Cuts to the ECO ................................................. 154 
Figure 32 - Domestic Electricity Prices for European Household Consumers in Second Half 2015 ... 171 
Figure 33 - Domestic Gas Prices for European Household Consumers in Second Half 2015 ............. 172 
Figure 34 - Average U-Values of Walls, Roofs, Floors & Windows ..................................................... 173 
Figure 35 - Comparison of Housing Stocks in Britain & Denmark ....................................................... 178 
Figure 36 - Building Regulations: Energy Consumption in New Buildings in Denmark ...................... 179 
Figure 37 - Energy Consumption in Dwellings in 2011 by Construction Period in Denmark .............. 181 
Figure 38 - Development in the Danish Energy Efficiency Obligations Target ................................... 182 
Figure 39 – Three-Tier Rising Block Tariffs .......................................................................................... 209 
Figure 40 - Three-Tier Rising Block Tariff with Zero-Rated Block 1..................................................... 210 
Figure 41 - Two-Tier Rising Block Tariff with Zero-Rated Block 1 ....................................................... 210 
Figure 42 - Relationship between new narrative and other proposed solutions ............................... 219 
 
  
17 
 
Acronyms 
ACE - Association for the Conservation of Energy 
BEIS – Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BIS - Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
BSUoS - Balancing System Use of System (charge) 
CAB - Citizen's Advice Bureau 
Capex - Capital Expenditure 
CCC - Committee on Climate Change 
CERO - Carbon Emissions Reduction Obligation 
CERT - Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
CEPC - Climate and Energy Policy Committee 
CESP - Community Energy Saving Programme 
CfD – Contract for Difference 
CHP - Combined Heat and Power 
CMA - Competition and Markets Authority 
CME – Coordinated Market Economy 
CSCO - Carbon Saving Communities Obligation 
CSE - Centre for Sustainable Energy 
CSS - Consolidated Segmental Statement 
DCLG - Department for Communities and Local Government 
DECC - Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DERA - Danish Energy Regulatory Authority 
DNO - Distribution Network Operator 
18 
 
DWP – Department for Work and Pensions 
ECA - Energy Consumers Australia 
ECO - Energy Company Obligation 
EEC - Energy Efficiency Commitment 
EESoP - Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance 
EII – Energy Intensive Industry 
EPC - Energy Performance Certificate 
EU - European Union 
FiT - Feed in Tariff 
FPAG - Fuel Poverty Advisory Group 
GB - Great Britain 
GDHIF - Green Deal Home Improvement Fund 
GEMA - Gas and Electricity Markets Authority 
GIB - Green Investment Bank 
GoO - Guarantee of Origin 
HEEPS - Home Energy Efficiency Programs for Scotland 
HHCRO - Home Heating Cost Reduction Obligation 
IHD – In Home Display 
IMD - Index of Multiple Deprivation 
IQI - Information Quality Incentive 
KfW - Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Banking Group) 
kWh - Kilowatt-hour 
LA - Local Authority 
19 
 
LCF - Levy Control Framework 
LIHC - Low Income High Cost 
LME – Liberal Market Economy 
LSOA - Lower Layer Super Output Area 
NEA - National Energy Action 
OFGEM - Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
Opex - Operating Expenditure 
OTC - Over The Counter 
PCW - Price Comparison Website 
PPA - Power Purchase Agreement 
PPM - Prepayment Meter 
RBT - Rising Block Tariff 
REC - Regional Electricity Company 
REGO – Renewable Electricity Guarantee of Origin 
REV – Reforming the Energy Vision 
RIIO - Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs 
RMR - Retail Market Review 
RO - Renewable Obligation 
ROC - Renewable Obligation Certificate 
ROCE - Return on Capital Employed 
RPI - Retail Price Index 
RUCO - Residential Utility Consumer Office 
SAP - Standard Assessment Procedure 
20 
 
SC - Standard Credit 
SO - System Operator 
SVT - Standard Variable Tariff 
TDCV – Typical Domestic Consumption Volume 
TER - Target Emission Rate 
TFEE - Target Fabric Energy Efficiency 
TNUoS - Transmission Network Use of System Charge 
Totex - Total Expenditure 
VI - Vertically Integrated 
VoLL - Value of Lost Load 
WACC - Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
WHD - Warm Home Discount 
  
21 
 
Acknowledgements  
Although there is only one name on the cover, this thesis would not have come into being without 
the help and support of a vast number of people. 
Firstly, I must thank the University of Exeter and EPSRC respectively for funding this PhD, and the 
IGov project to which it was attached. 
I am enormously indebted to all the people that so generously took time out of their busy lives to 
answer my questions - I have learned so much from you all. 
I will be forever incredibly grateful to my supervisors Catherine Mitchell and Matthew Lockwood, 
without whose sage council, this thesis would never have been written. I also cannot overstate how 
much I owe to Bridget Woodman, Caroline Kuzemko and Richard Hoggett for the immense amount 
of support and guidance they all provided during the process.  
To Jess Britton, Richard Lowes, Shane Fudge, Oscar Fitch-Roy, Heinke Thies, Nicola Hole, Iain Soutar 
and Joe Dutton - I say thank you for all the conversation, laughter, wisdom, cake, and office-ball-
games – I am so lucky to have done something so challenging alongside such fantastic friends. Lena 
Kitzing and Jonas Katz - you welcomed me into your home, showed me a fantastic city, and made 
what would have otherwise been an intimidating part of my work, incredibly enjoyable. 
Julia and Clive Steward – you have both always believed in me, and always been there – I would not 
have even begun this thesis, let alone finished it, without what you have given me. I must also thank 
the countless other wonderful family and friends, who provided such welcome relief from work but 
also understood whenever I had to stay at home with my laptop.  
Finally - Lucy, your love, support and relentless belief in me made this all possible.  
Quite simply, I couldn’t have done it without you.  
 
22 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction: The Context of Governance and Affordability of 
Energy for Domestic Consumers in Great Britain 
 
1.1 - Introduction 
This thesis examines the impact of demand-side governance on affordability of energy for domestic 
consumers in Great Britain. In Great Britain, affordability of energy for domestic consumers is both a 
social and political issue. Energy bills have maintained an upwards trend from 2007 to the time of 
writing in 2016 (BEIS, 2016c), and the impact that this has had on the population has pushed energy 
up the political agenda (Lockwood, 2016), as well as leaving millions of households struggling to pay 
for adequate warmth (DECC, 2014a). Governance is broadly defined as the ‘Rules of the game, and 
who is allowed to play’ (for discussion of the term ‘governance’, see section 1.5), and is of particular 
interest because the governance of an energy system has a significant impact on outcomes and 
practices, including levels of affordability for domestic consumers (Lockwood et al., 2013). This thesis 
takes a demand-side approach to understanding governance, taking a bottom-up approach based on 
the costs which face consumers, with particular focus on the factors which affect the levels of 
demand of domestic energy consumers.  
This opening chapter examines the existing literature relating to affordability of energy and fuel 
poverty to situate the research in the literature. The governance literature is then reviewed, and 
explanations for what 'affordability' and 'governance' can each be taken to mean in the context of 
this thesis. The research questions are then set out, and an overview of the thesis is given. This 
thesis was undertaken as part of the University of Exeter IGov Project (Innovation and Governance 
for a Sustainable Economy) between October 2012 and November 2016, with the majority of 
primary research carried out in 2014 and early 2015 – for this reason there is limited consideration 
of events from June 2016 onwards. 
1.2 - Thesis in Context 
Energy policy is commonly framed as the pursuit of three, often conflicting goals - sustainability, 
energy security, and affordability (DECC, 2014e). It is the third of these which is the focus of this 
thesis, however it is written in the context of a need to pursue the other two. In terms of 
sustainability, the UK has legally-binding targets to reduce CO2 output by 34% by 2020, and 80% by 
2050, compared to 1990 levels (HMG, 2008). The UK also has legally-binding targets to source 15% 
of all energy from renewables by 2020 (European Commission, 2009), and to reduce primary energy 
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demand by 18% compared to a 2007 business-as-usual projection, also by 2020 (DECC, 2014o). 
Energy security has less clearly defined goals, although in recent years 'ensuring the light's don't go 
out' has often become political shorthand for the pressures of energy security (DECC, 2014h). The 
priority of the three aspects of the trilemma shifts over time, with a significant focus on 
sustainability in the early 2000s: ‘The Energy Review last year spelt out the big challenges we face: 
the need to work with other countries to tackle climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions, 
and the need to ensure we have secure energy supplies’ (DTI, 2007, p.4). This gave way to a greater 
focus on energy security in the 2010s: 'Delivering energy security is the number one priority for 
DECC' (DECC, 2016a, p.8). Any policies put in place to support one aspect of the trilemma operate in 
the context of the other two objectives however. For example, the building of new coal-fired power 
stations might help to improve energy security, but would be highly damaging to the environment, 
and so would be likely to be considered unviable.  
There are some technical solutions which support all aspect of the trilemma. For example, as will be 
set out throughout this thesis, increased energy efficiency standards can improve affordability of 
energy through reducing the amount of energy that consumers need (Boardman, 2009). However 
energy efficiency can also support sustainability through reductions in emissions (Pett, 2009; Ürge-
Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero, 2012; Cullen and Allwood, 2010; DECC, 2012b; IEA, 2012) owing both to 
a reduced need for combustion of fossil fuels for energy, and a reduced need to construct additional 
generation and network infrastructure - which can be a carbon intensive and environmentally 
damaging processes (Varun et al., 2009). Energy efficiency also has benefits for energy security such 
as reduced dependence on imported fossil fuels (DECC, 2012b; OCN and ECOFYS, 2014; IEA, 2012), 
and reductions in peak electricity demand, so reducing risk of black-outs or brown-outs (Boardman, 
2014; Hoggett et al., 2013). 
1.3 - Why Does Affordability of Energy Matter in Great Britain? 
Affordability of energy is important for separate, but over-lapping reasons. Firstly it has important 
political impacts - as energy prices continue to rise, energy is repeatedly highlighted as one of the 
biggest financial concerns for households (uSwitch, 2013; YouGov, 2015; DECC, 2014f), leading 
affordability of energy to become an increasingly political issue (Lockwood, 2016). Energy bills have 
also been identified by the Conservative think tank Policy Exchange as an issue of importance for 
those households which are ‘just about managing’, whom it is suggested may prove to be an 
important target for electoral success (Policy Exchange, 2015). 
Affordability also has important implications for design of the energy system  – a system focussed on 
minimising long-term costs, both through micro-scale features such as efficient network revenue 
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regulation which keep costs down on a year-by-year basis, and macro-scale aspects such as through 
the development of a low-demand, highly flexible energy system which has the potential to bring 
costs down in the long term (Sanders et al., 2016), is likely to differ from one which in which 
affordability is less of a focus, or only a focus over the short term. 
 Affordability of energy also has important social implications, stemming from the fact that the 
impact of rising energy bills is felt particularly strongly by those on low incomes and in inefficient 
homes – the fuel poor. In spite of it being twenty-five years since Brenda Boardman published her 
first book defining the issue of fuel poverty (Boardman, 1991), millions of households in Great Britain 
today still cannot afford adequate amounts of energy. This is significant because being able to afford 
access to basic levels of energy services such as warmth and light is essential for maintaining physical 
and mental health (Harrington et al., 2005; Stockton and Campbell, 2011). Older households are 
particularly at risk of the effects of a cold home, with increased risk of heart attack, strokes, 
respiratory problems, depression, worsening arthritis, and increased accidents such as falls (AgeUK, 
2015). The recommended indoor temperatures for maintaining a healthy living environment is 21°C 
in the living room and 18°C in the other occupied rooms (World Health Organisation, 2007; DECC, 
2015a). The effects of unaffordable energy are felt particularly acutely by those on low incomes, as 
these testaments from interviews by Anderson et al. (2010) demonstrate: 
“It's hard at the moment because I'm on just a small budget and I find that we're having to 
sit in the cold because if the money runs out on the meter, you haven't got any more money 
to put on it.”  
    (Lucy, not working, single, living with 12-year-old granddaughter) 
"…If we know we've got a bill coming up, then we know that we can't get extra food or 
something. So, we sort of chop down the food bill.” 
         (Colin, retired couple) 
“…It's not very nice when you're having to worry about money all the time. You know, everyone 
wants to be warm, don't they? But it's just what you have to do. If you haven't got the money, you 
can't, can you?”  
(Emily, young single mother, not working, living with her son) 
 
In spite of some small  price cuts in 2015 (see Figure 1), the general trend of energy retail prices over 
the past decade has been of significant increases - 30% for the average gas consumer, and 16% for 
the average electricity consumer since 2007 (Dempsey et al., 2016). During this time, average 
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household income fell between 2007 and 2012, and only recovered to 2012 levels in 2016 (ONS, 
2016). Although there are significant issues with measuring affordability (discussed below), the 
closest government figures to measurement of affordability (those of fuel poverty) showed that in 
2013, the most recent year where aggregate figures for Great Britain are available, approximately 
4.2 million households in Great Britain had to spend more than 10% of their income to maintain a 
healthy living environment (DECC, 2015a). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Average energy bills 2007-2015, non-E7 domestic consumers (assuming fixed demand),  
Source: BEIS, 2016c 
If energy prices continue to follow this upward trend, issues of affordability (and associated welfare 
impacts) will continue to worsen. This is unless significant changes can be made to the energy 
system to protect and improve affordability of energy for domestic consumers. This thesis sets out 
to establish what those changes should be, specifically in relation to the governance structure of the 
energy system. 
1.4 - What is 'Affordable'? 
Defining affordability presents a challenge for academics and policy-makers because what might be 
considered 'affordable' can be seen as subjective (Owen, 2010), and normative (Feitelson and 
Chenoweth, 2002; Niëns and Brouwer, 2013) - attitudes vary among different consumer groups as to 
what may be considered 'affordable' (Palmer et al., 2008). This can lead to use of vague framings for 
affordability such as 'reasonable prices for all users... [with] ...provision of services for those who 
cannot afford it under normal market conditions' (Bartl, 2010: 227). Such definitions are difficult to 
apply however because they give no explanation of what is considered 'reasonable', what ‘normal 
market conditions’ are, or what level of service should be provided to those who cannot otherwise 
afford it.  
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1.4.1 - Measuring Affordability 
Many scholars attempt to address issues of definition by creating quantitative metrics of 
affordability. Some use a ratio of expenditure on energy against disposable income (He, Xia, Liu, 
Zhou & Zhou, 2013, Winkler et al., 2011). This however frames energy as a non-staple item. Other 
scholars make use of expenditure on energy as a proportion of total income (Niëns and Brouwer, 
2013; Gan and Hill, 2009; Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007; European Bank, 2003; Hancock, 1993), this 
appropriately assesses energy as an item which must be purchased but household income data 
rarely capture all sources of household income (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007). This is why Fankhauser 
& Tepic (2007) suggest that using expenditure on energy as a proportion of total expenditure, rather 
than income, gives a more accurate picture. However, any measure based on actual expenditure risk 
underestimating issues of affordability as they will not capture instances of late or non-payment 
(Fankhauser et al., 2008), and also fail to capture where households may be under-heating their 
homes - something which is common in Great Britain (CSE, 2011). As living in a cold home is 
associated with significant health risks such as physical and mental ill-health (Harrington et al., 2005; 
Stockton and Campbell, 2011), any metric of affordability which does not capture those that under-
heat their home, fails to take account of some of households that suffer most from being unable to 
afford their energy bills (See Box 1). This is why measures of fuel poverty are based on necessary, 
rather than actual expenditure (see below). 
Measurement of affordability is of interest to policy-makers because it allows them to track levels of 
affordability over time. This allows them to ensure the needs of consumers are being met, and to 
measure the efficacy of policy measures. Measurement of affordability is also necessary for effective 
targeting of policy measures, in order to identify those who face the biggest financial challenge in 
meeting their energy needs. In Great Britain, this group of consumers are known as the 'fuel poor'.  
Box 1 - Comparison of two households with differing heating regimes 
Household 1      Household 2 
Heats home to 21°C    Heats home to 14°C 
Income: £600 per month   Income: £600 per month 
Expenditure on Energy £50 per month  Expenditure on Energy £50 per month 
 
Spends 8.3% of Income on energy  Spends 8.3% of Income on energy 
& has a healthy heating regime   & faces significant health risks 
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1.4.2 –Measuring Fuel Poverty 
Beyond monitoring of average bill levels, the government in Great Britain does not measure general 
affordability of energy. It does however monitor levels of fuel poverty but the metric used to identify 
them has changed over time. The measurements resemble the measures of affordability set out 
above, but also include thresholds, below-which households are considered fuel poor. 
1.4.2.1 – Fuel Poverty: The 10% Measure 
Boardman (1991, 2009) gives a detailed account of the history of fuel poverty, explaining how it was 
first identified as an area of public concern following the oil shocks of the 1970s. However a 
succession of British governments considered fuel poverty as indistinct from general poverty (often 
called income poverty), arguing that an inability to afford energy is no different from an inability to 
afford food or clothing (Boardman, 1991). Although it is true that general poverty and fuel poverty 
are related, they are not equivalent to one another. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the overlap between 
households facing fuel poverty (based on those needing to 10%  or more of their income in order to 
maintain a healthy living environment), and households facing income poverty (generally recognised 
as having an income below 60% of the median) (Palmer et al., 2008). Box 2 gives a written 
explanation of the differences in the effects of income poverty and fuel poverty on a household. 
 
Figure 2 - Overlaps Between Income Poverty and Fuel Poverty – Before Price Increase, Source: Palmer et al., 2008 
 
If energy price rises outstrip wage increases, the diagram will shift, meaning that although the 
number of households in income poverty will not change, the number of households in fuel poverty 
will increase. 
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Figure 3 - Overlaps Between Income Poverty and Fuel Poverty – After Price Increase, Source: Palmer et al., 2008 
 
Box 2 – Explanation: Why is Fuel Poverty Distinct From General Poverty? 
Fuel poverty is unique, and distinct from general poverty, as this example demonstrates.  
 
In a universe where people buy and use only what they need: 
 
If you are well off, and the price of bread goes up, it is inconvenient but you have many 
options. You may be able to get cheaper bread by shopping around. Alternatively, you can 
substitute bread in your diet for potatoes, rice or pasta, or you can simply accept that prices 
have increased and pay more. 
 
If you are on a low income, and bread prices increase, it is inconvenient but you have a few 
options. You may be able to get cheaper bread by shopping around. Alternatively, you can 
substitute bread in your diet for potatoes, rice or pasta. 
 
However, energy is different…  
 
If you are well off, and the price of energy goes up, it is inconvenient but you have many 
options. You may be able to get a cheaper tariff by shopping around. Alternatively, you can 
invest in a range of energy efficiency measures such as a more efficient boiler, loft insulation, 
cavity wall insulation, energy efficient light bulbs, double glazing etc. Finally, you can simply 
accept that prices have increased, and pay more.  
 
If you are on a low income, and the price of energy goes up, you may have a few options.  
You are less likely than your well-off counterparts to know how (or indeed that you can) shop 
around for a cheaper energy tariff (Anderson et al., 2010). You may also not have access to the 
cheapest deals in the market either because you do not have access to the internet or because 
the type of meter you have prohibits you from accessing the cheapest deals (TNS and OFGEM, 
2015). Being on a low income, you are unlikely to have sufficient income, or savings, to pay for 
energy efficiency measures (Boardman, 2009), and if in rental accommodation you are unlikely 
to have the option to improve the buildings’ fabric (Golubchikov and Deda, 2012). Being on low 
income, you will also be unable to simply accept prices have increased and pay more. With 
energy there is almost no substitute like swapping bread for potatoes. The only option that is 
clearly at your disposal is to consume less energy - it's as if in response to the price of bread 
going up, your only clear option was to eat fewer meals. 
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The framing of fuel poverty as equivalent to income poverty continued until Labour came to power 
in 1997, and policy work on quantifying and addressing fuel poverty as a distinct issue began. The 
first official definition of fuel poverty was put in place in the early 2000s, based on the work of 
Boardman (1991). The definition relied on calculating the number of households that needed to 
spend 10% or more of their income to maintain a healthy living environment, including a minimum 
healthy heating regime. The new focus on levels of fuel poverty led to the creation of the Warm 
Homes and Energy Conservation Act (HMG, 2000b), and later the first fuel poverty strategy (see 
chapter 3).  
1.4.2.2 - Fuel Poverty: The ‘Low-Income, High-Cost’ Measure (LIHC) 
A review of the 10% measure was commissioned in 2011 by the Coalition government (Hills, 2011). 
This led to the replacement of the 10% measure in England (although not in the devolved 
administrations) in 2013 with the Low Income High Cost (LIHC) measure, devised by Hills (2012). The 
new measure defines those in fuel poverty as households with earnings (after housing costs) that 
put them below the poverty line (set at 60% of median income), with an above-median required 
expenditure on energy in order to maintain a healthy living environment. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Low Income High Cost Threshold Diagram, Source: DECC, 2013b 
Figure 4 shows a diagrammatic representation of the LIHC measure of fuel poverty. The vertical axis 
represents modelled necessary cost of energy based on achieving a healthy heating regime. This 
Increasing 
Energy Costs 
Increasing 
Income 
Fuel Poor 
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takes into account the size and efficiency of properties, the number of people in the household, and 
the cost of energy. The households facing higher costs are at the bottom of the diagram, and the 
households facing lower costs are at the top. The threshold is set at the median required cost of 
energy.  
The horizontal axis reflects the income of households, with higher incomes on the right-hand side 
and lower incomes on the left. An after-housing costs figure is used, and the threshold is set in line 
with the measure of income poverty; which is 60% of the median income. The cost of the energy bill 
is added, so its effects are not double-counted. 
This means that the bottom left quadrant represents the combination of those with above average 
costs who are also deemed to be in income poverty, which together under this definition qualify 
them as fuel poor. Put simply this means that households are considered fuel poor if: 
• They have required fuel costs that are above average (the national median level).  
• Were they to spend that amount, they would be left with a residual income below the 
official poverty line. 
(DECC and BRE, 2016) 
This has the effect of making income poverty a prerequisite to fuel poverty (See Figure 5), which 
differs from the 10% measure (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
 
Figure 5 - Overlap Between Income Poverty and Fuel Poverty Under LIHC Measure, Source: Author’s Own 
The thick red arrow on Figure 4 represents the fuel poverty gap. This represents the distance below 
the fuel poverty threshold that a household exists, and is equivalent to how far the household’s 
energy bill would have to fall for it to move out of fuel poverty. This means that a household with a 
fuel poverty gap of £3 only just qualifies as fuel poor, whereas a household with a fuel poverty gap 
of £300 is deep in fuel poverty. The fuel poverty gap can be reported as an average figure, or as a 
total figure, alongside the number of households in fuel poverty. This gives an indication of the 
severity of fuel poverty that households are facing – i.e. if there are many households facing a small 
fuel poverty gap, or a small number of households which are deep in the depths of fuel poverty. 
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Both the 10% measures, and the LIHC measure use necessary expenditure to achieve a healthy living 
environment, rather than actual expenditure, and so avoid the issues faced by the above-explored 
quantitative measures of affordability which rely on actual expenditure, such as missing under-
heated homes. 
The LIHC definition is not without its shortcomings however. This measure makes the headline 
figure, the proportion of the population that is fuel poor, far less responsive to changes in energy 
prices than the previous 10% measure (see Figure 6). This is because of its relative nature and may 
be considered counter-intuitive given 'Sharp price rises exacerbate budgeting difficulties for all 
consumers, particularly for low-income families, where fuel is already a large proportion of 
expenditure' (Boardman, 1991, p.20). Although rising prices do affect the majority of households, it 
falls most heavily on those on low incomes - between 2002 and 2012, spending on energy by those 
in the richest quintile increased from 2%-3% of their disposable income, whereas for those in the 
poorest quintile, the increase was from 8% to 11% over the same period (ONS, 2014). It is counter-
intuitive therefore to suggest that significant price rises will have such a limited effect on the 
reported number of households that face difficulty meeting their energy needs. 
 
Figure 6 - Severity of Fuel Poverty in England Over Time by Indicator, Source: Based on figures from DECC, 2014a 
In addition to a lack of responsiveness, the impact of price rises can have other counterintuitive 
outcomes under LIHC. It would be possible, under a universal price increase, for a number of high-
income households to move into fuel poverty, but without any low-income households moving into 
fuel poverty. This is because although fuel costs affect both the vertical, and horizontal position of a 
household on the axis, a households’ vertical position is based on a relative measure (median 
necessary expenditure). This means that under a universal price rise, all households spending will 
increase by the same rate – keeping their relative vertical axis position fixed. However, the 
horizontal position is based on the combination of a relative measure (60% of the median income) 
and an absolute measure (the impact of energy costs on that household’s income). This means that a 
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price increase can move a household from having an above 60% of median income, to below. This is 
set out in Figure 7, which shows the possible impact of a price increase on a ‘Low-Income Low-Cost’ 
household and a ‘High-Income High-Cost’ household. A metric which depicts an energy price rise 
leading to a high-income household moving into fuel poverty, but the same price rise not moving a 
low-income household any closer to fuel poverty is highly counterintuitive. 
 
Figure 7 - Impact of Price Increases on Different Households, Source: Author's Own 
The new measure does however bring some benefit in the form of the 'depth' measurement, which 
gives some perspective of how severe the situation is for those that are facing fuel poverty. This 
arguably gives a more nuanced picture than the simple ‘in/out’ of the 10% measure. The depth 
measure does change with increasing prices (See Figure 6), however, both the fuel poverty gap, and 
the definition for fuel poverty are significantly less straight forward to communicate and therefore 
risk making levels of fuel poverty less transparent (Preston et al., 2014), making them harder to 
communicate to policy-makers and the public.  
A number of reasons were given for this change in measurement from using the 10% measure to the 
LIHC, that the 10% measure was over-sensitive to changes in price, risked labelling those on high 
incomes with particularly large old properties as fuel poor, and gave no incentive to improve the 
situations of those whose lives could be made better, even if they could not be easily lifted out of 
fuel poverty (Hills, 2011). The introduction of the new measure also had political implications. Firstly 
its introduction in 2013 had the effect of instantly reducing the most up to date figure for the 
number of households considered in fuel poverty at the time by approximately 800,0001 (DECC, 
2013b) which improved the appearance of fuel poverty figures. Additionally, as the change of metric 
made the headline number of fuel poor households considerably less sensitive to price changes, it is 
                                                          
1 This refers to the 2011 value, because fuel poverty figures are published two years in arrears.  
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therefore unlikely to change dramatically from year to year. This may serve to reduce political 
pressure on the government to address the issue – even in the face of rising prices.  
The new measure was accompanied by a removal of the 2016 target to eradicate fuel poverty (HMG, 
2013c), which was later replaced by a 2030 target based on improving energy efficiency for fuel poor 
homes, and there are a number of possible reasons this. For example, the high levels of fuel poverty 
in the lead-up to 2016 made eradication highly unlikely (in 2013, over two million households were 
in fuel poverty in England, over four million households across the whole of Great Britain (DECC, 
2015a)). 
Additionally, the relative nature of the new measure makes fuel poverty under the new definition 
practically impossible to eradicate (CSE, 2012), meaning that an eradication target would no longer 
be viable. This is because the LIHC definition of fuel poverty is related to the average cost of energy, 
meaning that for fuel poverty to be eradicated, every household in poverty would have to have 
below-average energy costs. This is particularly challenging to achieve because any bill reductions, 
either through improved energy efficiency or energy bills discounts, would cause a shift in the 
median bill level, which could move other households into the fuel poverty quadrant even if these 
reductions were perfectly targeted at fuel poor households (See Figure 8 for a depiction of changing 
axis following deployment of targeted energy efficiency measures, perfectly targeted at LIHC 
households). Increasing the incomes of fuel poor households would have a similar effect along the X-
axis, pulling other households into income poverty. It is not clear if the 2016 target was removed 
because the design of the new definition made eradication impossible, or if the new target was 
designed to make eradication impossible so that the removal of the 2016 target could be justified. 
However, the political benefit to policymakers of the day should not be overlooked. 
 
Figure 8 - Impact of Improved Energy Efficiency on Levels of Fuel Poverty Under LIHC Definition, Source: Author’s Own 
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It is worth noting that neither measure of fuel poverty takes account of specific tariffs in their 
modelling, relying instead on average prices by payment type (DECC and BRE, 2016). The range of 
tariffs available in the retail market is significant - at the time of writing the difference between the 
cheapest and most expensive tariff in the market was in excess of £400 at typical consumption levels 
(uSwitch, 2016), this is likely to lead to a distorted picture of fuel poverty – depicting the 
circumstances of those on the cheapest tariffs as worse than they are in reality, and those on the 
most expensive tariffs as better than they are.  
This thesis will not seek to define a new method of quantifying fuel poverty, and will therefore 
where necessary make use of published figures, but will generally take a broad view of fuel poverty 
as 'a social problem that affects the poor, with its roots in the quality of the housing stock and the 
cost of fuel' (Boardman, 2009, p.1). 
 1.4.3 - Affordability in this thesis 
The common themes that emerge from the above analysis of affordability of energy show that it 
principally is the product of three factors - level of household income, the level of energy bill, and 
the amount of energy that a household needs to maintain a healthy lifestyle. The relationship 
between income and energy policy is complex; policies to improve income are generally connected 
with macro-economic or social welfare policy - such as levels of taxation or income support. This 
means that although income forms an essential part of the context to understanding affordability of 
energy, the policies which affect income generally lie outside energy policy, and therefore beyond 
the boundaries of this thesis. The exception to this is where income is increased for the express 
purpose of supporting the purchase of energy - such as in the winter fuel payment (discussed in 
chapter three). 
Energy bills are the combination of prices (driven by various policies and practices in the energy 
supply chain) – see chapter two, and the amount of energy that a household consumes – see 
chapter three. The energy tariff mediates the relationship between energy prices, and a household’s 
energy demand – commonly expressed as a price per unit of energy consumed – see chapter two. As 
will be set out in this thesis, each of these features of the energy bill are heavily influenced by the 
governance structure in place in the energy system. 
The amount of energy a household needs to live healthily is affected by a number of drivers such as 
day-to-day behaviours (e.g. wearing additional layers of clothing, turning off lights when leaving a 
room etc.), number of household occupants, climatic conditions, property size, social trends, and 
domestic energy efficiency standards (Yohanis et al., 2008). The last among these, domestic energy 
efficiency, is one of the main factors which are most relevant to discussions of affordability, and in 
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reference to energy policy. It is important to note that although there is a close relationship between 
energy need, and actual energy demand (a driver of the energy bill), they are not necessarily equal - 
such as when households under-heat their homes.  
Therefore, affordability of energy is considered to be a product of three interrelated factors - level of 
household income, level of energy bills (which are a product of unit prices and levels of energy 
demand, mediated by tariffs) and the amount of energy that a household needs to live healthily. 
However, the factors of affordability of energy which are most relevant to energy policy in this thesis 
are energy bills, and energy efficiency, both considered in the context of household income. This 
thesis will examine the impact of governance on each of these drivers, as summarised below in Table 
1. 
Table 1 – Impact of governance on drivers of affordability focussed on in this thesis 
Impact of governance on: Investigated in this Thesis? 
Prices ✓ 
Tariffs ✓ 
Income ✓ / ✕ 
[Context, not central consideration] 
Energy Efficiency ✓ 
Social Trends ✕ 
Day-to-day behaviours ✕ 
Climate ✕ 
Household Size ✕ 
1.4.4 - Affordability vs. Fuel Poverty 
It is important to note that although issues of fuel poverty overlap considerably with issues of 
affordability, they are not equivalent to one another. Just as the fuel poor are a subset of the whole 
population, this thesis understands fuel poverty as being conceptually nested within affordability 
(See Figure 9), but affordability is a much larger concept. This is because factors affecting general 
affordability pertain to the whole population, whereas factors affecting fuel poverty relate 
specifically to the fuel poor.  
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Figure 9 - Fuel Poverty as a Nested Phenomenon, Source: Author's Own 
The difference between fuel poverty and general affordability lies in who is affected, and the wider 
implications this has. For example, if energy prices increase, this affects the whole population – 
including the fuel poor, therefore it worsens both fuel poverty and affordability. Crucially also, 
because a rise in energy prices affects the whole population, not just a smaller (possibly politically 
less engaged (JRF, 2015; Weeks, 2013; IPPR, 2013a)) subgroup, the political implications are different 
– it is likely to lead energy bills to become more politically salient (Lockwood, 2016). If energy bills 
are high because the system structure does not minimise costs and demand, this is an affordability 
issue. However, if cuts are made to energy policies designed to support the most vulnerable, or if 
policies are designed that exclude poor or vulnerable consumers, this affects fuel poverty. There are 
inevitable areas of overlap between fuel poverty and affordability, however it is important to make 
the distinction between the two because the governance issues and solutions pertaining to general 
affordability may differ from those relating specifically to the fuel poor.  
1.5 - The role of Governance 
There are numerous factors which affect affordability of energy for domestic consumers, however, 
there is little in the literature which examines the overall impact that the governance structure has 
on affordability of energy for domestic consumers. The closest work is that of Boardman (2009) who 
sets out some of the core governance challenges to addressing fuel poverty – noting that there is no 
single institution or government department with the explicit obligation to ensure fuel poverty 
targets are met, and that the targets themselves are weakly defined – with no clarity over the term 
‘reasonably practicable’ which is fundamental to assessing if the fuel poverty target has been met. 
Boardman (2009) also identifies the cross-departmental nature of the causes of fuel poverty 
affecting both housing, and energy, and health, and that this can create a barrier to progress.  
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This thesis aims to address the significant gap in the literature joining affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers and the governance of the energy sector. To do this effectively, the term 
'governance' should be explored, and what it means for this thesis set out. 
1.5.1 - Governance as Government 
Formerly, governance was considered to be limited to the actions of government, and so analysis of 
governance in the literature was focused on governmental institutions at all levels. Sovacool (2011) 
shows this approach to consider government as a 'nested hierarchy' whereby international and 
national governments exist above regional or state governments, which in turn exist above city-level 
governments. However, governance is now increasingly understood to reach beyond forms of top-
down control had by government (Folke et al., 2005) to other institutions (Smith, 2007), meaning the 
understanding of 'government as governance'  has largely been replaced by a broader understanding 
(Florini and Sovacool, 2009).  
This shift is in large part owed to the increasing importance of the international environment, and 
the 'arguably diminished capacity of those governments to insulate their economies and societies 
from the global pressures' (Peters and Pierre, 1998, p.223). The effects of the international 
environment are in of themselves of course not a new development, and do not necessarily lie 
outside traditional understandings of governance (for example through the influence of the 
European Union). However the increasing impact of less formal lines of influence, such as 
international capital markets, trans-national companies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
civil society, and new communications media, may be said to have an erosive effect on a 
government's exclusive control over its national territory (Hirst et al., 2009). This has progressed to 
the point where some institutions, such as large multi-national corporations, may be suggested to 
have become even more powerful than state actors (Newell, 2006), however governments still 
remain key actors in any governance structure (Newell, 2006). 
1.5.2 - Institutions 
Institutions are another widely-discussed factor of governance, however there is much variation in 
how exactly they are defined. Some scholars consider institutions to be individual actors (Kern, 2011; 
Bernstein, 2005; Meadowcroft, 2011, 2007) or collaborating groups of actors (Biermann et al., 2012; 
Florini and Sovacool, 2009). Networks formed by institutions can be formal, or informal temporary 
collaborations or sharing of resources between actors working towards a common goal (Loorbach, 
2010). These networks often span sectors and scales, and work to influence the creation, 
implementation, and monitoring of policy (Koliba et al., 2011).  
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Institutional capacity can have a significant impact on outcomes of a governance system -  transition 
to a more efficient, lower carbon energy system cannot take place without having the appropriate 
institutions in place, who are both supportive of transition, and who have the right 
capacities/resources (Varone and Aebischer, 2001; Golubchikov and Deda, 2012; Grubb et al., 1991; 
Lockwood, 2013; Kuzemko et al., 2016), and operate at the appropriate level to support their goals 
(i.e. international, national, regional or local) (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2013; DECC, 2014c; Grubb et al., 
1991). Wilson, Chryssochoidis and Pettifor (2013) highlight the significant role that some institutions 
can play in supporting greater energy efficiency in a very practical sense - highlighting that those in 
the building trade can help to trigger decisions, and provide information to households regarding 
possible energy efficiency improvements.  
Decision-making Institutions can sometimes bear 'engrained' ways of operating or thinking (UNEP, 
2001), which lead them to support the status quo (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012), a type of 
'institutional lock-in' (Unruh, 2000) can develop. This means institutions can have a material effect 
on if and how transitions (such as that to a more sustainable, or affordable energy system) come 
about (Meadowcroft, 2011).  
Institutions may not necessarily be actors, but formalised legal and political frameworks, such as 
laws, regulations or markets (Biermann et al., 2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; 
Brousseau et al., 2011). Although often formalised, institutions are not necessarily always so (Pahl-
Wostl, 2009; Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012; Brousseau et al., 2011). Formal institutions are 'linked to 
the official channels of governmental bureaucracies... codified in regulatory frameworks or any kind 
of legally binding documents... [and] enforc[able] by legal procedures' (Pahl-Wostl, 2009: 356). 
Whereas informal institutions can be framed as 'socially shared rules such as social or cultural 
norms...[generally] not codified or written down... enforced outside of legally sanctioned channels' 
(Pahl-Wostl, 2009: 356). The nature of an institution as formal or informal is likely to have an impact 
on the speed and fashion in which change may be brought about. Formal institutions can change as 
the result of direct engagement such as through lobbying (Brousseau et al., 2011), however informal 
intuitions may be considered as more 'slow moving' (Roland, 2004) and less likely to change as the 
result of direct negotiation (Brousseau et al., 2011). There are examples of informal institutions 
being altered by means of direct action however, such as when conscious steps are taken to alter the 
culture within an organisation or industry. 
1.5.3 - Paradigms & Ideologies 
The mix of institutions that exist in a governance structure are both the result of, and drivers for, 
other aspects of governance. New institutions are created, or come about, in relation to the 
39 
 
dominant 'ideas' (Hall, 1993) or ideologies of the time, and then go on, alongside paradigms 
(Kuzemko et al., 2016), to affect choices around policy instruments (Kern, 2011).  
Paradigms can be defined as 'informal guiding principles' which generate an 'internal logic and 
selection environment which exclude non-compatible approaches' (Pahl-Wostl, 2009, p.355), or 
'interpretive frameworks' through which both policy objectives, and the policy instruments which 
may be used to attain them, are viewed (Hall, 1993). Kuzemko et al. (2016), Lockwood et al. (2013), 
Grubb et al. (1991) all demonstrate the impact that paradigm can play in outcomes. They suggest 
that the dedication to a neoliberal paradigm, characterised by support of market mechanisms over 
direct intervention, that exists in Great Britain is slowing the pace of transition to a decarbonised 
energy system. Dedication to particular forms of policymaking can become heavily embedded in the 
governance system, meaning these ideas can ‘emerge as orthodoxy, taken for granted, and highly 
self-referential’ (Kuzemko et al., 2016, p.99). This can lead to ideology overriding evidence and 
channelling decisions by policy-makers (Metcalfe, 1993). Helm (2003) argues that the widespread 
privatisation of formerly nationally owned industries which dominated the nineteen-eighties and 
nineties occurred as a result of a shift in paradigm – the belief that the most effective means of 
driving the economy was through governmental ownership and control of industry was replaced by 
the view that private companies and market mechanisms were more effective.  
Soskice & Hall (2001) demonstrate the role that paradigms can take in steering decision-making 
though their work on 'Varieties of Capitalism'. They argue that there are principally two forms of 
capitalism - Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as the US and UK, and Co-ordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) such as Germany and Denmark. LMEs follow a neo-liberal market paradigm, 
reliant upon markets, and arm's-length relationships for trade. CMEs follow a model of greater social 
democracy, with a greater level of direct interaction and collaboration between actors in order to 
build core competencies. The UK's status as an LME may have a material impact on which policy 
options are viewed as viable, and which are 'locked out' (Kuzemko, 2013; Mitchell, 2008), and so this 
may go some way to explaining why Denmark and Germany (CMEs) have made greater progress 
toward decarbonisation than either the UK or the US (LMEs) (Kuzemko, 2013). 
1.5.4 - Power 
A key pillar of governance is power. Relative power of different institutions can affect outcomes of 
existing systems of governance (Geels, 2010), as well as the evolution of future governance systems 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). This is because 'different actors do not have equal power or strength. They 
have unequal resources (e.g. money, knowledge, tools) and opportunities to realise their purposes 
and interest, and influence social rules' (Geels, 2004, p.909). 
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There are many forms of power, derived from differing sources. An actor may have power because 
of their position, or by having power bestowed to them (Acemoglu et al., 2004), or because of the 
resources they possess are particularly large, or important (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Newell, 2006). 
Positional power is not always explicit, for example the White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, a 
climate-change denier, was in a position to decide which views on the costs of abatement 
technologies President Bush should be exposed to (Newell, 2006). Power is likely to have a 
substantial impact on the transition to an affordable energy system because change is most 
challenging in systems that 'give dissenters substantial powers to delay or block it' (Grubb et al., 
1991, p.916). Regulatory capture is an effect of power which is particularly problematic for 
affordability of energy in the domestic sector. This is because wherever regulation is captured 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1991), it is done so by politically effective interest groups, which are usually 
producers or sections of the regulated industry, rather than consumers (VelJanovski, 2012). 
Consumers are likely to be less able to mobilise into politically active collectives (See: Olson, 1965). 
That is not to say that consumers are entirely without power, democratic governments respond to 
the attitudes and actions of consumers, who are also voters (Fuchs and Lorek, 2005; Grubb et al., 
1991; Lovell et al., 2009; Lockwood et al., 2016). However, that does not imply that all groups of the 
population wield equal power – although, as set out above, affordability of energy is gaining greater 
political salience (Lockwood, 2016), given that those on low-incomes are less likely to vote than their 
higher income counterparts (JRF, 2015; Weeks, 2013; IPPR, 2013a), there is lower political incentive 
for policy-makers to protect the interests for those on low incomes (IPPR, 2013a), this is likely to 
have an effect on the allocation of resources to protecting the interests of the fuel poor. 
Ultimately governments have power of final decision over introduction of policy, however the 
governance structure is now broader than simply the institutions of government, and that other 
actors can often levy considerable power against government to affect policy decisions (Mitchell, 
2008). 
Therefore, for the purposes of this project, a broad definition of energy governance is taken: 'The 
dynamic network of power and relationships between actors at all levels, and other institutions, 
operating within a particular political paradigm, which lead to outcomes and practices including 
(although not limited to) levels of affordability of energy in the domestic sector'. This definition can 
be broadly summarised as governance being ‘The rules of the game and who is playing, in relation 
to affordability of energy’. This broad definition is chosen to give space to establish which features 
of governance are most relevant in discussions regarding affordability of energy for domestic 
consumers in Great Britain, and how outcomes are affected. This is consistent with the view of 
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governance used by the Innovation and Governance for a Sustainable Economy (IGov) project to 
which this PhD was attached -  summarised in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10 – IGov Understanding of Governance  
Source: Mitchell, 2014 
This means that this thesis will examine the impact of each of the features of the governance 
structure (the actions of government, the role of other actor and non-actor institutions, power, 
ideology, and paradigm), on the aspects of affordability of energy more relevant to energy policy 
(energy prices and tariffs, and energy efficiency). 
1.6 - Key Actors in the Governance Structure 
Having defined the term ‘governance’, it is worth setting out the key actors within the current 
governance structure. An explanation of the energy value chain is included in chapter two, but an 
overview of the role of those institutions which have a bearing on levels of affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers in Great Britain is set out here as it forms part of the context to the thesis. 
Suppliers 
The retail market in Great Britain is dominated by six large energy supply companies (referred to as 
the Big Six – British Gas, EDF, Eon, RWE Npower, Scottish Power and SSE), which are responsible for 
the sale of gas and electricity to a wide portfolio of customers. In 2016, the Big Six supplied ~87% of 
the domestic electricity market and ~86% of the domestic gas market (OFGEM, 2016f). These Big Six 
suppliers were formed from the several regional electricity companies (RECs), and the one national 
gas supplier which existed prior to privatisation of the gas industry in 1986, and electricity industry in 
1990 (Helm, 2003). Prior to liberalisation of the market, it was not possible to shop around for an 
alternative energy supplier, this means that the Big Six are left with a number of legacy customers. A 
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number of new firms have also entered the market since privatisation, many of whom have grown 
quickly. In 2016, these small and medium sized suppliers held 13% of the domestic electricity retail 
market, and 14% of the domestic gas retail market (OFGEM, 2016f). In March 2016, there were 43 
suppliers operating in the retail energy market, the majority of which offered both electricity and gas 
(OFGEM, 2016f). 
In order to become a supplier, a firm must be granted a supply licence (GEMA, 2015). This sets out a 
number of requirements for suppliers to adhere to, including (but not limited to) listing the industry 
codes that suppliers are required to follow, requirements around conduct, billing, tariffs, methods of 
payment, and theft of power (OFGEM, 2015g). Many suppliers also operate a gas shipping function 
(responsible for the purchase of gas and its movements across the gas network), and operate their 
own electricity generation assets - in 2014, the Big Six owned ~70% of the electricity generation 
capacity in Great Britain (OFGEM et al., 2014). Some suppliers also own and operate either network 
companies, or gas production operations.  
 
Network Companies 
Networks are made up of the cables and pipes that bring electricity and gas respectively, to 
consumers. The institution which owns and operates each of these stretches of cable or pipe, known 
as a network company, varies depending on the scale and location of the pipe or cable in question. 
They operate as regulated monopolies, and so are subject to a complex arrangement of price control 
regulation, which affects the costs that go into consumers’ energy bills. There are seven electricity 
network companies, and six gas network companies. The charges for running the electricity and gas 
networks are passed onto consumers via suppliers in energy bills. Ownership and operation of a 
network is also a licensable activity – meaning that all network companies are required to adhere to 
a licence which sets the standards for their operation. 
 
The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is the arm of the government 
which oversees the energy sector. It states its purpose relating to energy as ‘Ensuring that the 
country has secure energy supplies that are reliable, affordable and clean’ (BEIS, 2017:Online). To 
this end, it is the department responsible for setting a wide breadth of policies relating to the 
generation and consumption of energy in Great Britain. Prior to its inception in 2016, BEIS’ duties 
were split between the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and The Department for 
Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS). The secretary of state for BEIS is empowered to give guidance 
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to OFGEM on social and environmental matters (OFGEM, 2013d), which could be viewed as 
undermining OFGEM’s independence as a regulator. 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 
With the privatisation of the electricity and gas industries, new regulators were created – the office 
of electricity regulation (OFFER) and Office for Gas Regulation (OFGAS). OFFER had three main duties 
(a, b and c below) and OFGAS had just two (a and b below) - this difference reflecting the different 
structures under which the two industries were privatised. These duties were set out in the 1989 
Electricity Act (HMG, 1989), and the 1986 Gas Act (HMG, 1986), respectively. 
a. To secure that all reasonable demands for electricity (gas) are satisfied. 
b. To secure that licence holders are able to finance the carrying on of the activities which they 
are authorised by their licence to carry on. 
c. To promote competition in the generation and supply of electricity. 
(HMG, 1989, 1986) 
OFFER and OFGAS were merged in the Utilities Act in 2000 (HMG, 2000a) to create OFGEM, and it 
was at this time that a number of duties were introduced, including the primary duty to protect the 
interests of current and future consumers of mains-fed electricity and gas wherever appropriate by 
promoting effective competition between generators and suppliers of electricity/gas (HMG, 2000a). 
Although this meant that duties a and b (above) became secondary to the principal duty, this 
demonstrates the significance for OFGEM of the promotion of competition - as a codified pillar to its 
approach to consumer protection. 
The Utilities Act (HMG, 2000a) also required OFGEM to carry out its principal duty with regard to the 
interests of individuals who are disabled or chronically sick, individuals of pensionable age, 
individuals with low incomes, and individuals residing in rural area. It is specifically noted however 
that ‘…that is not to be taken as implying that regard may not be had to the interests of other 
descriptions of consumer’(HMG, 2000a, p.7). Given OFGEM’s primary duty to protect all consumers, 
is it not clear what additional value is provided by a secondary duty to protect particular groups of 
consumers. 
In the 2010 Energy Act (HMG, 2010b), OFGEM’s duties were further clarified to include that 
reduction of greenhouse gasses, and maintaining security of supply were both also facets of the 
consumer protection set out in the primary duty. This left OFGEM in effect with a primary duty to 
meet all aspects of the energy trilemma. This inevitably means that OFGEM is forced to make trade-
offs between competing aspects of consumer protection.  
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In addition to those relating to the trilemnna, OFGEM’s other duties include the regulation and 
monitoring of the licenced operations of firms operating in the gas and electricity wholesale and 
retail markets (OFGEM, 2013d), monitoring of firms’ conduct in wholesale markets under the 
European Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) (OFGEM, 2015j), and the 
revenues and operation of the licenced distribution and transmission operators of both the gas and 
electricity networks (See: OFGEM, 2010). OFGEM is also responsible for setting the regulation of 
various government schemes such as the energy company obligation (ECO) (See: OFGEM, 2015). 
OFGEM was designed to be an independent regulator (Kuzemko, 2014), free from political 
interference, however BEIS has some official powers over OFGEM, such as to veto proposed licence 
changes (Bohne, 2011). This, along with the definition of OFGEM as a department of government 
(OFGEM, 2013d), and the Secretary of State’s power to offer guidance to OFGEM (OFGEM, 2013d), 
may limit the degree to which OFGEM is truly isolated from political pressures. Indeed there is 
evidence of OFGEM managing some code modification processes with regard to network charges for 
small generators in a way which appears to be in response to Governmental pressure (Cornwall, 
2017). In addition, ultimately parliament has the power to abolish OFGEM, as was proposed by 
Labour in 2012 (Flint, 2012) – this potentially gives government significant power over OFGEM. All 
this means that although OFGEM was initially designed to be independent from the political process, 
the government appears to be both able and willing to exert significant political pressure over 
OFGEM. 
 European Union 
The European Union has a range of legislation in place which requires certain policies or policy 
designs to be put in place in member states. For example, various directives such and the Renewable 
Energy Directive (European Commission, 2009), or the Energy Efficiency Directive (European 
Commission, 2012a), require member states to operate policies in pursuit of increased deployment 
of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures respectively. There are also EU-level 
regulations to guard against market abuse in wholesale energy markets (OFGEM, 2015j), and state-
aid rules which give the European Commission the power to investigate and brand unlawful any 
policies which may be considered to constitute state aid to a particular industry or firm (European 
Commission, 2012b). The Eco-Design directive (European Commission, 2014a) also sets energy 
efficiency standards for a number of domestic appliances. Interestingly, much of the energy policy 
which exists at the European level was inspired by British approaches to policy and regulation 
(Bohne, 2011).  
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Citizen’s Advice Bureau (CAB) 
The official consumer advocate role within the energy sector is undertaken by the Citizen’s Advice 
Bureau. The role has shown a trend of consolidation; it began as separate bodies for electricity and 
gas, but through a number of stages has been combined with other institutions and since 2014 has 
been the responsibility of the CAB (CAB, 2015)2. The CAB today provides direct support to 
consumers, provides comments and consultation responses relating to policy changes, and 
represents consumers at code review panels (GEMA, 2014). This involvement in code panels is the 
CAB’s only formal place in the policy-making process however. 
Citizens - Consumers/Electorate 
Citizens are an implicit part of the governance structure, and take a number of roles. Citizens as 
consumers are responsible for paying energy bills which fund the costs and profits of the energy 
supply chain, as well as a number of social and environmental policy costs. It is also consumers 
which engage (or not) in the retail market, and many consumers face fuel poverty. The sentiment of 
citizens as voters is likely to have an impact on the actions of policymakers. Although not all groups 
are equally likely to vote, and feel the impact of outcomes of the governance structure differently, 
impacts upon them is likely to influence those active in the governance structure. 
Other Institutions 
There are myriad other institutions who have some involvement in the Governance structure 
affecting affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain, in their impact on the 
amount of energy that households consume – such as the building industry, landlords, and 
manufacturers of domestic appliances.  Their roles and impacts of these other institutions will be set 
out in the body of this thesis wherever pertinent.  
1.7 - Research Questions 
Having set out the context to the research, it is now possible to set out research questions.  The 
central question which this thesis sets out to examine is: 
What is the impact of demand-side governance on affordability of energy for domestic 
consumers in Great Britain? 
In order to carry out the research, the central question is broken down into separate research 
questions. These are based on the understanding of affordability of energy set out above. To add 
richness of understanding, a comparison will be made with the governance structure in another 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed overview of this evolution of consumer representation in Britain - see appendix I. 
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country. Denmark was selected because of its high standards of energy efficiency (IEA, 2011). The 
research will then be used to inform policy recommendations. The four research questions which 
form the foundation of this thesis, based to the factors of affordability, are: 
1. Are current governance arrangements regarding pricing and tariffs supportive of affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
2. Are current governance arrangements regarding domestic energy-efficiency supportive of 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
3. What lessons may be learned from the Danish system of energy governance which may be 
beneficial to affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
4. How might the governance structure in Great Britain be reformed to improve affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers? 
1.8 - Thesis Overview 
This thesis departs slightly from a traditional thesis structure. Instead of having a number of chapters 
dedicated to setting out the existing policy and academic literature to lay foundations for the 
primary research, the analysis of the governance structure will also be carried out throughout the 
opening chapters, alongside review of the literature. This is done both to avoid large amounts of 
repetition, and because there is very little in the literature which focuses on the governance 
arrangements relating to those matters discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Therefore, these chapters will 
examine existing literature in a new light – through a governance lens. This means that they will 
contribute significantly to findings and offer new insight regarding governance and affordability, 
rather than primarily offering a review of the existing literature. 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two applies a governance lens to literature regarding 
the impact of pricing and tariffs on affordability. The different costs contained within domestic 
electricity and gas bills in Great Britain are broken down into wholesale costs, network costs, 
supplier costs, VAT, and environmental and social policy costs. The governance of the drivers behind 
these costs are examined, along with their relative impacts on affordability. The impact of 
governance on the nature of the retail market, consumer engagement and tariff design is also 
explored in this chapter. 
Chapter three applies a governance lens to literature regarding drivers of energy demand, and 
policies relating to energy efficiency. The fuel poverty strategies from each of the administrations in 
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Great Britain are then set out, followed by a review of the impact of governance on income policies 
designed to support spending on energy.  
Having examined the policy literature through a governance lens, primary research is undertaken. 
Chapter four sets out the research methodology that is employed to carry out this primary research, 
based on 56 semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders from across the energy sector 
in both Great Britain and Denmark. The chapter also highlights possible methodological dangers, 
how ethical considerations were addressed, and closes by setting out the research questions which 
are investigated in this thesis.  
Chapter five sets out the results from the data collection and analysis for Great Britain, grouping 
data from interviewees into themes in order to bring clarity to the large amount of data collected. 
This chapter highlights that there are significant governance issues affecting policies both around 
prices, and effective deployment of energy efficiency measures. It is suggested that the current 
design of tariffs is not supportive of affordability, particularly for the fuel poor. A significant reliance 
upon a highly competitive retail market in order to deliver affordability is also highlighted as an 
issue, along with a lack of long-term policy-making, and an absence of effective consumer 
representation. Energy suppliers’ role as the primary conduit for delivery on energy efficiency policy 
are also shown to have negative impacts on affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great 
Britain. 
 
Chapter six sets out the results from data collection and analysis in Denmark, as well as setting the 
context of the Danish energy system. Research in Denmark focussed on energy efficiency, as Danish 
energy efficiency standards are widely accepted to be very good (IEA, 2011). The governance 
structure in Denmark is characterised by a tradition of consensus-building and collaboration, both 
across Governmental parties, and between government and industry. This enables long-term 
policies to be put in place, supporting a high degree of investor confidence, enabling Danish firms in 
the energy efficiency sector to succeed on a national, and international level. There are stringent 
energy efficiency regulations in place for both new-build homes, and retrofitting, the latter of which 
is supported by detailed information for households regarding renovation opportunities, as well as 
structures to support access to affordable finance. The findings in this chapter suggest that much can 
be learned in Great Britain from the Danish approach to energy efficiency. 
Chapter seven brings together the findings from the governance-focussed examination of the 
literature in chapters 2 and 3, with the findings from the research in Great Britain and Denmark. It 
sets out that there is much that may be altered in the governance structure to support affordability 
of energy in the domestic sector in Great Britain. Central to this is the development of a new policy 
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narrative, which would both support and be supported by the introduction of new building and 
rental regulations; reassignment of responsibility for energy efficiency to local authorities, fostering 
of a more powerful demand-side lobby, and stronger consumer representation. Tariffs reforms are 
also proposed to help ensure that all households to support access to basic amounts of energy by all 
consumers, and mechanisms to make energy efficiency measures more easily accessible are also 
included. The fostering of higher levels of institutional capacity among policy makers in proposed, 
along with transition away from current pro-market ideologies. Finally, a pathway to more stable 
policy regime is set out.  
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by summarising the findings of the research, and answering each 
of the research questions in turn. Limitations of the research are then examined, followed by 
possible avenues for further research. Concluding remarks are also given. 
1.9 - Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis, establishing the context to the research, and 
what the terms ‘affordability’ and ‘governance’ may be taken to mean in the context of this thesis, 
and why each of thesis is important in Great Britain. The research questions that this thesis will 
address were also set out in order to guide the research. The structure of this thesis going forward 
will be based on the framing of affordability – breaking down the impact that governance has on the 
two primary facets of affordability of energy which relate to energy policy – bills and energy 
efficiency. The following chapter will then break the first of these down further, examining the 
impact of governance on wholesale costs, network costs, policy costs, VAT, supplier profits, retail 
markets, and tariff design. This will be followed by chapter three which examines the role of 
governance in standards of domestic energy efficiency.
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Chapter 2 – Governance Behind Energy Bills in Britain: Costs, Prices and 
Markets 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
This thesis breaks affordability down into its constituent parts, and this chapter examines the first 
part – energy bills, tariffs, and the retail market and the impact that governance has on each of 
these. This chapter will examine existing information through the lens of governance, and will form 
and important contribution to the overall findings of the thesis. To this end, it will set out the role of 
governance in the range of drivers behind the different costs which come together to make the 
domestic energy bill, and the nature of the different tariffs which are available in the market - these 
are the different price offerings from suppliers which consumers are able to choose between. 
Finally, it will go on to examine the nature of the retail market, such as the level of competition, and 
consumers’ switching behaviour.  
2.2 - Energy Bills in Great Britain 
2.2.1 - Makeup of Energy Bills 
Before examining the various cost drivers within the bill, it is necessary to set out the nature of 
domestic energy consumption. Virtually every household in Great Britain is connected to the main 
electricity network to access power for devices and appliances, and approximately 85% of 
households make use of the gas grid to provide energy for space and water heating (CAB, 2014). 
Those households that rely on other fuels for space and water heating make use of electricity (9%), 
Heating Oil (4%), Solid Fuels (1%), District Heating (1%), and LPG/Bottled Gas (1%) (Baker, 2011)3. 
Due to limitations in time and resources, discussion of cost drivers will focus on electricity and gas. 
This captures the costs affecting 94% of households' heating fuel supply, and ~100% of households' 
electricity supply. It is worth noting however that those homes which rely on fuels other than mains 
gas generally face a much higher cost of warmth than those connected to the main gas network 
(Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, 2013), albeit some consumers experienced an uncharacteristic 
reversal in this trend in 2016 owing to a fall in the wholesale oil price (Energy Saving Trust, 2016b). 
Discussion in later chapters regarding levels of demand applies equally to all households - 
irrespective of their heating fuel. In Great Britain, the median household with access to gas 
consumes considerably more gas than it does electricity – at the time of writing in 2016, typical 
                                                          
3 NB. These figures do not sum to 100% owing to rounding, and reliance upon a range of data sources. 
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consumption levels stand at 3100 kWh of electricity per year, and 12500 kWh of gas per year 
(OFGEM, 2015c), this is based on an average from the previous two years (OFGEM, 2013b) (although 
there is significant variation in consumption levels between households, see Figure 24). 
 
 
Figure 11 - Cost Breakdown by Bill Type, Source: Author's Own based on figures in OFGEM, 2015a4 
Energy bills represent the sum of a number of different charges, primarily relating to the constituent 
costs of the energy supply chain. These may be divided into five categories: 
• Wholesale cost of energy represent the costs faced by the supplier for purchasing the energy 
to be supplied to the customer - in the case of electricity this is the cost of purchasing 
electricity from the generator, or the electricity market. In the case of gas this is the cost of 
purchasing gas from the upstream operator or importer, or on the gas market. This charge 
includes any profits made by the firms selling the energy to suppliers. The level of these 
costs, and the way they are passed on to consumers are affected by the design and function 
of the wholesale market – a feature of the governance framework. 
• Network Costs represent the costs faced, and profits made, by both the transmission and 
distribution companies for the transport of electricity and gas to the customer. The level of 
these costs is affected by the framework of regulation designed to keep these costs low – a 
feature of the governance framework. 
• Environmental and Social Policy Costs pay for a range of schemes such as funding energy 
efficiency measures and subsidising low-carbon forms of electricity generation. The scale 
                                                          
4 For a detailed breakdown of different charges in the average bill, see appendix J. 
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and design of these charges, and their place in the bill are a product of the governance 
structure. 
• Supplier Costs are the costs faced, and profits made, by the company that purchases the gas 
and electricity, and carries out billing and metering services for customers. Suppliers’ costs 
and profits, and the way they are passed through to consumers is a product of the 
governance structure. 
• Value Added Tax (VAT) is set at 5% for the supply of domestic electricity and gas. This level, 
and the way it is charged is a product of the governance structure. 
The constituent charges in bills are important to affordability for a number of reasons, beyond 
simply that their sum and magnitude affect costs for consumers – some of them, notably 
environmental and social policy charges, carry particular political significance. There is often a focus 
by some politicians and areas of the media on the impact of social and environmental policy costs on 
energy bills. For example, headlines such as "Green policies to add up to 40pc to cost of household 
electricity" (The Telegraph, 2014) are not uncommon. Also, reductions in subsidies for renewable 
generators, announced in 2015 were justified on the basis of reducing their impact on energy bills 
(DECC, 2015c), in spite of this cut only being expected to save £2 in the average domestic energy bill 
in 2017-2018 (HM Treasury, 2015b). This political focus on social and environmental charges comes 
in spite of their only being responsible for 7% of the average dual fuel bill (OFGEM, 2015m). This 
inevitably leads to less scrutiny of the remaining 93%, but all charges in the bill should be examined 
to ensure affordability of energy is supported.  
Not all charges fall equally on each fuel. As can be seen in Figure 11 the proportions of the different 
charges vary considerably between electricity and gas, with some charges, such as those for 
environmental and social policy obligations, featuring considerably more prominently on the 
electricity bill. This has substantial negative implications for those consumers who rely on electricity 
to meet all of their energy needs (i.e. including space and water heating), who already have a high 
cost of warmth and therefore may be at greater risk of falling into fuel poverty. 
2.2.2 - Comparing Energy Prices in Europe 
Before examining the details of the charges behind electricity and gas bills, it beneficial to put the 
level of these costs in context with other countries. Figure 12 and Figure 13 below set out the 
average price (calculated to include standing charges) of electricity and gas per kilowatt hour (kWh) 
in a number of European countries (not taking into account purchasing power parity). As can be 
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seen, although the UK5 is not entirely out of step with average for the EU-286, it is in the upper third 
of countries for electricity prices. For gas, it is approximately in the middle of the ranking, and is 
below the EU-28 average. It is important to note that the ranking of average prices is not equivalent 
to ranking of energy bills in different countries, this is affected by other factors such as levels of 
domestic energy efficiency - of which Great Britain is noted to have one of the worst in Europe, 
leading it to have some of the highest bills in Europe (ACE and Energy Bill Revolution, 2015). The 
ranking should also now be considered to give a rating of affordability, given issues such as 
household incomes and purchasing power parity should be considered, these account for the 
economic context facing the households in different countries (comparative analysis is carried out 
with regard to Denmark in chapter six). This ranking is included to demonstrate that the average cost 
of a unit of energy delivered to a household in Great Britain relative to elsewhere in Europe. 
A striking difference between the UK and other countries is that the UK's position in the middle of 
the ranking appears dependent upon its low tax rate. This is highlighted by Lockwood (2015) who 
suggests that to meaningfully compare the efficiency of energy systems in different countries, taxes 
should be removed. This is a complex issue with regard to affordability of energy as broadly speaking 
it is the final retail price as experienced by the consumer which affects affordability of energy (this 
includes the level of taxation). Additionally, the level of taxation may be an important component of 
the energy policy landscape and so may have had an impact on other aspects of affordability, such 
as funding or encouraging investment in energy efficiency measures. 
However, the fact that when tax is discounted, that the basic cost of energy in the UK is among the 
highest in Europe, implies that there may be fundamental underlying issues in the energy system 
which is causing the underlying cost of energy to be very high. If these issues were resolved, either 
lower costs could be delivered to consumers (or the level of tax could be increased in order to 
generate more revenue for the exchequer). This chapter demonstrates how the governance of the 
energy system is driving up costs in the bill for consumers.  
                                                          
5 GB-specific data unavailable.  
6 This is calculated by weighting the prices for each EU Member State according to their consumption by the 
household sector. 
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Figure 12 - Domestic Electricity Prices for European Household Consumers: Second Half 2015, Source: Eurostat, 2015a 
 
Figure 13 - Domestic Gas Prices for European Household Consumers: Second Half 2015, Source Eurostat, 2015b 
2.2.3 - Energy Supply Chains 
In order to set out the drivers behind different constituent costs that make up the domestic energy 
bill, it is beneficial to examine the roles of institutions in the supply chains that deliver electricity and 
gas to domestic consumers. 
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Figure 147 shows a simplified conceptual explanation of the flows of energy (solid lines) and money 
(dashed lines) through the electricity system. The flow of money begins with the consumer, who 
pays their energy bill to the supplier. The energy market in Great Britain is arranged around the 
'supplier-hub model' (OFGEM, 2013a) which means that the consumer pays the supplier and then 
the supplier passes these funds on to the relevant bodies to cover the costs associated with 
generating the electricity, and delivering it to the customer, as well as covering charges for various 
social programs. For simplicity, a number of connections are not shown. These include subsidy 
payments to generators, flows of 'green' certificates such as ROCs, REGOs and GoOs, and the flows 
of money and power relating to ancillary services such as balancing reserve. Bilateral trades between 
different suppliers are also not shown. 
The supplier is responsible for buying sufficient volumes of electricity to meet the needs of its 
customers. It can do this either by buying from an electricity generator (which may be owned by the 
same parent company as the supply company), or from another market participant such as another 
supplier (not pictured). Trades can be carried out via a broker, over an exchange, or bilaterally. 
It is the responsibility of the system operator to maintain levels of supply and demand on the 
electricity grid in real time, this is because electricity cannot be easily economically stored (National 
Grid, 2015c). The system operator also manages system constraints, under which generators may be 
asked to increase or decrease output to address 'bottle-necks' in the electricity system. Finally, those 
electricity generators that need to pay to buy fuel to run their plant such as gas and coal generators 
do so either directly from producers or via the commodity market.  
                                                          
7 A larger version of this diagram is found in Appendix C.  
Figure 14 - Electricity System: Flows of Energy & Money, Source: Author's Own 
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The flow of energy is in the other direction: fuel (be it a fossil fuel like gas or coal, or be it a 
renewable source such as wind) is received by electricity generators who convert it into electricity. 
Large generation plants are connected to the high voltage transmission grid, to which a number of 
distribution grids are then connected, which in turn connect domestic and other smaller consumers. 
Generally, power flows from the generator onto the transmission system, then onto the distribution 
system, and into the customer’s home. The exceptions to this arrangement are small scale 
generators, such as renewables, which are often connected to the distribution network, and some 
large industrial consumers that can be connected directly to the transmission network (Cornwall 
Energy, 2013).  
 
Figure 15 - Gas System: Flows of Energy & Money, Source: Author's Own 
Figure 158 shows a simplified conceptual explanation of the flows of energy (solid lines) and money 
(dashed lines) through the gas system. The 'supplier-hub model' (OFGEM, 2013a) also exists in the 
gas industry meaning domestic consumers contract only with their supplier who then makes 
payments to other participants in the supply chain. The supplier pays a shipper to source gas and 
arrange its movement around the gas network (OFGEM, 2015l), often a supplier will operate its own 
shipper business. The system operator ensures that gas flows successfully through the transmission 
system to the distribution networks, and that the gas system remains balanced. Shrinkage and 
balancing charges are levied by the system operator from shippers as part of the cost of carrying out 
this duty (National Grid, 2015b, 2015a). Shrinkage costs are the costs associated with the system 
operator's need to purchase electricity and gas to cover compressor fuel usage, calorific value 
                                                          
8 A larger version of this diagram is found in Appendix D. 
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shrinkage, and unallocated gas (National Grid, 2015a). Much in the same way as electricity, gas flows 
from the upstream producers onto the transmission network, then onto the distribution network, 
and finally into the consumer’s home. 
2.3 - Governance of Costs within the Domestic Energy Bill 
2.3.1 – Governance of Supplier Costs and Profits     
As set out in Figure 11, supplier costs and profits make up 21% of the average domestic electricity 
and gas bill. This section sets out the operations of the energy supply companies, and their impact 
on the bill. OFGEM (2015a) separates out supplier costs and profits in the supply market indicator, 
however these have been combined here because profit is contained within every section of the bill 
(i.e. wholesale costs include generator profits, network costs include network company profits etc.), 
and therefore separating out supplier profits would be inconsistent with other drivers of the energy 
bill. 
2.3.1.1 - Vertical Integration 
A number of energy supply firms (including all of the Big Six) are to a greater or lesser extent 
vertically integrated (VI). This means they operate within more than one part of the same supply 
chain. Although only two of the Big Six own upstream gas production (Kuzemko, 2015b), all six own 
and operate electricity generation assets as well as a supply firm.  
There are a number of incentives for vertical integration (VI), many of which relate to the 
minimisation of risk as it guarantees the supplier access to generation, without having to go through 
the market (OFGEM et al., 2014). It also guarantees a buyer for the generator’s power, giving a 
generator a sure route to market for its output (Kuzemko, 2015b). Vertical integration can also help 
to create a 'natural hedge', whereby if prices go up in the wholesale market, this will cost the 
supplier more, but could lead to the generator making increased profit - the extent to which this 
occurs will depend on the generation portfolio of the firm in question, and the reason for the change 
in wholesale price (CMA, 2015g). A VI firm may also choose to offer its own counterparty a 
preferential power purchase agreement (PPA), such as a longer term contract, than it might offer to 
other counterparties (CMA, 2014). There are also benefits relating to collateral - when making 
trades, either via exchanges or directly with other counterparties, collateral is posted to guard 
against default on payments (OFGEM et al., 2014). Large VI firms have substantial asset bases and 
strong credit ratings so are able to keep the costs of collateral low (OFGEM et al., 2014; Which?, 
2013). Smaller parties are likely to face higher collateral costs as result of having smaller asset bases 
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against which to secure trades (Cornwall Energy, 2014), an arrangement which is likely to make it 
harder for them to compete. Finally there may be economies of scope from operating businesses 
across the market, such as having a broad range of personnel with understanding of all aspects of 
the market upon which it can draw (OFGEM et al., 2014; CMA, 2015g).  
2.3.1.2 - Variation in Suppliers’ Costs and Profits  
Suppliers have varying levels of control over the costs they administer, with most ability to affect 
sales and marketing costs, metering costs, billing and customer service costs, and any value added 
services such as giving of advice (CMA, 2015g). Amongst these costs, metering and customer service 
costs are typically the largest proportion (CMA, 2015g). These costs are passed through to 
consumers in the energy bill. 
Figure 16 shows the level of profits from the Big Six energy companies’ supply and generation 
businesses. This is based on figures from the consolidated segmental statements (CSS) which are 
submitted to OFGEM by the Big Six suppliers each year. The variation of levels of profit between 
different areas of the business are clearly shown. It should be noted that the activities of non-Big Six 
suppliers are not included because the small and medium suppliers are not required to submit a 
consolidated segmental statement. The negative effect of this on transparency of industry activity is 
becoming increasingly important because, as noted above, the market share of small suppliers has 
grown considerably since 2010. 
 
Figure 16 - Aggregate Profits of Big 6 Energy Companies, Source: OFGEM, 2016h  
Figure 16 demonstrates both that the level of aggregate profit made by the Big Six can vary 
substantially over time, and that the balance between segments of the business can also shift. There 
are a number of possible reasons for this including variation in fuel prices (OFGEM, 2014g), changes 
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in short-term price volatility, upon which flexible generation can capitalise (OFGEM, 2015o), or a 
strategy to accrue profits in one arm of the business or another. 
 
Figure 17 - Generation Profits in £Million by Supplier, Source: OFGEM, 2016h 
There is considerable variation in the level of profit in the generation arms of the big suppliers, with 
EDF consistently producing generation revenues far above other Big Six generation arms (See Figure 
17). This is likely to be at least in part due to EDF's generation portfolio which is considerably larger 
than each of the rest of the Big Six suppliers (DECC, 2015d). There is also wide variation in supply 
profit levels (See Figure 18), with a number of suppliers operating at a loss for some years – 
something they would be unlikely to be able to sustain if they were not vertically integrated. 
Centrica's high level of profit is concentrated in its gas supply business, founded on its supplying over 
a third of all domestic gas customers, which in 2013 led to Centrica's gas supply margins being 
approximately twice that of the next most profitable supplier (OFGEM, 2014b). Centrica's 
dominance in this sector is likely to be, at least in part, a result of its previously being the monopoly 
gas supplier in Great Britain. Centrica (which owns British Gas) also has the single largest domestic 
electricity supply market share (CMA, 2015g), which implies it has been successful in convincing gas 
customers to switch their electricity supply to British Gas. 
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Figure 18 - Domestic Supply Profits in £Million By Supplier, Source: OFGEM, 2016h 
2.3.1.3 – Impact of Supplier Costs and Profits Governance on Affordability 
Although it is possible to monitor the levels of profits that the Big Six are making, establishing what 
might be considered an 'excess level of profit' presents a significant challenge. In its investigation of 
the energy market, launched in 2014, the CMA states that 'a situation in which firms representing a 
substantial part of the market have persistently earned profits in excess of the cost of capital can 
indicate limitations in the competitive process, resulting in prices that have been too high' (CMA, 
2015h, p.407). The CMA compared firms' return on capital employed (ROCE) with their weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC)9, and found that of the Big Six suppliers, Centrica, SSE, Scottish Power 
and E.ON have earned profits substantially and persistently in excess of their WACC (CMA, 2015a), 
resulting in the average domestic dual fuel customer paying £36 per year more than might have 
been the case in a competitive market between 2009 and 2013 (CMA, 2015g). This alone is bad for 
affordability, but it is also symptomatic of a lack of competitive pressure in the retail market which is 
relied upon to force down prices (see below). This has a significant negative impact on affordability 
of energy for domestic consumers.  
Kuzemko (2015b) highlights that energy suppliers use their profits to reward shareholders 
generously for their investment with substantial dividend pay-out ratios (5.2%-7.8% for the Big 6 in 
2012), justified on the basis of maintaining shareholders' support for the firm reduces the cost of 
capital, and so supports future investment, and protects against corporate takeover. However this is 
money that these firms are choosing not to invest elsewhere, such as in delivering better customer 
service (Kuzemko, 2015b). 
                                                          
9 A measure of a company’s cost of capital which takes into account the relative proportions of debt finance 
and equity finance.  
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Although the CSS have been being produced since 2009, it took until the CMA carried out a full 
market investigation in between 2014 and 2016 to uncover excess profit-making (CMA, 2015g) – 
something which was an unusual event, rather than a regular review of the energy industry. This 
suggests both that the level of monitoring by OFGEM is insufficient to provide protection to 
consumers, and that suppliers are able to exploit the lack of competitive pressure in the retail 
market. Unless such CMA investigations are to become a regular feature of the energy system, or 
there is a significant upswing in the level of competitive pressure in the retail market, there appears 
to be a fundamental issue with the governance arrangements regarding costs and profits of the 
energy suppliers, which is leading to significant negative impacts for affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers.  
2.3.2 – Governance of Wholesale Costs     
As set out in Figure 11, wholesale costs make up the largest single segment of the average domestic 
energy bill, and wholesale price increases have been a significant contributor to energy bill increases 
between 2007 and 2014 (DECC, 2014f). Wholesale costs relate to all costs that the supplier faces in 
order to take out contracts to buy sufficient levels of electricity and gas to cover the demand of their 
customers. Often wholesale costs are discussed in a fatalistic fashion, as if there were a single 
market price against which energy consumed on each day could be assessed against. This section 
will set out why this is not the case, and the way governance affects the level of the wholesale costs 
to the consumer.  
2.3.2.1 – What is the Wholesale Market? 
The wholesale market may be taken as a non-actor institution, and the term refers to the various 
places from which an energy supplier may purchase the electricity and gas that its customers need. 
Suppliers are able to buy energy for delivery in the very short term, such as on the same day, or for 
delivery months or years in advance. For this reason, there is no single market price – but a different 
price for electricity and gas, depending on when the supplier is buying for. For example, purchasing a 
unit of gas for next winter is likely to cost more than a unit of gas for next summer, because there is 
generally less demand for gas in summer. In addition to the effects of demand, the wholesale market 
price of gas is also affected by the wholesale oil price because oil and gas are often extracted 
together, and pricing of gas is also sometimes contractually linked to the price of oil (OFGEM, 
2015o).  
There is a close relationship between the wholesale price of gas and the wholesale price of 
electricity. This is because much of the electricity generating capacity in Great Britain is powered by 
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gas, making the price of gas a significant cost driver for many generation plants. A gas power station 
is also often the ‘marginal’ plant, which is the most expensive plant operating on the system, 
meaning it sets the price for that period (OFGEM, 2015o). The marginal plant can swap between gas 
and coal generation, depending of the relative cost of running each plant. On days where there is a 
lot of sun or wind, or days when demand for electricity is low, the wholesale market price for 
delivery that day is considerably lower than on cold, dark, still days where demand is likely to be 
higher, and renewable generation likely to be lower (OFGEM, 2015o). 
2.3.2.2 - Trading  
The vast majority of supply firms, vertically integrated or otherwise, participate in wholesale market 
trading. Suppliers forecast how much electricity and gas their customers are going to use, and then 
buy sufficient amounts of each to meet that demand. However, a supplier does not know in advance 
exactly what the market price will be at the time that its customers use that energy, or exactly how 
much energy its customers will use. For this reason, a supplier will often choose to purchase some 
energy in advance, and as the delivery period approaches, then trade again to refine its position. 
How much and how far in advance they will buy depends on factors such as commercial strategy, 
market prices and actions of their competitors (CMA, 2014). This practice of forward trading to 
reduce risk is known as 'hedging'. The upshot of this practice is that as delivery date approaches, the 
same unit of energy may be bought and sold many times (CMA, 2014).This makes it almost 
impossible for an external party to identify with certainty what the cost associated with energy 
delivered to a consumer is on any particular day. 
Varieties of Trading: OTC & Exchanges 
When a supplier is looking to purchase electricity or gas to meet the demand of its customers, it can 
choose to do so in a number of ways. The first of its options is to carry out bilateral trading, either 
directly with a generator, or via an intermediary such as a broker (OFGEM et al., 2014). Bilateral 
trading, often referred to as 'Over-The-Counter' (OTC), can occur between independent companies 
like a generator and a supplier, or between generation and supply segments of the same vertically 
integrated company. These trades are completely customisable, with participants able to offer 
different prices and volumes, depending on the counterparty they are trading with (CMA, 2014). The 
vast majority of trades in Britain are carried out OTC (Which?, 2013; OFGEM et al., 2014). 
The majority of OTC trades that occur in the GB electricity wholesale market are 'uncleared'. This 
means that they occur bilaterally between two parties which do not go via any sort of exchange or 
clearing house (OFGEM, 2009d; Which?, 2013) – thereby meaning that they cannot be tracked by 
either volume or price. Price reporting agencies such as ICIS Heren attempt to gather information on 
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these trades through directly contacting traders to get their view on the day's trading activities. This 
information is then compiled with information from known trades in order to produce pricing 
information (OFGEM, 2013e).  
An alternative model of trading is carried out via an exchange such as N2EX or APX, this differs from 
OTC in that contracts are standardised, as opposed to the customisable contracts of OTC trading 
(PWC, 2008). Exchange trading accounts for approximately 13% of traded electricity volume (CMA, 
2015j), and although they can be monitored, the counterparties to a trade are anonymous so it is 
still not possible to track a unit of energy’s price from source to consumption. 
Varieties of Trading: Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
Power purchase agreements (PPAs) are a means of a supplier purchasing the output from a 
generator. The PPA is a private contract which specifies the terms and conditions under which power 
will be purchased and generated, and require the generator to supply power at a specified price for 
the life of the agreement. PPAs vary, but commonly include: specification of the size and operating 
parameters of the generation facility; price mechanisms; service and performance obligations; 
dispatch options; and conditions of termination or default on the agreement (PWC, 2008). The 
pricing structure varies also, but typically falls into one of three categories – variable priced, variable 
with a floor price, or fixed-price (DECC, 2012a).  
It is usual for a VI supply company to hold PPAs with its own generation assets. For example, it is 
apparent that EDF's supply arm holds a PPA which covers all of the generation arm's nuclear plants, 
which over the course of a year would generate more than enough electricity for all its domestic 
customers, and the majority of its business customers (for an explanation of the paper trail which 
demonstrates this, see Appendix E). Trading would likely then be used to fit the profile of EDF's 
customers' demand (CMA, 2014). 
2.3.2.3 – Impact of Trading Governance on Affordability  
It appears that VI suppliers are able to use these sorts of arrangements to select where in the 
business they wish to accrue profit. For example, OFGEM (2016h) shows EDF consistently making 
significant profits in the generation arm, and consistent losses in the supply arm across several years. 
Moving margins up and down the supply chain in this way means they are able to obfuscate their 
supply profits and construct arguments regarding low margins in energy supply, and therefore 
arguing that retail prices are not disproportionate to the costs of running supply companies 
(Kuzemko, 2015b).  
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Issues are not confined to VI trades however. As set out above, the private nature of the majority of 
trades, including PPAs, and the complex arrangement of buying and selling the same unit of energy 
multiple times prior to delivery mean it is almost impossible to identify the actual cost of electricity 
or gas for any particular supplier on any given day. This presents a challenge to the regulator 
OFGEM, in the absence of an empowered market monitor, in verifying that the prices that 
consumers are paying are fair and representative of the underlying costs. This does not 
automatically imply that they are not cost reflective, but the inability to verify them leaves 
opportunity for excess profit-making. This situation is exacerbated by a lack of competition in the 
retail market (considered below). As was set out above, suppliers appear to have been resulting in 
the average domestic dual fuel customer paying more than might have been the case in a 
competitive market between 2009 and 2013 (CMA, 2015g). Although it is unclear if this would have 
definitely been avoided with a greater level of wholesale transparency, greater transparency is 
consistent with more effective monitoring which would facilitate better protection of consumers. 
Therefore, a lack of transparency, a feature of the design of the wholesale market, may be said to 
risk undermining affordability of energy for domestic consumers. Other market designs, such as a 
pool design as used to be present in Great Britain (Helm, 2003), could be more transparent, albeit it 
has other drawbacks. 
The location of trading arrangements may also be important. Electricity is traded on a national, 
rather than regional, level. Although there are benefits to suppliers of having contracts with 
generators and consumers in the same area (known as embedded benefits), by and large the 
generator or consumer themselves are unable to trade directly between themselves and so are 
unable to benefit from this proximity. The development of local energy markets is something which 
is becoming of increasing interest to suppliers (See: Centrica, 2016b), and has the potential to 
improve affordability of energy for domestic consumers (OFGEM, 2015h).  
2.3.2.4 - Electricity Balancing 
The wholesale cost segment of the bill also includes balancing costs. In electricity, there are two 
types of balancing action: one for ensuring supply and demand match in real time - 'energy 
balancing' actions, and those that ensure system constraints are managed effectively - 'system 
balancing' actions (Elexon, 2015). The rules governing balancing, and how imbalance prices are 
calculated, are set out in the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC), one of the statutory codes that 
electricity suppliers and generators sign up to (CMA, 2015e).  
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System Balancing Actions 
System balancing actions are in response to 'bottle-necks' in the system, whereby there may be 
insufficient transmission capacity to transport power from where it is being generated, to where it is 
needed to be consumed. This results in the system operator instructing generation plant to reduce 
output in one location, and a different plant to increase generation elsewhere. Plants will pay, and 
be paid, when providing this service, and the costs for this are recovered from energy suppliers 
through the balancing system use of system (BSUoS) charge, and then passed on to consumers. 
Energy Balancing Actions 
Energy balancing actions are taken in response to there being too much or too little electricity on the 
electricity transmission system at any one time. This is necessary because by and large, electricity 
cannot be economically stored (CMA, 2015d). If a supplier has purchased more, or less energy than 
its customers consume, it is deemed to be in imbalance, and therefore faces imbalance prices 
(known as ‘cash-out’). These cover the costs of the system operator (National Grid) for carrying out 
balancing actions whereby it instructs generators (or consumers) to increase, or decrease their 
generation (or consumption) (Elexon, 2015). The greater the level of imbalance, and the greater the 
cost of actions, the higher the imbalance price. Settlement takes place every half hour, but the vast 
majority of domestic customers do not have half hourly meters and so are assigned a usage profile 
class. This is used to estimate the profile of consumption over time and allocate energy used in any 
half hour period (CMA, 2015j), reconciliation runs are carried out over the months that follow as 
meters are read. Approximately 2% of electricity demand is contracted for through the balancing 
mechanism (National Audit Office, 2014). 
Impact of Electricity Balancing Governance on Affordability 
It appears that the regulations dictating how imbalance prices are calculated are not designed to 
minimise costs to the consumer. Imbalance prices going to be made intentionally more expensive 
from 2018. Since 2015, imbalance prices are set on the basis of the average price of the last 50MW 
of capacity that the system operator contracts for in each half hour, however from 2018, this will 
move to the last 1MW, which will make cash-out prices higher. The value of lost load (VoLL), which 
can also feature in imbalance price calculation is also being increased from 2018, from the current 
level of £3000/MW to £6000/MW (Elexon, 2015) - both of these will lead to more penal imbalance 
prices. The rationale behind this sharper imbalance pricing is to act as a greater incentive for market 
participants to balance their position accurately, however it is not clear that all market participants 
necessarily have the ability to respond to these sharper prices – that they are not already balancing 
their position as accurately as possible. It is likely however that more punitive imbalance prices will 
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push up prices for consumers, whilst also making operating conditions more difficult for small 
suppliers, both of which have a negative effect on affordability.  
2.3.2.5 – Impact of Gas Trading Governance on Affordability 
Much of this section has focussed on issues relating to the electricity market. Some of the same 
issues such as a lack of transparency owing to trading and hedging strategies, also apply to gas, 
however high levels of churn (European Commission, 2014b), and low levels of vertical integration 
(OFGEM et al., 2014; CMA, 2015g), give some reassurance that competition is stronger in the gas 
wholesale market. The CMA (2015j) supported this view, and set out that few stakeholders raised 
concerns regarding the functioning wholesale gas market, therefore elected not to investigate it 
closely.  
In spite of CMA assertions that the gas wholesale market is well-functioning, the private nature of 
trades, and hedging strategies makes it almost impossible to state the wholesale price paid for gas 
delivered on any individual day. This means that when wholesale gas prices fall, it is almost 
impossible for OFGEM to monitor if the full value of this fall is being passed through to consumers. It 
also implies that there should be a lag in price reductions, so drops being seen in retail prices now 
are likely to be related to drops in the wholesale price some months, or possibly even years 
previously, and current drops in wholesale price would only be expected to appear in retail prices in 
some months or years in the future (Dutton, 2015). If by that time, media and governmental focus 
on gas prices has relaxed, and in absence of OFGEM being able to effectively monitor the market, 
there will be weakened pressure on suppliers to pass these savings through to the end consumer, 
with negative implications for affordability of energy. This is particularly true in light of weak retail 
market competition (discussed below).  
2.3.3 – Governance of Network Costs   
Network charges have a significant impact on affordability, making up 25% of the average annual 
domestic electricity bill, and 20% of the average annual domestic gas bill (See Figure 11). The 
structure of both the electricity network, and the gas network is similar, in that it consists of a small 
number of large pipes/wires which transport energy over large distances (similar to the trunk of a 
tree), this is called the transmission network. From this come many smaller sections which deliver 
energy to homes and businesses (much like branches), these are the distribution networks.  
2.3.3.1 - Electricity Networks 
In Great Britain, there are three electricity transmission companies - National Grid in England and 
Wales, Scottish Power Energy Networks in Southern Scotland, and SSE Power Distribution in 
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Northern Scotland. Each of these has responsibility for maintaining the transmission system in their 
area. National Grid also has the role of System Operator (SO) across all three networks, and is 
responsible for ensuring that supply and demand are balanced across the entire transmission 
network in real time (albeit this function is ring-fenced from the transmission-owner function). The 
distribution networks are more sub-divided, with eight distribution network operators (DNOs) with 
responsibility for ensuring continual running and maintaining the distribution networks in different 
areas of Great Britain (See Figure 19). Electricity network costs have increased significantly in recent 
years, which DECC attributed to increasing requirement for the connection and management of 
significant volumes of new, particularly distributed, generation capacity (DECC, 2014f). 
 
Figure 19 - Electricity Transmission (Left) and Distribution Network (Right) Ownership, Source: ENA, 2014b, 2014a 
2.3.3.2 - Gas Networks 
The whole of Britain's gas transmission network is owned and operated by National Grid, whereas 
the distribution networks are owned and operated by one of four regional gas distribution network 
operators (known as transporters) - Wales and West Utilities, Scotia Gas Networks, Northern Gas 
Networks and National Grid (see Figure 20).  
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Figure 20 - Gas Transmission (Left) and Distribution Network (Right) Ownership, Source: ENA, 2014d, 2014c 
Both the electricity and the gas networks are operated as regulated monopolies. This means that 
although they are owned and operated by private companies, it would be inefficient to open them 
up to competition because this would imply multiple companies constructing pipes and pylons that 
served the same geographic area. As private profit-making entities, these firms need to be able 
make profit from their activities, however they are regulated to ensure that they do not take undue 
advantage of their monopoly position. This has resulted in a complex system of revenue control 
which is administrated and enforced by OFGEM. Although the specific details of the regulation vary 
between transmission and distribution in electricity and gas, the basic foundations of the regulation 
remain the same. The structure of this regulation is relevant to debates around affordability because 
the costs of the network systems are passed through to suppliers, and so feed through to 
consumers' bills. 
2.3.3.3 - Price Control Regulation 
The revenues of the network companies are regulated through a range of price control mechanisms. 
Previously, the income of networks was regulated through a process called RPI-X. This involved a 
series of price control periods each lasting five years. Ahead of the start of each period, OFGEM 
agreed with each network company an allowable level of revenue based upon the value of assets 
possessed by the network company, the operational and capital expenditure that the company 
expects to make over that period, the cost of capital that OFGEM believes the network company 
should be able to achieve, and the costs of depreciation. The allowed revenue was then spread 
across the price control period, with allowances for inflation (RPI) minus a certain reduction in order 
to stimulate efficiency improvement (-X) (OFGEM, 2009e).  
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The RPI-X system is no longer in place however. In 2008, OFGEM launched a review of this 
framework under the title RPI-X@20 in order to assess if the RPI-X framework was fit for meeting 
future challenges of supporting moves to tackle climate change, maintaining security of supply, and 
to supporting ongoing maintenance and upgrade of the network (OFGEM, 2009e). This review was 
also partly in response to a perceived need to foster greater levels of innovation from network 
companies (OFGEM, 2009f). This led to the eventual replacement of RPI-X with a new price control 
mechanism called RIIO (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs).  
A key element of RIIO is the combining of the capital expenditure (Capex) and operational 
expenditure (Opex) categories into total expenditure (Totex). The RPI-X control had the effect of 
offering greater incentive to capital expenditure than operational expenditure. The change to RIIO 
was designed to support 'smarter' and more efficient network solutions such as fostering demand 
side response, in place of simply expanding physical network capacity (Lockwood, 2014). Although 
RIIO does differ in a number of ways from RPI-X including requirements for innovation and customer 
engagement (OFGEM, 2012b), the change was an evolution, not a revolution - the principal of 
allowed revenues remains at root the same as that of RPI-X. It is calculated in relation to the 
regulated asset value and the anticipated expenditure over the period. Once the level of allowed 
revenue is set, charges are passed from the network company to the supplier, so it may then be 
passed onto consumers through bills. These charges are revised annually, and any discrepancy 
between allowed revenue and actual revenue collected is adjusted for the following year (OFGEM, 
2012b).  
The RIIO framework also includes a benefit-sharing mechanism. Following the price control being 
set, a network company then works to carry out its operations at a cost below that which was 
agreed in the business plan. If it is able to do this, the benefits are shared between the network 
company and consumers. This is achieved by means of the 'efficiency incentive rate'. A rate is set 
individually for each network operator which sets out the distribution of benefits as shared between 
the network company and consumers following an over/under spend. Although this varies between 
companies it is on average expected to be a 50/50 split between networks and consumers (OFGEM, 
2012b). In practice this is achieved by altering the future level of year-by-year allowed revenues. 
There is a two-year lag between performance and that performance being reflected in allowances, 
e.g. an underspend in 2014-15 will be reflected in allowed revenues in 2016-17 to reflect the under-
spend two years previously (OFGEM, 2016g). A similar process is applied if network companies 
exceed their allowed revenues – meaning on average they are required to bear 50% of any cost 
overrun. 
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2.3.3.4 - Impact of Network Regulation Governance on Affordability 
There are issues with the RIIO framework however, the central of which stems from institutional 
capacity. Although the upfront nature of the price control gives network companies a strong 
incentive to 'beat' the expected costs and so deliver at lower cost, it also gives them an incentive to 
attempt to inflate the costs of the business plan, so they are able to appear to deliver greater savings 
and so receive greater profits. There is significant potential for problems of asymmetry of knowledge 
given that arguably network companies are in a better position to fully understand their expected 
costs over the price control period than OFGEM (Lockwood, 2014), particularly given the process of 
privatisation led to the hollowing out of expertise from state actors (Kuzemko et al., 2016). As 
network companies have a role in the price control setting process, this gives them opportunity to 
inflate the level of the price control making it easy for them to recover substantial returns. 
OFGEM is not unaware of these issues however. In an attempt to combat these issues of asymmetry 
when setting the initial price control, the Information Quality Incentive (IQI) was introduced. This is a 
mechanism which offers greater financial reward the closer a network company's initial expenditure 
proposal is to the final allowed revenue figure. However OFGEM (2010b) concede that there are 
limitations to this mechanism, and that indeed it is reliant upon input from network companies in 
order to function. Introducing a mechanism which financially rewards network companies for not 
over-inflating the value of business plans in search of greater financial reward, could be viewed as 
counter-intuitive. 
In spite of the IQI mechanism, The Energy & Climate Change Committee (2015) and the CAB (See: 
Moore & Hall, 2015) share Lockwood's (2014) concerns that OFGEM may lack the capacity to 
effectively judge the appropriate level of returns in the price control. The Energy & Climate Change 
Committee (2015) highlighted that OFGEM has agreed targets with network companies which were 
too easily met, meaning they achieved the majority of their objectives (38/40) within the first year of 
the eight-year price control period. This allowed them to go on to make higher than expected profits 
(Energy & Climate Change Committee, 2015). The CEO of OFGEM, Dermot Nolan proposed waiting 
until the end of the eight year period to establish if the price controls had been under-ambitious, 
however The Energy and Climate Change Committee has proposed that this will not deliver value to 
consumers, and so called for mid-term review of targets to be carried out (Energy & Climate Change 
Committee, 2015). The Energy and Climate Change Committee also raised concerns around OFGEM's 
ability to set the price control levels accurately owing to lack of comparable industries against which 
to benchmark levels of return (Energy & Climate Change Committee, 2015). The CAB has 
demonstrated that OFGEM has made significant errors in its assessment of key variables such as risk-
free rate of return, and the debt premium faced by investors – this has the effect of making 
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investment in network companies more attractive for investors but driving up charges for consumers 
(Moore and Hall, 2015).  
Indeed, it appears this range of concerns may be justified. Some network companies are able to 
make very substantial profits. For example, Western Power Distribution Group made a £556 million 
profit in the financial year ending 2016, this is equivalent to 38% of its total revenue (Western Power 
Distribution, 2016). Also, in 2014, a greater proportion of SSE's operating profits came from network 
operations than from its supply and generation operations combined (SSE, 2014a). Owing to costs 
being met through energy bill, high returns to network companies can have a considerable negative 
impact on affordability of energy for domestic consumers.  
The process of setting price controls in advance in this way also undermines affordability in that it 
locks network costs in for periods of up to eight years at a time, based on forecast levels of demand, 
and forecast technology costs. Any reductions in demand in excess of those forecast, or 
technological developments, which may be in no way related to the practices of the network 
company, are only partially passed onto consumers through the benefit sharing mechanism 
(discussed above). Any significant developments cannot be fully accounted for until the following 
price control period, potentially up to eight years later. 
Mitchell (2016) argues that the RIIO is fundamentally limiting for other reasons, in that it does not 
truly foster innovations, which could support better outcomes, such as improved affordability of 
energy. Mitchell (2016) sets out that in comparison to the New York Reforming the Energy Vision 
program (REV), the RIIO is narrow, and simply supports the current arrangements in which large 
transmission-connect generators generate electricity to be consumed by passive end consumers. In 
contrast, the REV is fundamentally redesigning the New York state energy system to place customers 
at the centre of the energy system by allowing them to access locally generated energy without 
having to go via the transmission system, or the wholesale market – thus helping to reduce costs 
(Mitchell, 2016). This would imply that the transition from RPI-X to RIIO was not sufficiently radical 
to deliver meaningful long-term benefits to consumers, and so RIIO represents an institutional 
framework which, in part owed to a lack of institutional capacity within OFGEM, is negative for 
affordability.   
2.3.4 – Governance of Environmental and Social Policy Costs   
Environmental and social policy costs make up 11% of the average electricity bill, and 4% of the 
average gas bill (See Figure 11). These pay for a range of schemes such as funding energy efficiency 
measures for low income households and subsidising low-carbon electricity generation. The costs for 
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these schemes are primarily levied from electricity bills (CMA, 2015e), and a number of these 
schemes are contained under the Levy Control Framework (LCF).  
The Levy Control Framework (LCF) was created in 2011, and is a Treasury-controlled cap on the 
spending that can be undertaken on certain governmental energy schemes. The LCF covers the 
Feed-In-Tariff (FiT), the Renewables Obligation (RO), and Contracts for Difference (CfD) (DECC, 
2011a)10. The budget is divided up annually into cost envelopes to give the year's budget for each 
policy scheme (National Audit Office, 2013). The cap in Great Britain was set at £2 billion in 
2011/2012, rising to £7.6 billion for the period 2020/2021 (National Audit Office, 2013).  
Not all environmental and social policies fall under the LCF however, for example the carbon price 
support, a charge imposed upon fossil fuel electricity generators to discourage fossil fuel burning 
manifests in the wholesale electricity price (CMA, 2015e). Additionally, costs of the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) (examined in detail in chapter 3), which is designed to deliver energy efficiency 
measures to fuel poor and hard-to-treat households (DECC, 2014m), and the capacity mechanism 
which is paying generators (often existing large fossil-plant) to be available to generate electricity at 
times of system stress (DECC, 2015h), are levied outside the LCF. 
2.3.4.1 - The Impacts of Social and Environmental Policy Cost Governance on Affordability  
Lockwood (2016) sets out that the levy control framework was introduced without a clear objective, 
however two possible objectives are identified. Firstly that it is to protect the welfare of consumers, 
and secondly that it is to avoid increasing policy costs which could undermine public support in 
renewable energy support schemes, which could in turn undermine investor confidence (Energy and 
Climate Change Committee, 2016). Lockwood (2016) sets out that the latter of these reasons is the 
more compelling, given the context of a government which appears to offer limited customer 
protection in other areas, having imposed a range of tax and welfare policy changes which have 
generally fallen most heavily on those towards the bottom of the income distribution (Browne and 
Elming, 2015). However the National Audit Office suggests the LCF may not offer as much support to 
investor confidence as could be achieved, owing to poor transparency, poor forecasting of the 
current level against the cap, and limited reporting (National Audit Office, 2016a). It is also apparent 
that as the number of CfD projects increases, the number of projects that can be supported under 
                                                          
10 Although the Warm Home Discount is similarly considered under annual spending reviews, and therefore is 
often described as being part of the LCF  (See: DECC, 2011a), it is not included under the £7.6 billion cap (DECC, 
2013a). 
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the cap will become increasingly uncertain – owing to the variable nature of CfD payments 
(Brandmayr, 2016). 
It appears that the LCF was also designed to ‘…ensure that spending is subject to appropriate 
oversight by HM Treasury equivalent to spending from general taxation' (National Audit Office, 
2013, p.6). This was particularly relevant in the context of the 2010-2015 Coalition government 
under which the LCF was implemented, owing to the fact that DECC (now BEIS) was headed by a 
Liberal-Democrat minister, whereas the Treasury was a Conservative-led department. The LCF gave 
the Conservative-controlled Treasury oversight over a large part of DECC spending.  
The LCF was later used to justify cuts to environmental policies such as the FiT for small-scale solar 
generation. Following the introduction if the FiT in 2010 (OFGEM, 2017a), costs fell faster than 
expected leading to high levels of deployment of solar PV. The filling up of the LCF was then used as 
justification for cutting the solar PV FiT by 63.5% from February 2016 (OFGEM, 2016d; DECC, 2015b). 
Although the LCF does act as a cap on some policy costs, the framework’s design means it is paid for 
in large part by domestic consumers – with a clear negative impact for affordability of energy. This is 
because Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) have been exempted from paying for the majority of costs 
under the LCF on ground of preserving industrial competitiveness (HM Treasury, 2015b). This means 
that other bill payers such as domestic and smaller business customers face higher energy bills. 
Given that it is likely that small businesses will pass on these costs in the same way as any other 
production cost, ultimately it is domestic consumers which will, either directly or indirectly, pay the 
cost of the LCF (Lockwood, 2016). 
Environmental and social policy costs have increased significantly in recent years (CMA, 2015g), and 
in spite of only currently making up 11% of the average electricity bill, and 4% of the average gas bill 
(OFGEM, 2015a), they have received a high level of political and media attention (Lockwood, 2016). 
There are often calls, particularly from the Big Six firms, that some policies such as the ECO should 
be removed, or placed under general taxation (Business Green, 2013).  
The removal of policy costs from bills would reduce bills, and therefore benefit consumers, 
particularly those who rely upon electricity to heat their homes, owing to the concentration of social 
and environmental costs in the electricity bill (CMA, 2015j; CSE, 2013). However, any policy decisions 
that lead to cuts to renewable generators, or a reduction in funding to energy efficiency, such as via 
cuts to the ECO, although could be beneficial in the short term through reduced prices, would 
undermine long-term affordability of energy for domestic consumers - this is set out in detail in the 
following chapter. In addition to policy costs in the bill driving up costs for consumers, as energy bills 
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become increasingly politicised, these charges are more likely to become the target of further cuts. 
This risks undermining investor confidence in the energy industry as a whole, which could have 
significant negative impacts on the long-term affordability of energy. For example, a transition to a 
more flexible energy system has been estimated to lead to potential savings of between £2.9-8.1 
billion per year by 2030 (National Infrastructure Commission, 2016) - equating the average 
household energy bill of £30-90 per year (Howard and Bengherbi, 2016). However, such a transition 
is less likely to come about if investor confidence is severely undermined, and innovative business 
models unable to develop. 
2.3.5 – Governance of VAT   
VAT on domestic energy is currently charged at 5%, which is very low by international standards 
(DECC, 2015e) – see Figure 12 and Figure 13. Domestic energy was free of VAT until 1994, when it 
was introduced at 8%, with the intention to raise it to the normal rate (17.5%) the following year. 
However following a governmental defeat on a budget resolution vote, it was never raised (Seely 
and Twigger, 1997). In 1997 the new Labour government took the opportunity in its first budget to 
cut VAT on energy to 5% where it has remained since (Pearson and Watson, 2010).  
2.8.1 – Impact of VAT Governance on Affordability 
The low level of VAT charged on energy bills is crucial for affordability of energy for domestic 
consumers in Great Britain. As set out above, if levels of VAT were more in line with elsewhere, 
Great Britain would likely face one of the highest unit prices of energy in Europe. This stated, it could 
still be argued that energy should not attract any VAT at all. Many items such as unprocessed foods 
have a zero-rate of VAT charged to them, this because they are considered essential staple items. 
Therefore, the inclusion of VAT on domestic energy frames it as a non-staple item. It could be argued 
that there is a level above which consumption of energy becomes a luxury good (e.g. if demand is 
associated with heating a hot tub or swimming pool), but basic levels of heating are essential to 
maintain a good level of health (Harrington et al., 2005). This suggests that charging VAT on low 
levels of energy use is both inappropriate, and inconsistent with other staple products. Bringing 
energy in line with other staple products in this way would be highly beneficial to affordability of 
energy, both directly (in that it effectively cuts all energy bills by 5%) but also indirectly in that 
beginning to frame energy as an essential staple item could lead to a more progressive 
understanding of energy going forward. The removal of VAT from energy bills could however have 
implications outside energy policy as it would lead to a reduction of income to the treasury from 
energy, which in 2012 was worth in the order of £1.3 billion (Advani et al., 2013; Utility Week, 2013). 
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Currently, there is EU regulation which prevents VAT in energy being cut (The Council of the 
European Union, 2006), however it is not clear if this will continue to be the case after the UK leaves 
the European Union. 
2.4 – Governance of the Energy Retail Market 
Having examined the costs in the bill, it is important to look at how consumers engaged with those 
costs through the retail market. The retail market in its current form has existed since 1998 (CMA, 
2015e). It is based on the premise that consumers will shop around in the market and then choose a 
supplier and a tariff which is right for them. In such a scenario, suppliers would compete to win 
customers from one another on the basis of price, customer service and environmental credentials 
etc. This section sets out the governance affecting the offerings that suppliers make, the impact of 
meter type, and the way that consumers respond to these offerings in the market. The impacts that 
this has on affordability of energy is then examined.  
2.4.1 – Governance of Tariffs 
Tariffs are the pricing structure that the energy suppliers use for charging customers for their energy 
consumption. In Great Britain, the basic structure of a tariff typically consists of a daily standing 
charge, and a per-unit charge. This means an annual bill is calculated as below: 
This ‘standing charge + unit charge’ structure, along with rules around discounts and number of 
tariffs offerings, was a requirement as a result of OFGEM’s retail market review (RMR), launched in 
2010 (OFGEM, 2013i). However this aspect of the RMR policies is due to be lifted, and in 2016 
OFGEM advised that it will no longer be enforcing a number of the regulations which resulted from 
the RMR (OFGEM, 2016a). The majority of tariffs in the market still fit the basic ‘standing charge + 
unit charge’ structure, likely because it reflects suppliers ‘fixed cost + variable cost’ cost structure, 
however some new tariffs are beginning to emerge, such as British Gas offering tariffs with free 
electricity on a Saturday or Sunday (British Gas, 2016). 
Despite these sorts of tariff innovations emerging, the retail market is largely made up of two types 
of tariff. The majority of consumers are on standard variable tariffs (SVTs), and this is particularly 
true of Big Six’s customer base (CMA, 2015j), which have between 50% and 90% of their customers 
on SVTs (depending on the supplier in question) (CMA, 2015j).  These do not have an expiry period 
and so are sometimes referred to as 'evergreen' tariffs (OFGEM, 2009c). Suppliers are free to change 
(Daily Standing Charge x 365) + (Energy Unit Charge x Number of Units Consumed) 
= Annual Energy Bill 
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SVT prices frequently, subject to giving required notice of price changes. In practice however, most 
suppliers generally adjust prices only once or twice a year (See Figure 21). 
Fixed-price tariffs are the other common alternative to SVTs. These offer a fixed price, for a set 
period of time. Although these cannot be increased during the tariff period, they can be withdrawn 
and replaced quickly. At the end of the fixed period, the consumer is free to choose a new tariff, or 
will automatically be switched to the supplier's SVT. Fixed price tariffs are on the whole cheaper 
than their SVT counterparts, but this is generally not a product of their being cheaper to administer, 
SVTs typically attract a higher level of margin than their fixed-price counterparts (CMA, 2015j, p.27). 
The different tariffs are priced and targeted for commercially significant reasons (CMA, 2015k), with 
decisions around SVTs predominantly based on costs, volume forecasts, strategic objectives, and 
expectations of rivals' strategies and financial positions (CMA, 2015k). Whereas, fixed tariffs are 
more focussed on establishing a competitive position relative to rivals' offerings in the market, 
acquisition targets and retention targets (CMA, 2015k). Fixed price tariffs are set in reference to how 
many customers it is expected will move onto variable tariffs at the end of a fixed-tariff period (CMA, 
2015i). New fixed price tariffs may be launched to coincide with the ending of a rival's offering in an 
attempt to win customers. This indicates that fixed tariffs are inherently designed to be more 
competitive than suppliers’ SVT offerings (CMA, 2015i). The majority of consumers are on SVTs, and 
therefore paying a premium in comparison to the cheapest tariffs available. This means that most 
the population are paying prices which are often far above the cheapest available in the market – 
with significant negative implications for affordability of energy. This is discussed in more detail 
below 
2.4.2 – Governance of Switching  
It is apparent that the retail market is not functioning effectively for all consumers. In spite of over a 
decade of retail market competition, over half of all customers are considered either disengaged11 - 
(20%) or severely disengaged12 (37%) with the energy market (OFGEM, 2015k), and switching rates 
fell from their peak in 2008, remaining generally consistent in the order of ~30,000 electricity and 
gas switches per month (OFGEM, 2016f) - equivalent to approximately 0.1% of the domestic market. 
This is a long-standing issue, and was one of the principle drivers for OFGEM’s 2010 RMR (OFGEM, 
2013i), as well as also being the focus of some of the remedies from OFGEM’s 2008 supply probe 
                                                          
11 'Aware that there is an option to switch, but are unlikely to have actually done so in the last year, or indeed 
ever'(CSE, 2015, p.19) 
12 'May have glanced at their bills but are unlikely to understand their energy consumption or whether 
switching could actually save them money' (CSE, 2015, p.19) 
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before it (OFGEM, 2009c). OFGEM’s decision to repeal a number of the RMR rules relating to the 
number and structure of tariffs (OFGEM, 2016a) is likely to lead to an increase in the number of 
tariffs in the market, including tariffs exclusively for new customers. This means not only will 
consumers be required to change tariff frequently, they may in future also have to frequently 
change supplier. 
The decision to remove the RMR rules is in pursuit of greater levels of competition, (in spite of their 
being originally introduced for the same reason) however it is not clear this is necessarily something 
which customers are calling for: OFGEM (2015j) notes that in a survey monitoring the effectiveness 
of the RMR policies, 44% of consumers said the amount of choice in the market was now about 
right, however nearly a third stated that there is still too much choice in the energy market. In spite 
of the majority of customers being confident in their ability to switch (OFGEM, 2015k). 
The significant savings available in the market suggest that this confidence does not translate to 
action - each of the Big Six suppliers has a number of unengaged, 'legacy' customers which remain 
from before liberalisation, or who have switched only once or twice and have now become 
unengaged (TNS BMRB and OFGEM, 2016). Between 40-70% of each of the Big Six’s customer base 
has been with the same supplier for four or more years (CMA, 2015c). This is in spite of significant 
savings that could be made from switching:  
• £44-£144 savings annually from switching to a different tariff with the same supplier (e.g. 
SVT to fixed) - these savings were found available to 56-82% of the dual fuel customer base 
of each Big Six supplier 
• £46-£153 saved annually from switching to a similar design of tariff with a different supplier 
(e.g. SVT to SVT or fixed to fixed) - these savings were found to be available to 58-94% of the 
dual fuel customer base of each Big Six supplier 
• £158-£234 annually saved by switching to a different design of tariff with a different supplier 
(e.g. SVT to fixed with a different supplier) - these savings were found to be available to 94- 
99% of the dual fuel customer base of each Big Six supplier    
        (CMA, 2015b, pp.3–4) 
This means that nearly all of the Big Six domestic dual-fuel customers could benefit from switching, 
and given that single-fuel customers often face some of the highest prices (OFGEM, 2015k), it is 
reasonable to suggest that many of them may also make significant savings by switching supplier. 
This supports OFGEM's (2015j) analysis that consumer engagement is low in the domestic retail 
market, which is leading to unengaged consumers paying some of the highest prices. This means 
that engagement in the retail market by switching has become a prerequisite to accessing the lowest 
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prices. This has led to the creation of a two-tier market; split between engaged consumers who 
access the lowest prices on the market by actively choosing their energy supplier by switching, and 
unengaged consumers who do not switch, and as a consequence pay more. This is likely to be having 
a particularly negative effect on fuel poverty because those on SVTs are more likely to be on low 
incomes, or otherwise vulnerable (OFGEM, 2015k).  
It is evident from the statements that the Big Six energy suppliers made to the CMA that they use 
the higher margins from SVT customers to subsidise those on fixed tariffs. However, the CMA did not 
highlight this as a significant issue. One supplier explained that it priced its fixed tariffs on the 
assumption that some customers would then move onto the higher priced SVT (CMA, 2015g), 
meaning that the low revenues in early years (from the low-priced fixed tariff) would be offset in 
later years (from the high-priced SVT). This means (1) that the supplier is making pricing decisions 
based on the assumption (or hope) that customers will become unengaged in the future, and (2) 
that in any given year, the suppliers’ cash flow is reliant upon high revenues from SVT customers 
offsetting the low revenues of those customers on low-priced fixed tariffs. In short, this means that 
suppliers business models are reliant upon unengaged SVT consumers subsidising those engaged 
consumers paying a fixed rate.  
Not only do SVTs generate higher margins (see CMA, 2015g), but they can be increased to offset any 
rises in the underlying costs in the bill as/when it is beneficial to the supplier to do so (CMA, 2015j; 
Rutledge, 2010). Given that being on an SVT is associated with being unengaged from the energy 
market, prices can be increased with limited risk that this will prompt consumers to switch supplier. 
This gives the Big Six firms access to a large reliable revenue streams which can be used to levy 
competitive advantage against new entrants (Which?, 2013; OVO, 2014) who are reliant upon 
attracting engaged consumers in order to generate revenue. This is an issue because, in addition to 
the challenges of being a new small company, their customer base by definition is made up of 
customers that are engaged in the market, and so therefore may be willing to switch again away 
from the new supplier. Even upon attracting new customers, there is no guarantee that they will be 
profitable - campaigns to gain new customers represent considerable cost, which may only be 
recouped if that customer remains with the supplier for 3-5 years (Kuzemko, 2015b). This allows the 
large suppliers to continue to prosper, and for them to make it difficult for small innovative firms to 
challenge them and grow.  
2.4.3 – Governance and Meters 
The type of energy meter a household has affects which tariffs are open to them. The majority of 
households in Great Britain make use of standard credit meters, which log consumption, and are 
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then read weeks or months later. Consumption levels are then used to calculate consumers' bills. 
Consumers with standard credit meters are able to access the vast majority of tariffs in the market. 
A common alternative to standard credit meters is the prepayment meter (PPM), which is present in 
15% of households (CMA, 2015g). These require topping up with credit in advance, and when the 
credit on the meter is exhausted, the supply of electricity or gas is cut off. This is called 'self-
disconnection', and enables energy suppliers to state that they no longer disconnect customers for 
non-payment (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2013b). It is common practice to install 
prepayment meters in the instance of a customer accumulating a debt on their account (CMA, 
2015g). In addition to the risk of having their energy supply cut off if they do not top up the meter, 
there are also fewer tariff options available to PPM customers, owing to most suppliers offering 
fewer PPM tariffs than standard credit meter tariffs, and to the fact that not all suppliers in the 
market offer PPM tariffs. This latter factor is connected to rules in the supply licence - suppliers with 
less than 50,000 customers are not required to offer prepayment as a payment option (GEMA, 
2015).This means that PPM customers are often unable to access some of the lowest prices in the 
market. 
There may also be barriers for some consumers from moving from a prepayment meter to a 
standard credit meter. Although in 2014, 95% of PPM removals were carried out for free, there are 
often requirements for large upfront security deposits, these are typically in the order of £200, and 
in some instances can be as high as £5000 (OFGEM, 2015i). This means that not only are PPM 
customers unable to access the lowest prices in the market, but they also may not be able to afford 
to take the necessary steps to gain access to the lowest prices. Given PPM meters are often used by 
those on low incomes, is likely to harm the fuel poor in particular. The CMA has proposed the 
introduction of a transitional price cap for PPM customers, benchmarked against expected costs. In 
2015, had this cap been present it would have saved the average PPM customer £75 a year (CMA, 
2016c). Although this is likely to produce some benefits to PPM consumers, it fails to address issues 
such as lack of choice of tariffs in the PPM market, or the issue of security deposits associated with 
having a PPM removed. It also is predicated on OFGEM having the institutional capacity to set a tariff 
reflective of underlying market conditions and hedging patterns. Given the lack of transparency in 
trading in the wholesale market, this is likely to be highly challenging. 
2.4.4 – Governance of Price Comparison Websites 
Price comparison websites (PCWs) allow consumers to compare the prices of different tariffs in the 
market, and are often paid a commission by suppliers for facilitating a customer switching to their 
supply (CMA, 2016a). Currently they are required to give customers the option to see all tariffs from 
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all suppliers, rather than just those that the PCW can facilitate a switch to (which are usually 
operated by suppliers which pay commission to the PCW) (OFGEM, 2015b). However, following the 
CMA’s energy market investigation, this requirement is being removed, allowing PCWs to show only 
a subset of the tariffs available. This is in addition to their being permitted to offer exclusive tariffs, 
not available elsewhere (CMA, 2016c). This is both to prevent suppliers that do not pay commission 
‘free-riding’ (CMA, 2016c), and is also designed to promote competition between PCWs. However, 
this means that in future consumers will have to shop around not only between suppliers, but also 
between price comparison websites. This means that customers will have to work harder to 
guarantee they are accessing the lowest prices, further necessitating a high level of engagement 
with the energy market, and the exclusive nature of some tariffs further damages affordability for 
some vulnerable consumers. This is because PCWs are less widely used by those with less education, 
or lower income (CMA, 2015g). Given that over seven million UK adults have never used the internet 
at all (OFGEM, 2013c), a significant number of people, particularly the vulnerable, do not have 
access to the exclusive tariffs on offer.  
The benefits to the rise of PCWs is however that not only are there are new avenues for some 
consumers to engage in the market through switching, but PCWs represent a new group of 
institutions who are marketing to consumers to encourage them to engage through switching. This is 
in stark contrast to suppliers, in whose interests it is for unengaged consumers to remain 
unengaged.  
2.4.5 – Governance of Price Announcements  
Competition in the retail market may also be undermined by the coordination of price 
announcements by the energy suppliers. It is important to note that coordination differs from 
collusion in that it occurs without formal agreements to act together. Collusion is illegal, whereas 
coordination may signal weak competition, and lead prices to be higher than they would otherwise 
be (OFGEM et al., 2014). 
Figure 21 sets out the average gas and electricity price change announcements of the Big Six firms 
between January 2004 and January 2014. The location of the circle demonstrates the point in time 
the price announcement was made, and the size of the circle reflects the size of the change. Red 
circles reflect price increases, and white circles represent price cuts. There appears to be a high 
degree of synergy to the price-change announcements, both in timing and in scale, which implies 
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some level of coordination.
 
Figure 21 - Gas and Electricity SVT Price Change Announcements: January 2004 - January 2014, Source:(OFGEM et al., 
2014) 
CMA (2015c) sets out three criteria that need to exist to enable coordination to persist:  
1. Coordinating firms are be sufficiently aware of one another to be able to predict one 
another's behaviour, and identify which behaviours would bring about a mutually beneficial 
outcome. 
2. Coordinating firms find it individually beneficial to seek the coordinated outcome, and lack 
incentive or have a disincentive to compete. 
3. Coordination can only continue to function if it is unlikely to be undermined by outside 
challengers.  
Each of these criteria appear to be fulfilled: 
1 - Rutledge (2010) states that the Big Six have had sufficient time and experience to learn each 
other's behaviours in the face of one raising prices, and the regularity of price changes is also likely 
to allow suppliers predict the future behaviour of competitors. 
2 - These price announcements relate to the SVT of each of the Big Six companies. Although as set 
out above, these are generally occupied by unengaged consumers, these highly publicised, and 
coordinated price announcements would help to foster the notion that suppliers are 'all the same', 
and therefore limit the perceived benefits to switching (CMA, 2015c). This both discourages those on 
SVTs from becoming engaged, as well as encouraging those customers that are currently engaged to 
become less so. It also helps to create an image in the eyes of policy makers of an industry operating 
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with prices which accurately reflect underlying costs, in spite of there being little transparency over 
whether this is in fact the case. As set out above, the Big Six make pricing decision in the hope that 
customers will stop engaging in the market. 
3 - It could be suggested that the independent suppliers are outside challengers to this coordination, 
indeed the CMA (2015c) suggests the recent growth of independent suppliers is further evidence for 
lack of coordination. However, although together they hold a meaningful market share, each 
individual firm carries a much smaller market share, making it difficult for any one challenger to 
threaten this coordination.  
In spite of these criteria seeming to be fulfilled, the CMA (2015c) is of the opinion that coordination 
is not taking place; stating that it found a number of differences in suppliers' business strategies and 
purchasing behaviours, and that these differences would make it difficult to coordinate behaviour. 
However, it is not clear why, if business strategies and purchasing behaviours are indeed so varied, it 
is that the price rises occur together with such regularity. Given the need for consumers to engage in 
the market, and that this behaviour from suppliers may discourage that engagement, coordinated 
price announcements may be said to undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers. 
2.4.6 - Impact of Retail Market Governance on Affordability  
Since the repeal of the RMR rules (OFGEM, 2016a) suppliers are free to offer any number or 
structure of tariffs they wish, although this allows them to trial innovative tariff designs, which is 
likely to support pricing structures which could support affordability in future, this complete 
freedom of tariff design is not necessarily an entirely positive thing. The ubiquitous ‘unit + standing 
charge’ pricing structure appears to be designed around suppliers’ cost structure, rather than a new 
serving the needs of consumers. It is understandable that if given complete freedom, suppliers may 
choose such a structure to reduce risk, but the fact that this structure was codified in the RMR, 
which was put in place by OFGEM, demonstrates how the current governance structure may not 
consistently place consumer needs as the central consideration. 
Suppliers’ freedom to derive greater revenues from those customers that are on SVTs has a negative 
impact on both general affordability, and particularly the fuel poor. The Big 6 suppliers who have a 
large incumbent customer bases are able to charge their unengaged, often vulnerable, SVT 
customers a higher price in order to subsidise low-priced fixed tariffs to entice engaged consumers. 
This harms those consumers who are charged more, and in turn enables the large market 
participants to stifle the growth of smaller players who may be looking to offer innovative solutions 
to the benefit of consumers. 
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The higher-priced SVTs are generally occupied by those consumers who are unengaged from the 
market. This means that suppliers generate more revenue from an unengaged customer, than an 
engaged one. This creates a fundamental conflict in the market – the retail energy market functions 
on the principle of high levels of consumer engagement in order for consumers to access the best 
prices, however the biggest players in that market make their largest revenues from unengaged 
consumers. This means it is in the interests of the large incumbent suppliers for levels of 
engagement to be low. This leads them to make pricing decisions in the hope that consumers will 
stop engaging, and take steps to discourage engagement (such as through coordinated price 
announcements). The growth of price comparison websites has helped to support engagement, 
however regulations regarding allowing exclusive offers and no longer having to display a complete 
view of the market are likely to erode the value of PCWs. 
In spite of all this, competition is still relied upon to deliver the best outcomes for consumers. This 
heavy reliance on competition is likely to be, at least in part, as a consequence of OFGEM’s primary 
duty, which is in turn a product of a pro-market ideology. However, this is serving to undermine 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers. The government and OFGEM have been aware of a 
number of issues in the energy market for some time, and so in June 2014 OFGEM referred the 
energy market to the CMA for investigation. Although such a review is inarguably beneficial, the 
review and subsequent proposals are fundamentally limited by the nature and role of the CMA – 
which is inherently tied to this reliance on competition. The main purpose of the CMA is ‘…to 
promote competition for the benefit of consumers, both within and outside the UK’ (CMA, 2016b). 
This constrains its framing of the issues, and limits the solutions it is likely to offer – as a 
competition-focussed body, all issues and solutions will relate to competition. This is problematic 
because the complexity of issues of affordability of energy calls for an extensive understanding and 
consideration of a diverse range of solutions. Competition was introduced with the objective of 
delivering lower prices and better service for consumers, however it appears now that this objective 
has been superseded by simply promoting competition for its own sake. This strong dedication to a 
pro-market ideology again limits the focus on taking whichever steps deliver best outcomes for 
consumers. 
2.5 - Conclusion 
Although there is a limited amount in the literature focussing on the relationship between 
governance and the makeup of energy bills in Great Britain, this section has shed light on some 
significant issues in the governance structure relating to prices, tariffs, and market arrangements 
which undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers.  
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It has been shown that there are a number of opportunities to reform the governance structure in 
order to reduce the different costs in the domestic energy bill, and therefore improve affordability of 
energy. Firstly, a lack of institutional capacity to critique the business models of network companies 
appears to be responsible for the network companies being often able to achieve very high profits, 
paid for by consumers. A different price control framework, or a higher degree of institutional 
capacity within OFGEM could improve this situation.  
The design of non-actor institutions, such as the electricity and gas wholesale markets are having a 
negative effect on affordability. Both markets are characterised by a lack of transparency which 
makes it almost impossible for an outside observer, including OFGEM, to verify that prices charged 
to end consumers are reflective of the underlying costs. In other supply chains, it would be the 
competitive pressure of the retail market that would help to ensure this happens, however a lack of 
competition from the electricity and gas retail markets means this pressure is weak. Although this 
does not prove that savings are not passed on, there is little incentive for a profit-motivated 
company to do so. Less opaque market arrangements, or greater powers for OFGEM to examine 
trades, would however allow OFGEM a better view of trading activities in order to ensure that the 
prices paid to consumers where reflective of the charges suppliers faced. This may also require a 
tightening of rules around transfer pricing, which currently require trades between separate parts of 
the same company to be only loosely connected to any sort of external market price. This would be 
necessary in order to ensure that VI firms do not simply accrue large profits in their generation arms. 
The dominant ideology in the design of industry structures appears to be one of support for non-
interventionist, pro-market mechanisms. This is particularly visible in the retail market where 
consumers must engage to receive the lowest prices. There are issues however, a two-tier retail 
market has developed, where one group of customers are engaged and switch often to receive the 
best prices, and a second tier where customers remain on standard variable tariffs, often with the 
Big Six suppliers, paying significantly higher prices – meaning this has negative consequences for 
general affordability. Poor and vulnerable households are among those least likely to engage in the 
market (OFGEM et al., 2014), so likely to be predominantly found in the second tier – meaning the 
effects are particularly acute on the fuel poor. The situation is particularly poor for those with PPMs 
who are often unable to access the lowest price tariffs, and can face significant barriers to changing 
their meter. What is more, there is an inherent paradox in this market design. The high margins 
which unengaged customers on SVTs  bring (CMA, 2015j, p.27) mean it is in the interests for large 
suppliers to keep their existing customer base unengaged from the market.  
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Finally, it appears that there are other areas of the bill, such as environmental and social policy costs, 
and VAT, which although only make up a small percentage of the average domestic energy bill could 
be reduced further to better support affordability. However, if this led to the reduction of funding 
for social and environmental policies, this could have significant negative effects on investor 
confidence.  
This chapter has demonstrated how the governance in the energy system fails to push down each of 
the costs within the energy bill, leading prices to be higher than they could be – resulting in the 
underlying cost of energy (before tax) to be among the highest in Europe. Although the final prices 
faced by consumers are on average not significantly higher than some other countries in Europe, this 
is owed in large part to low levels of taxation on energy. It is also the case that there is a large 
disparity between those predominantly engaged consumers on the lowest priced tariffs, and those 
predominantly unengaged consumers on the highest priced tariffs – suggesting that an average price 
does not tell the whole story.  
The following chapter will go on to discuss the role of governance in affecting energy efficiency 
standards, which have a significant impact on affordability of energy for domestic consumers. Energy 
efficiency standards in Great Britain are poor in comparison to some other countries in Europe (ACE 
and Energy Bill Revolution, 2015). This means that although final unit prices are between average 
and the slightly higher end of levels in Europe, energy bills (as a product of prices and demand) are 
high. The following chapter will focus on the relationship between governance and domestic energy 
efficiency standards in Great Britain, which will inform and be added to, the primary research. 
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Chapter 3 - Energy Demand & Energy Efficiency in Great Britain  
 
3.1 - Introduction 
As was set out in previous chapters, energy bills are the combination of prices, and levels of energy 
demand. Having applied a governance lens to the examination of costs in the bill, tariffs, and the 
operation of the retail market, the impact of governance on energy demand and energy efficiency 
should also be examined. This forms the second important factor of affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers. This chapter will begin by briefly setting out drivers of energy demand, and 
barriers to its reduction, before examining the role that governance plays in supporting, or 
hindering, improved energy efficiency standards in Great Britain. The relative scale of spending on 
energy efficiency and income support policies is then reviewed, and what this implies for energy 
governance. The analysis in this chapter will then be combined with primary research to give a 
strong overall picture of the impact of governance on energy efficiency in the domestic sector – a 
key driver for affordability. 
3.2 - Levels of Energy Demand 
3.2.1 - Drivers of Demand 
Before examining the impact of governance on energy efficiency, it is first beneficial to examine 
drivers of final energy demand, and the barriers to demand reduction. These are important because 
their understanding informs the design of an appropriate governance structure to support the 
reductions in the amount of energy that consumers need.  
3.2.1.1 – Behavioural Drivers 
Behavioural drivers are complex and multi-faceted (Socolow, 1978; Hole, 2014), and  affect 'short-
term energy service demand ' such as setting of indoor temperatures, choosing to turn off lamps 
when leaving a room etc. (Haas, 1997). Individuals’ decisions are not taken in isolation, but are 
influenced by the social context in which they occur (Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014; Alexander, 2012; 
CORPUS, 2013; Hole, 2012). They are also made with reference to past decisions, both as a product 
of habit, (Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014; Alexander, 2012; DECC, 2014p), and simple ‘rules-of-thumb’ 
(Brown, 2001). Crucially for affordability, the financial pressure of high energy prices can alter 
behaviour to reduce energy demand (Gillingham et al., 2009), as vulnerable and fuel poor groups will 
often cut back on consumption to create an immediate saving on energy bills in response to rising 
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prices (DECC, 2014p). For example, fuel poor parents often ration heat to when children are in the 
home in order to protect them from health impacts of living in a cold environment (Tod et al., 2016).  
3.2.1.2 - Structural Drivers 
Structural drivers such as social trends affect 'long-term energy service demand' (Haas, 1997). 
Examples which all increase demand include that people today prefer to keep homes significantly 
warmer than 40 years ago (Palmer and Cooper, 2013), increasing ownership of  consumer 
electronics (Energy Saving Trust, 2007), and an aging population who often choose to remain in the 
large family home (Hamza and Gilroy, 2011). 
3.2.1.3 - Technical Drivers 
Technical drivers relate to energy efficiency of properties and associated energy infrastructure such 
as boilers, and have a significant effect on levels of both actual demand, and the amount of energy 
consumers need for a good standard of living (Haas, 1997). Great Britain generally has a low 
standard of domestic energy efficiency (Pyrko and Darby, 2011). In 2014, seventy-three percent of 
the English13 housing stock had an energy performance rating of grade D or below (See Figure 22), 
this in part relates to Great Britain's aging housing stock and history of poor building standards 
(Hamza and Gilroy, 2011; Hoggett et al., 2011; CAB, 2014). This is in spite of the fact that the 
importance of thermal insulation in housing was identified as early as 1947 (Parker, 1947 in Wicks, 
1978). This does however highlight the considerable opportunity to improve affordability of energy 
by means of improving the efficiency of the housing stock. This is particularly true in the private 
rental sector which has a greater proportion of some of the least efficient properties than other 
tenure types (although the average value of private rental energy efficiency is improving owing to an 
increasing number of modern purpose-built flats in the rental sector) (DCLG and ONS, 2015).  
Improvements in energy efficiency do not always lead to the technically expected levels of demand 
reduction. This is because the money saved on energy bills can be spent either on consuming more 
energy directly, or indirectly on other appliances or hobbies that lead to increased energy demand. 
This is known as the 'rebound effect' (OECD and IEA, 2014; Sorrell et al., 2009). The level of rebound, 
and so the effect efficiency improvements have on final demand varies between different 
households (Kelly, 2011; Pett, 2009), and different end uses (Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Greening et 
al., 2000). Although this leads to less reduction in demand than would otherwise be expected it can 
in fact be a desirable effect in some households. This is because those in fuel poverty are most likely 
to be significantly under-heating their homes (Stockton and Campbell, 2011; Chitnis et al., 2014). 
                                                          
13 NB. Aggregated figures are not available, however proportions are broadly similar for Scotland (Scottish 
Government, 2012), and in Wales there is a greater proportion of E-rated properties (Welsh Assembly 
Government, 2010), although this latter difference may be at least partially explained by the age of the data.  
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When energy efficiency standards are improved, rather than reducing expenditure, they are likely to 
continue with similar levels of expenditure but instead choose to benefit from greater levels of 
warmth. This is known as 'comfort-taking' (CSE, 2011; Sorrell et al., 2009). Energy efficiency 
standards, and the governance to support their improvement, is a core focus of this thesis.  
3.2.1.4 - Other Explanatory Variables  
Other explanatory variables can affect energy demand. In the short term, weather can affect 
demand (DECC, 2015i). Also, Haas (1997) highlights that income is important, but acts only as 
secondary drivers to energy demand, in that it has an effect on the primary behavioural and 
structural drivers. For example, those with a higher income are likely to own a larger house, which 
can increase levels of energy demand.  
 
 
Figure 22 - EPC Distribution of English Housing Stock, Source: Author’s Own From Data in DCLG, 2014 
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3.2.2 – Energy demand over time 
Figure 23 shows the total level of final domestic energy demand over time, from 1970 to 2014. 
Reductions in recent years coincide with increased deployment of energy efficiency measures and 
condensing boilers (DECC, 2015j), as well as increasing energy prices (DECC, 2014b) leading to 
deprivation (DECC, 2014p). The 2008 economic recession is also likely to have had an impact (DECC, 
2015k). 
Box 3 - Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) Explained 
EPCs were introduced in Great Britain in 2008 as part of adherence to the European Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (EU, 2002). They show the level of efficiency of a domestic 
property, presented both as a score out of 100 (known as the SAP rating), and as a letter A-G, 
with A representing the most efficient properties, and G the least efficient. These ratings take 
into account factors such as thermal efficiency of the building including double glazing, the 
efficiency of the heating system, and installed lighting etc. Energy consumption in other 
appliances is not considered however. 
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Figure 23 - Total GB Final Domestic Energy Demand 1970-2014, Source: Author's Own from data in DECC, 2015j 
There is considerable variation in different households’ energy demand. In 2016, the estimated 
typical domestic consumption volume (TDCV) for a household connected to the gas network was 
3100 kWh for electricity and 12500 kWh for gas (OFGEM, 2015c). These figures are used as the basis 
for discussions around average energy bills, and in communications with consumers. As can be seen 
in , the range of different levels of consumption means that the TDCV (marked in red) is not wholly 
representative of a significant proportion of the population. This means that often in policy 
discussions, the figures used differ significantly for large proportions of the population. OFGEM does 
also publish typical consumption value figures for high and low demand users, but these are seldom 
used in policy discussions regarding the average bill. There is also no requirement for suppliers to 
inform consumers if they are a low, medium, or high user of energy. 
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Figure 24 - Distribution of GB Domestic Gas and Electricity Consumption with Typical Consumption Values (2014), 
Source: Author's Own from data in DECC, 2016d and OFGEM, 2015c 
 
 
3.3 – Governance and Established Barriers to Energy Efficiency 
In spite of the considerable benefits of high levels of energy efficiency, and a number of policies 
(both past and present) designed to improve the standard of the housing stock, Great Britain still has 
generally low levels of energy efficiency in the domestic sector (ACE and Energy Bill Revolution, 
2015; Pyrko and Darby, 2011). Nearly three quarters of homes in Great Britain are rated EPC grade D 
or below (see Figure 22). The academic and policy literature offers a number of explanatory factors 
for this sub-optimal take-up of energy efficiency, often termed as the 'efficiency gap' (Brown, 2001). 
This section however examines these established barriers through a governance lens. 
3.3.1 - Cost 
One of the most significant barriers to energy efficiency deployment is cost, owing to the upfront 
nature of the investment (IPPR, 2013b). This is a particular issue in older properties which cost more 
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to improve; 36% of the UK housing stock is incompatible with the most cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures - loft and cavity wall insulation (Morris, 2010). Although there are technical 
solutions to improving the efficiency of older properties such as solid wall insulation, the costs 
associated with some such measures can be high (Golubchikov and Deda, 2012). The technically 
challenging nature of some parts of the building stock is routed in the history of building regulations, 
with effective regulations for energy efficiency slower to develop in Great Britain than a number of 
other countries. This has created a form of technological lock-in (Unruh, 2000), making a number of 
those properties that are most in need of renovation, among the most expensive to renovate - 
currently only 4% of solid wall properties have solid wall insulation (DECC, 2015f). 
Whilst it is true that the high up front cost of measures can form a barrier to an individual investing 
in improved standards of energy efficiency. This barrier may also be viewed as a lack of access to 
appropriate finance necessary to support improvement (See: European Bank, 2003; Brown, 2001; 
Hirst and Brown, 1990). If banks, or some other institution, were able to offer straightforward 
competitively priced financing for energy efficiency measures, this barrier would be significantly 
reduced.   
3.3.2 - Principal-Agent Problem 
Another barrier to energy efficiency deployment is known as the principal-agent problem (Druckman 
and Jackson, 2008; Brown, 2001; Gillingham et al., 2009). This is the situation where the energy 
consuming party is not the party who makes decisions around efficiency investment. This exists most 
notably in the private rental sector (Golubchikov and Deda, 2012) where generally the landlord is 
responsible for bearing the cost and organisational burden of installing efficiency improvements, but 
it is the tenant who accrues the benefits. The same issue may also arise in design and construction of 
new properties. Builders or architects who are responsible for selecting the energy technologies may 
seek to minimise upfront costs, and it is the residents of the properties which then bear the ongoing 
cost of such decisions (Gillingham et al., 2009; Brown, 2001). 
Through a governance lens, this may be viewed as a failure to put in place the appropriate policy or 
regulatory regime to ensure that the interests of the ‘principal and the agent were more in line with 
one another, such as through the introduction of regulations requiring a minimum energy efficiency 
standard, or incentives to encourage higher standards such as combining heating bills with rent. 
3.3.3 – Behaviours and Attitudes 
The views and attitudes of households, which relate to a number of varied drivers (Mallaburn and 
Eyre, 2013), can also form a barrier to deployment of energy efficiency. A survey in Great Britain 
showed that in spite of high levels of concern for energy bills, there is limited support for the idea 
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that individuals should install insulation measures in reaction to these high bills (Change Behaviour, 
2013).  
The 'hassle-factor' is another behavioural barrier, this is where the time and effort relating to 
installing energy efficiency measures, such as finding a reputable and well-priced installer, or 
clearing possessions out of a loft, can lead consumers to choose not to invest in energy efficiency 
(Consumer Focus, 2012; Oikonomou et al., 2009; Rosenow and Eyre, 2012; Oxera, 2006). Therefore 
in spite of the future benefits of lower costs following energy efficiency improvements (Steward, 
2014), many consumers do not invest in energy efficiency, even in the face of rising energy prices. 
This implies that suitable structures have not been put in place to make energy efficiency 
improvements straight-forward and accessible for households. Although it is impossible to entirely 
remove the ‘hassle-factor’, institutions which are able to provide information and support services 
such as loft-clearance (as was trialled by three South London local authorities in 2013  (DECC, 
2013e)) may also facilitate deployment of energy efficiency. 
3.3.4 - Information 
Finally, consumers often do not have the right information to make informed decisions around 
which energy efficiency measures are appropriate for them (Consumer Focus, 2012; Gillingham et 
al., 2009; Rosenow and Eyre, 2012; IPPR, 2013b; OFGEM, 2012a), the pricing of such products 
(Consumer Focus, 2012), or the savings that they can provide (Gillingham et al., 2009), and 
Consumer Focus (2012) highlight research showing 15% and 9% of people respectively have never 
thought of having cavity or loft insulation installed. This is closely linked to issues of the hassle-
factor, indicating that either the right institutions are not currently in place, or that they do not have 
the necessary capacity, to effectively communicate the benefits and opportunities of energy 
efficiency to domestic consumers. 
This section has demonstrated how although there is much that is already understood in terms of 
barriers to energy efficiency improvements, that reviewing challenges through a governance lens 
can offer new insight, and possibly pave the way for new solutions to be developed. The following 
section will examine the governance surrounding some of the policies which have been put in place 
in Great Britain.  
3.4 –  Governance of Energy Efficiency and How Energy Efficiency Has Been Delivered  
This section will set out the governance relating to a range of energy efficiency policies in Great 
Britain. The Green Deal and the ECO are two of the most significant features of domestic energy 
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efficiency policy in recent years, and therefore will be examined in some detail. A range of other 
policies also exist however - these will be reviewed later in the chapter. 
3.4.1 - The Green Deal – A Failure of Governance 
The Green Deal is being examined as a case study of a policy which has failed to deliver, in large part 
owed to the surrounding governance structure. 
3.4.1.1 - Background to the Green Deal 
The Green Deal was the 2010-2015 Coalition government's flagship energy efficiency policy, and was 
designed to address a number of barriers to installation of energy efficiency measures. However, 
specifically which barriers it was designed to address was not consistent between documents. 
Although principally it was designed to address issues of upfront costs (DECC, 2011e, 2010), a lack of 
trust in the work of energy efficiency installers (DECC, 2011e), lengthy payback periods of measures 
(DECC, 2010), and lack of awareness of what options are available (DECC, 2011d, 2010) were also all 
cited. It appears that the design of the Green Deal lacked a clear objective. 
The Green Deal was launched early in 2013 (DECC, 2013g). It was a market-based mechanism relying 
on the private sector for its delivery (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2013), and represented a considerable 
change in direction from previous policies based on government/bill-payer funding. Under the Green 
Deal, the role of government was limited to capacity building, accreditation and compliance 
monitoring (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2013). The Green Deal offered participants the opportunity to take 
out a loan to cover the up-front cost of the improvement works, which was then paid back through 
their electricity bill. The loan was offered by the Green Deal Finance Company, which was funded by 
the Green Investment Bank (Green Investment Bank, 2015). The loan was attached to the property, 
not the owner, so future tenants/owners would be required to continue the payments. The basic 
interest rates for Green Deal loans was 6.96% (this is the rate at which providers were loaned funds 
by the Green Deal Finance Company). However after set-up costs, and depending on the measures 
taken out and the timescale of the loan, the effective interest rate could reach in the order of 10% 
(IPPR, 2013b).  
The central pillar of the policy was the 'Golden Rule' whereby the loan repayments should never be 
more than the projected saving on the energy bill brought about by the energy efficiency measures. 
The measures that were available under the 'Golden Rule' was established by means of an initial 
inspection of the property called the Green Deal Assessment (DECC, 2012c). Where the Golden Rule 
might not be achievable, households would be able to top-up the Green Deal loan with finance from 
the ECO (DECC, 2011b). Following the inspection, households then arranged with a Green Deal 
provider to have the measures installed, and the finance schemes set up. The repayment charge 
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would then begin to appear on the household electricity bill (DECC, 2011e). 
Funding for the Green Deal was designed to attract long term investment from a range of 
institutions including pension and insurance funds. Consultation with potential Green Deal providers 
demonstrated an interest in off-balance sheet finance, and the opportunity to access financial 
markets, potentially through the onward sale of Green Deal payments (e.g. through the 
securitisation of Green Deal receivables) (DECC, 2011e).  
The Green Deal was based on a highly complex customer journey, and supporting institutional 
arrangements (see Figure 25). First, customers arrange for a Green Deal Assessment, which involved 
a home visit from a Green Deal assessor. This set out what measures were appropriate for install 
under the Green Deal. The customer then chooses a Green Deal Provider (which was not necessarily 
the same company that provided the Green Deal Assessment). The Green Deal provider then 
discusses options available, and any other useful information. The provider gives a quote for various 
options and calculates a repayment plan when the quote is accepted. The provider then arranges 
finance, validates data against EPC database, and draws up the Green Deal plan which is signed by 
the customer, and then triggers the notification to supplier. The provider then engages an installer 
to come and install the measure, and follows up afterwards to ensure the customer is happy with 
the installation. The EPC is updated to reflect the new measures, and through the Green Deal Central 
Charge database (GDCC) suppliers are notified and the customer begins repayments through their 
bill (GDORB, 2012). 
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Figure 25 - Green Deal Institutional Arrangements, Source: GDORB, 201214 
3.4.1.2 - Drivers of Design 
The limited role for government, and the desire to bring private financial providers into the domestic 
energy efficiency market appears to be a product of adherence to a pro-market ideology. This can be 
seen in the language of the original Green Deal & ECO consultation document: 'Rather than another 
government expenditure programme placing a drag on the economy by crowding out an efficient 
and competitive private sector, Green Deal is designed to draw in greater investment' (DECC, 2011e, 
p.16). This design is likely to have contributed to the failure of the policy, as Mallaburn and Eyre 
(2013) note, stating that although energy efficiency schemes are unlikely to be successful without 
market forces, they will fail if market forces are overly relied upon. 
It is evident also that consumer protection was a high priority in the design of the scheme. It is 
discussed throughout the consultation document (DECC, 2011e) and subsequent impact 
assessments (DECC, 2012c, 2011d), citing an Australian insulation program which resulted in fires 
and injuries owing to inadequate certification or monitoring of installations (DECC, 2011e, 2012c). Of 
the fourteen components to the Green Deal & ECO framework, five of these related to consumer 
protection (DECC, 2011e). Principally consumer protection was to be achieved through accreditation 
schemes for different actors in the Green Deal supply chain, overseen by a bespoke institution, 
created to oversee accreditation and conduct of Green Deal authorised actors. Although consumer 
protection is an important consideration, the institutional arrangements to designed to ensure it 
may have served as a barrier to entry for prospective Green Deal providers, limiting opportunities 
                                                          
14 Larger version of this diagram is available in Appendix F. 
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for consumers to access energy efficiency measures. This prevented a market in provision of energy 
efficiency measures developing. Initially it was envisioned that high street brands would be involved 
with, and promote, the Green Deal. However, this was not forthcoming. 
3.4.1.3 - Failure of the Green Deal 
Even before The Green Deal’s introduction, expectations for success were low. A considerable drop 
in installations of energy efficiency measures was anticipated in the Green Deal impact assessment 
(DECC, 2012c), and this was indeed forthcoming (Rosenow and Sagar, 2015). Funding to the Green 
Deal Finance Company was stopped in July 2015, which put a stop to any new applicants to the 
scheme (DECC, 2015l). At the end of May 2016, there were 13,146 households with ‘live’ Green Deal 
plans, 612 which had fully paid off their Green Deal plans (including those paid off early) and 271 
awaited installation. If measures are installed in all those awaiting properties, the total will come to 
14,029 households in over two years of the policy running (BEIS and ONS, 2016). This is in 
comparison 1.9 million households through the Green Deal's sister policy, the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) (BEIS and ONS, 2016), and far behind the then Junior Energy Minister Greg Barker's 
hope of reaching fourteen million homes with the Green Deal by 2020 (Barker, 2011). 
A number of critiques and explanations for the Green Deal's failure have been offered. IPPR (2013b) 
highlights that the first point of contact for the Green Deal, the Green Deal assessment, often carried 
a charge in the order of £100. This appears to work against one of the main aims of the Green Deal 
to overcome the upfront cost of energy efficiency. IPPR (2013b) also demonstrated that the 
fundamental basis of the Green Deal works to cancel out the financial incentive for investing in 
energy efficiency (see Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26 - Impact of a Green Deal Loan on an Average Energy Bill for Properties with Viable Packages of Measures at an 
8% interest rate over 20 years, Source: IPPR, 2013b 
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Theoretically, if prices were to rise over the payback period, then the financial benefit of the energy 
efficiency measures would slowly increase, because the repayments would not increase in the way 
the bill would have done without the measures - effectively freezing a section of the bill. However, 
this potential benefit was eroded with Green Deal providers given the option to increase loan 
repayments by 2% per year (DECC, 2012c). This also meant that if energy prices fell, consumers 
could face higher bills as a result of taking a Green Deal plan. This had the effect of making the Green 
Deal a carbon-saving measure rather than a cost-saving one, which consumers undertook at risk of 
falling prices. 
Another significant issue with the Green Deal the level of the interest rate - the ~7% interest rate 
was put in place to make sure loans were attractive to investors, however it appears this interest 
rate was too high to be attractive to consumers (Rosenow et al., 2013). Although it may be 
competitive with other sources of unsecured finance (DECC, 2011d), a number of households would 
be able to secure cheaper finance elsewhere (Rosenow et al., 2013). Those unable to secure cheaper 
finance elsewhere due to poor credit ratings (often associated with poor debt history or low 
incomes) face little option but to take out the Green Deal loans, in spite of likely being among those 
households least able to afford such a high interest rate. The Green Deal’s interest rate was 
considerably higher than a comparable loan scheme available from the KfW in Germany (Rosenow, 
2013) and is in stark contrast to the interest-free loans available to public bodies in Great Britain 
such as local authorities, from the government-backed company Salix (Steward, 2015).  
In addition to these issues of take-up, when making payments there is a clear disconnect between 
the payment mechanism and savings achieved. The Green Deal was paid through the electricity bill, 
however most savings were likely to accrue in the gas bill (or other heating fuel) (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2012). This had the potential to cause cash-flow issues to any households who had different 
suppliers for their gas and electricity. 
The design of the Green Deal appears to have been heavily influenced by a pro-market ideology, and 
the high interest rate, possible 2% increase on repayments, upfront cost for the assessment, 
significant anticipated drop in deployment of energy efficiency measures, and complex customer 
journey imply that the design of the scheme was focussed on delivering best outcomes for investors, 
rather than best outcomes for consumers.  Rosenow and Eyre (2012) set out that although the 
Green Deal may have, at least in part, addressed the barrier of upfront cost to consumers, there are 
a number of issues that it did not address. These include the hassle and disruption of building work, 
the low priority that many consumers give to issues of energy, the lack of advice at the point of 
installation, or the poor integration of the supply chains of various energy efficiency measures. They 
cite evidence from previous energy efficiency schemes where suppliers had to offer significant levels 
98 
 
of subsidy in order to entice customers to take up measures. The complexity of the customer 
journey creates a significant ‘hassle-factor’ to engagement with the policy. Finally, Mallaburn and 
Eyre (2013) and IPPR (2013b) both highlight that the novel approach of financing, whereby debt is 
attached to the property, may carry significant risk with regard to future sale of the property.  
The Green Deal also had the negative impact of limiting the switching options of consumers (and 
future residents of the homes to which the loans are attached). Only suppliers with over 250,000 
customers are obliged to collect Green Deal payments (GEMA, 2015), this is likely to cause an issue 
for any consumer with a Green Deal contract who wishes to switch to a number of the smaller 
suppliers. Given government’s support for switching, this is surprising, however it is possible that 
DECC was not aware of this implication, as the issue was not commented upon by DECC. Had the 
Green Deal met Greg Barker’s aims for 14 million households by 2020, this would have resulted in 
over 50% of the market being unable to switch to smaller suppliers, many of which offer some of the 
most competitive or innovative tariffs in the market. This implies a lack of institutional capacity to 
connect policies relating to retail markets, with energy efficiency. 
The design of the Green Deal represented a departure from a long history of the primary route to 
energy-efficiency deployment being through a supplier obligation model. Although policy 
experimentation can support innovation, there was little put in place to ensure an effective 
transition from the previous supplier obligations, to the Green Deal and the ECO (discussed below), 
indeed the collapse in installations was fully anticipated. This implies that BEIS (then DECC) lacks 
either the institutional capacity, or the understanding of the value of energy efficiency to support all 
aspects of the trilemma, to create a new and effective policy for deployment of energy efficiency 
measures, When the Green Deal was effectively cancelled in July 2015, no new policy was 
introduced to replace it. This may be a strong demonstration of current low levels of government 
commitment to energy efficiency in the domestic sector. Given the poor energy efficiency standard 
of the British housing stock, such limited commitment to energy efficiency serves to significantly 
undermine long-term affordability of energy for domestic consumers. The Green Deal serves as an 
excellent demonstration of poor governance – how a policy constructed around a pro-market 
paradigm, designed to support the interests of investors rather than consumers, which did not learn 
from previous policies, can have long-term negative impacts on deployment of energy efficiency, 
3.4.1.4 - Green Deal Cash-Back & Green Deal Home Improvement Fund 
The low level of uptake in the Green Deal led to attempts being made to improve the situation 
through the introduction of the Green Deal Home Improvement Fund (GDHIF), and Green Deal Cash 
back scheme. These both offered cash back for installing measures, but carried no requirement to 
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actually set up payments through the Green Deal payment mechanism. The GDHIF opened and 
closed a number of times, originally staying open for just 6 weeks (closing early due to strong 
uptake). It reopened in December 2014 with an additional £30 million of funding, £24 million of 
which was earmarked for solid wall insulation, this section of the fund was exhausted within one day 
of the fund opening (DECC, 2014g) – suggesting there may be some appetite to install such measures 
when they are well-funded, and not dependent upon a complex institutional arrangement. 
3.4.2 - Energy Company Obligation (ECO) 
The ECO is included as a case-study for a policy which although more successful than its counterpart, 
the Green Deal, has faced repeated scaling back and alteration. The governance around the ECO is 
particularly worthy of study, and in spite of the cuts, at the time of writing in 2016, the ECO 
represents the largest energy efficiency policy in place. 
3.4.2.1 - Background to the ECO 
The Energy Company Obligation (ECO) was launched in January 201315, and in conjunction with the 
Green Deal formed the replacement for the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and the 
Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP) (DECC, 2011e). It also effectively replaced Warm Front 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2012). It represented the next stage in a long history of supplier obligations that 
began in Great Britain in 199416 (Rosenow, 2012b). Obligations were originally given to suppliers on 
the basis that they had a pre-existing relationship with customers, and because competitive firms 
would aim to deliver their obligations at least cost (CSE, 2014a), because the cost of delivering the 
scheme is levied from a suppliers’ own customer base. This continues, in spite of acknowledgement 
by OFGEM, and the CMA that there are issues with lack of competition in the retail market (OFGEM 
et al., 2014) (see chapter two). The continued reliance upon supplier obligations paints a picture of 
‘energy efficiency policy’ and ‘supplier obligation’ having become synonymous with one another for 
policy-makers. It is not clear that BEIS has sufficient institutional capacity to design an effective 
alternative model, and following the failure of the Green Deal there is a risk they will be reluctant to 
experiment with alternative delivery models in future.  
The ECO was originally designed to support installation of efficiency measures in the homes of the 
fuel poor, and in hard-to-treat homes such as solid-walled properties. The latter was later relaxed to 
include some 'easy-to-treat' measures, such as loft insulation, but was originally put in place because 
some measures, such as solid-wall insulation, were likely to be too expensive to meet the Green 
Deal's 'Golden Rule'. ECO puts an obligation on large domestic energy suppliers (those with more 
                                                          
15 Although energy companies have been able to count against their target measures delivered since 1 October 2012.  
16 For a timeline of previous supplier obligations, see Appendix G.  
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than 250,000 domestic electric or gas customers and supplying over 400 GWh of electricity and/or 
2,000 GWh of gas to domestic customers) to support carbon and bill reductions. The ECO is 
scheduled to close in 2018. Owing to the growth of some small suppliers, there are now 11 
companies with an ECO obligation - these are British Gas, E.On, Npower, EDF Energy, SSE, Scottish 
Power, First Utility, Co-operative Energy, Utilita, Ovo and Utility Warehouse (OFGEM, 2015e). 
The ECO consists of three primary obligations: 
• Carbon Emissions Reduction Obligation (CERO) - Initially designed to deliver efficiency 
measures to hard-to-treat homes, however this has been extended to any properties which 
require loft or cavity wall insulation. This is measured in tonnes of carbon saved. 
• Carbon Saving Communities Obligation (CSCO) - Delivering insulation measures to low-
income areas17. With an additional requirement for 15% of each supplier's CSCO to be met in 
households in deprived rural areas (This is known as the 'Rural Sub-Obligation'). The CSCO is 
measured in tonnes of carbon saved.  
• Home Heating Cost Reduction Obligation/Affordable Warmth Obligation (HHCRO) - 
Delivering insulation and heating measures to those (or those living with someone) in the 
Affordable Warmth Group (primarily connected to receipt of government benefit, and the 
nature of that benefit - sometimes connected to their income and if they have dependents) - 
those deemed likely to be in fuel poverty.18 This is measured in pounds of bill savings. 
(DECC, 2014m, 2014n) 
Each of these obligations has an individual target which is then divided up among obligated suppliers 
based on their energy volume market share. For a full explanation of how each supplier's ECO target 
is calculated, see Appendix H. The targets for ECO2 are below: 
CERO 12.4 MTCO2 
CSCO 6 MTCO2 
CSCO (Rural Sub-obligation) 0.9 MTCO2 
HHCRO £3.7 billion 
(DECC, 2014l) 
ECO has had three periods - ECO1 which ran from 1st January 2013 to December 2014, ECO1.2 
which ran from December to 31st 2014 to March 2015 (this featured revised targets following 
changes to the ECO, see below) (OFGEM, 2014a), and ECO2 which runs from 1st April 2015 to 31st 
                                                          
17 Defined using the bottom 25% of Lower Super Output Areas from the Indices of Multiple Deprivation in England, Wales 
and Scotland. Rural households are considered to be those in settlements with a population size under 10,000. 
18 Only those in private tenure and in receipt of a qualifying benefit will be eligible for support under Affordable Warmth 
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March 2017 (OFGEM, 2015d). Following ECO2, the ECO ‘Help to Heat’ program will be put in place 
(BEIS, 2016a). 
Suppliers have a number of avenues through which they can fulfil their ECO obligation. Either they 
can carry out works, contract directly with energy efficiency firms, work in partnership with a local 
authority, or they are able to go through the ECO brokerage mechanism which works as a blind 
auction for efficiency measures (OFGEM, 2014a). Consistently suppliers have preferred to contract 
bilaterally, rather than through the brokerage scheme (DECC, 2014m), with levels of brokerage 
becoming particularly low following the announcements of cuts to the ECO in December 2013 
(DECC, 2015e; HM Treasury, 2013).  
3.4.2.2 - Cutting the ECO 
As set out in earlier chapters, energy bills in Great Britain have become a political topic, and in spite 
of being a small portion of the average bill, environmental and social policy costs often attract 
particular political attention. This was born out in the events that followed the 2013 Labour Party 
conference. At the conference, then Labour leader Ed Miliband announced that if the Labour Party 
won the 2015 election, that they would impose a twenty month price freeze upon energy supply 
companies (Miliband, 2013). The 2010-2015 Coalition government sought to respond to this by 
reducing costs within the bill, and it was decided that these cost reductions would come from, what 
David Cameron was quoted in The Sun as referring to as 'Green Crap' (The Sun, 2013). In December 
2013, it was announced that the ECO would be the target of cuts which, along with other measures 
such as direct bill support from the Government, would reduce the average domestic energy bill by 
£50 (HM Treasury, 2013). This represented a 3.7% saving on the average £1316 dual fuel energy bill 
(OFGEM, 2015a). Such a small figure appears to suggest the government places greater importance 
on being seen to reduce bills in the short term for political reasons, than to actually deliver 
significant long term bill reductions. This demonstrates the political nature of energy bills – although 
energy efficiency measures deliver the best opportunities for long-term reduction of energy bills, the 
government instead chose to cut energy efficiency policy for short term political gain. 
There were issues regarding the level of cuts because there were differing views on the costs the 
ECO imposed on bills. DECC's central estimate was not dissimilar to the costs of meeting CERT and 
CESP (approximately £50 per bill). However, as Platt et al. (2012) highlight, there was a high level of 
uncertainty attached to this prediction. A consultation on changes to the ECO was run from March - 
April 2014, citing that although the costs of delivery of the ECO appeared to be broadly in line with 
DECC projections, however this was disputed by the large suppliers (NERA, 2012), which were 
apparently also concerned that costs would increase in the approach to the initial 2015 deadline. 
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This was seen in the approach to the 2012 CERT deadline. Eventually, this led to a number of policy 
changes being imposed, including: 
• The reduction of the CERO target by 33%. 
• The extension of the obligation to 2017 at the same post-consultation pro-rata levels as the 
new, lower 2015 target. 
• Uplift to reward those that had met their CERO obligations early (see below). 
• The inclusion of some low-cost measures such as loft and cavity wall insulation as primary 
measures under CERO. 
• The introduction of a target for solid-wall insulations, (as focus for CERO is likely to move to 
lower-cost measures). 
• The extension of the CSCO rural sub-target area to include 25% of the most deprived rural 
areas (up from 15%). 
(DECC, 2014m) 
The effect of these changes was principally to make it easier for the suppliers to meet their 
obligations. The justification for this was a £30-£35 saving on the average annual domestic energy 
bill, however this is a very small reduction on an average annual dual fuel bill of £1316 (OFGEM, 
2015a). In addition, it was proposed by a number of stakeholders that owing to a lack of clarity 
around the levels of costs of the ECO, that the level of saving to suppliers may actually be 
considerably higher than savings passed on - leading to substantial windfalls for suppliers in the 
order of £245million (ACE, 2014; INCA et al., 2014; CSE, 2014b). Any such windfall was paid for by 
domestic consumers, with a clear negative impact on affordability of energy. This highlights both a 
lack of transparency in the costs that some social and environmental policies add to energy bills, but 
also suggests that BEIS may lack the capacity to accurately assess the cost-saving implications of 
their policy changes. In addition, neither BEIS nor OFGEM is empowered to force suppliers to pass 
through cost savings through accurately, instead relying on competitive pressure from the retail 
market to ensure that happens. However as set out in chapter two this pressure is weak at best. The 
government and OFGEM are able only to place political pressure on the suppliers to pass through 
the savings that they believe to be appropriate, through such measures of threat of intervention in 
the market.  
During the process of the cuts, it was suggested that the move to a reduced target and simplified 
delivery disadvantaged suppliers that had delivered measures early when costs of delivery would 
have been higher. This led the government to give suppliers an uplift on measures that had already 
been delivered against the CERO obligation – making any measures above a 35% baseline worth 1.75 
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times their previous value (DECC, 2014m). A number of respondents to the consultation where this 
was proposed highlighted the risk that this could ‘lead to lower carbon savings, and greater cost 
savings to the companies in aggregate, than originally expected’ (DECC, 2014n, p.49). However, the 
government stated that it was happy to accept this risk in pursuit of being fair to suppliers, and so 
introduced the uplift as proposed. This brought a number of suppliers close to 100% compliance 
under the new reduced target. The government noted that it expected suppliers to pass on any 
additional cost savings to consumers, but (as above) put in place no mechanisms to ensure this 
occurred. The choice to uplift measures in this way once again shows the government to prioritise 
the needs of some firms, over the needs of consumers – with clear negative impacts on affordability.  
Following the cuts, the total estimated annual cost of the ECO fell from £1.35 billion before the cut, 
to £0.77 billion afterwards (National Audit Office, 2016b), representing a significant drop in funding 
for energy efficiency. 
3.4.2.3 - Targets & Ambition 
Figure 27 shows the average level of compliance across all suppliers for ECO2 in November 2016. 
This includes measures that were carried over from excess compliance during previous ECO periods. 
Since the start of ECO, over 1.5 million measures have been installed (DECC, 2015g), the majority of 
which have been either cavity wall insulation, loft insulation, or replacement boilers (in that order) 
(DECC, 2015g).  
 
Figure 27 - Total Progress Towards ECO2 Obligations (Surplus, Approved, and Notified) in November 2016, 
Source: OFGEM, 2016e 
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The level of compliance exceeds that which is required for the ECO2 period because BEIS has stated 
that it intends to allow surplus actions from ECO2 to count towards targets under the future ‘ECO: 
Help to Heat’ scheme (BEIS, 2016a). Although current progress is good relative to the ECO2 targets, 
it is evident that these are poor by historical standards. In the switch from CERT and CESP to ECO 
and the Green Deal, the number of installations fell considerably (See Figure 28).  
 
Figure 28 - Delivery Rates of Key Insulation Measures, Source: After Committee on Climate Change, 2016a and 
Committee on Climate Change, 2016b 
 
The ECO does not appear to be delivering sufficient measures to meet the needs for the 5th carbon 
budget. This includes the insulation of 2 million solid wall homes, and the insulation of the majority 
of remaining cavity walls and lofts in homes by 2030 (Committee on Climate Change, 2016a). Figure 
28 shows the necessary annual delivery rate necessary every year to insulate 2 million solid wall 
homes, and all of the remaining cavity walls and lofts by 2030. Although the fifth carbon budget does 
not specify the treatment of all lofts and cavities, this demonstrates the scale of the task. Even if 
only half of the remaining lofts and cavities were insulated, this would still require annual delivery 
rates above those being achieved by the ECO. Given the ECO’s replacement policy has a significantly 
reduced budget of £640 million per year (HM Treasury, 2015b), down from the original ECO budget 
of £1.3 billion per year (DECC, 2012c), current energy efficiency policy does not appear consistent 
with delivering at sufficient levels to meet the needs of the fifth carbon budget. The cuts to the ECO 
also may have created long-term challenges with improving the efficiency of hard-to-treat homes. 
Prior to the cut, 37% of measures installed addressed hard to treat properties, this fell to 9% after 
the cut (National Audit Office, 2016b). This limits the potential for growing the supply chain for 
measures to improve hard to treat properties, which is likely to prove essential in meeting the needs 
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of the fifth carbon budget (National Audit Office, 2016b), and treating at least 36% of homes (Morris, 
2010). 
In spite of the levels of energy efficiency deployment being far below what is necessary to best 
support significantly improved affordability, or carbon targets, the government has not expressed 
any interest in expanding its energy efficiency policies. This demonstrates a fundamental governance 
challenge for energy efficiency, that even the CCC as a statutory body is unable to force the 
government to take action on the issue, and there appears to be limited call from the electorate for 
improved energy efficiency policy, likely in part as a result of a lack of information or interest 
regarding the significant value in improving the energy efficiency of homes.  
The government has taken steps to protect the interests of some firms such as the investors in the 
Green Deal, and the large supply companies, but has not protected the interests of the energy 
efficiency supply chains, which is largely made up of SMEs whilst failing to protect the interests of 
consumers through delivery of fit-for-purpose energy efficiency policy.  
The changes to the ECO demonstrate the role that politics can play in affecting energy policy. The 
political pressure to be seen to be cutting bills in the short term led to the significant weakening of 
one of the few policies which can help to deliver long term bill reductions. The possible windfall that 
suppliers may have received at the same time further undermines affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers. Platt et al. (2012) set out that even if ECO were to meet its targets, it would 
still only be addressing 10% of all households in fuel poverty (based on the 10% measure).  
3.4.3 - Other Energy Efficiency Policies 
A number of other policies in Great Britain are designed to support deployment of energy efficiency 
measures. The impact of governance on each of these is reviewed below. 
3.4.3.1 - Local Authority Central Heating Fund 
This is a £25million central budget which local authorities are able to compete for in order to fund 
the installation of first-time central heating systems to fuel poor homes that do not currently use 
mains gas as a primary heating fuel (DECC, 2015p) 
3.4.3.2 - Green Deal Communities Scheme 
Although this features the Green Deal name, it has little connection with the Green Deal itself. This 
fund has awarded £88 million to local authorities to promote the roll-out of energy efficiency 
measures on a street-by-street basis in their areas. Twenty-four local authorities were successful and 
are able to deploy funding in way best-suited to their areas (for a full list see DECC, 2014k). This, 
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along with the Local Authority Central Heating Fund create opportunities for engaging local 
institutions, which creates opportunities for better targeting of measures to those whom need them 
most, based on local knowledge. This is consistent with learning lessons from Warm Front (see 
below), however such policy learning seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. The 
development of capacity within BEIS for greater policy learning would be supportive of improved 
affordability. 
3.4.3.3 - Energy Performance Certificates 
As set out above, the energy performance of buildings directive (EU, 2002) introduced a requirement 
for the vast majority of properties in Great Britain to have an EPC issued when being rented or sold 
(with the exception of listed properties and holiday homes) - this is designed to create a market 
value for greater levels of energy efficiency. There is conflicting information as to whether this level 
of energy efficiency is reflected in the value of the property. Fuerst et al. (2015) show that in some 
areas of the country, more efficient properties can attract higher market values in the UK, however 
an EU report suggests that EPC ratings contribute little to the purchase decisions of UK house-buyers 
(European Comission, 2013). It is not clear that the appropriate structures are in place to explain to 
house-buyers the potential impact of different EPC ratings, and what options are available to 
improve them. 
3.4.3.4 - Minimum Standards - Private Rented Sector 
From 2018, all private rental sector landlords will be required to bring their properties up to a 
minimum standard of EPC grade E (DECC, 2015n). However, this is only under the condition that 
works can be carried out at no upfront or net cost to the landlord (DECC, 2015n), and so can only be 
financed through either the Green Deal (now closed), a supplier obligation, or a similar financial 
arrangement (HMG, 2015b, 2011). There is also regulation in place meaning that from April 2016 
landlords were not able to reject reasonable requests by tenants for improved energy efficiency up 
to grade E, again providing they can be carried out at no upfront or net cost to the landlord (DECC, 
2015n). Grade E is an unambitious target in that it represents bringing properties to a standard 
which is both below the average standard for properties in Great Britain today (See Figure 22), and 
below Grade C which is set out as appropriate for limiting fuel poverty in England (HMG, 2014).This 
may be a fairly moot point however, as the requirement for the landlord to incur no cost once again 
represents a policy which better supports private interests of the interests of consumers. The 
closure of the Green Deal, and reductions to the ECO severely limit the opportunities for funding of 
such measures, meaning in practice there may be very little improvement to the private rental stock. 
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This again suggests a lack of capacity for policy-making which joins up two areas of energy efficiency 
policy. 
3.4.3.5 - Product Policy 
The European Eco-Design policies create minimum efficiency standards for appliances and apply to a 
wide range of consumer products including refrigerators, freezers, tumble driers, washing machines, 
dish-washers, televisions, computers, light bulbs, boilers, cookers, and vacuum cleaners (European 
Commission, 2014a). This has been highly effective in reducing in energy consumption of the 
respective appliances, most notable in lighting and refrigeration (DECC, 2015j), helping to deliver bill 
savings for all consumers who use such appliances produced since the rules came into effect. It is not 
clear what impact the 2016 vote to leave the European Union will have on product standards in 
Great Britain. Although any appliances produced for sale in the European Union will still abide by 
these standards, levels of efficiency may decline if there are increased imports from other countries 
with less stringent efficiency standards. This demonstrates the capacity of the European Union to 
introduce large-scale regulation, this is likely to be in part owed to the EU being insulated from 
national-level politics or changes in national government, as well as being in a position to introduce 
policies which can alter entire markets, spanning across national borders. 
3.4.3.6 - Smart Meters 
Domestic smart meters are due to be installed in all UK homes by the end of 2020 (DECC, 2013f). 
These will carry a number of features which do not currently exist in traditional ‘dumb meters’. 
These include the ability for energy companies to read them remotely putting an end to estimated 
billing (DECC, 2012d), the monitoring of real-time consumption by DNOs (Electricity North West, 
2014), the introduction of dynamic tariffs (Owen and Ward, 2010), and the ability for meters to be 
switched from prepayment to standard-credit meters (OFGEM, 2014f). The feature which is most 
likely to support reduction in demand however is the combination of the smart meter with an in-
home display (IHD). This will allow consumers to monitor their own consumption in real time (Darby, 
2012), and is expected to lead to greater awareness of consumption habits. This should help 
consumers to make more informed choices about how and when they use energy, and so lower their 
cost of comfort (Darby, 2012, 2006; Wilhite and Ling, 1995), as well as potentially reducing the 
informational barrier to energy efficiency by allowing consumers to understand more about their 
energy consumption. There is evidence to suggest that the institution chosen to deploy smart 
meters, energy suppliers, was a poor choice, and has significantly driven up the cost of deployment 
(Zhang and Nuttall, 2011), which in turn pushes up energy prices – with negative impacts on 
affordability of energy. 
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3.4.3.7 - Building Standards 
Building regulations were first introduced in Great Britain in 1965 (Elsharkawy et al., 2011). Today, 
Part L of the building codes relates to the conservation of fuel and power in new and existing 
dwellings. For new dwellings, these give a target CO2 emission rate (TER), expressed as kilograms per 
square metre of floor area per year; and a target fabric energy efficiency (TFEE) rate expressed as 
level of energy demand in kilowatt-hours per square metre per year. These together form a 
minimum energy performance standard for new dwellings, and are currently assessed using SAP 
2012 (HMG, 2013a). Part L also covers extensions to existing properties (HMG, 2010), however stops 
short of requiring additional upgrades to the existing property when homes are extended, as was 
proposed under the consequential improvements policy (Pickles, 2012) which was quickly 
abandoned after a strong media campaign by the Daily Mail in which the policy was labelled the 
‘conservatory tax’ (See: Mail Online, 2012). 
Previously there were additional requirements on developers of new properties to meet a particular 
standard of the code for sustainable homes (DCLG, 2010), as well as a requirement that from 2016 
new homes would have to be 'zero-carbon' (DECC, 2014o). Initially exemptions were introduced to 
the zero-carbon homes standard for smaller developments (DCLG, 2015). However now both the 
code for sustainable homes and the commitment to zero-carbon homes have been repealed. This 
was justified on the basis of reducing regulatory burden on the building industry (HM Treasury, 
2015a; DCLG, 2015). 
Although new-build properties will make up only a small percentage of the total housing stock going 
forward, reducing energy efficiency standards in this way undermines affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers (in addition to benefits to other aspects of the trilemma), and could lead to 
additional retrofitting being required at a later date. This would require overcoming the range of 
barriers to energy efficiency deployment discussed earlier in this chapter. This implies that the 
decision was based on an anti-regulatory ideology, which is demonstrative of the views set out in 
chapter one, that ideology can override evidence in policy-making (Metcalfe, 1993).  
3.4.3.8 – The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
The energy performance of buildings directive (EU, 2002) sets out a number of requirements on 
member states. The principal objective of the directive is to drive improvement of the energy 
performance of buildings within the EU through deployment of cost-effective measures. The most 
significant aspects of the directive are a requirement for EPCs to be included in all advertisements 
for the sale or rental of properties; setting of minimum energy performance requirements for new 
buildings and major renovation works; a requirement to draw up lists of national financial measures 
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to improve the energy efficiency of buildings and all new homes must be nearly zero energy 
buildings from 2021; (EU, 2002). 
This once again demonstrates the opportunities that exist at the European level for the introduction 
of more ambitious policies which are able to effect large-scale change over long periods of time, 
insulated from national-level politics, or changes in national government. It also implies that the 
reduction in building regulations set out above may prove to be temporary, as they will be 
effectively replaced with the nearly-zero energy building standards in 2021. This would imply that 
the removal of the zero-carbon requirement will lead to a number of lower-standard buildings being 
constructed, in exchange for only short term reductions in regulatory burdens to developers. This 
once again suggests that being seen to be doing something maybe more important to government 
than delivering lasting change, and this comes at the cost of giving those in the building trade time 
to develop expertise in low-carbon building practices ahead of 2021. This said, since the ruling to 
remove the code for sustainable homes and the zero-carbon homes, the UK voted to leave the 
European Union. This means that the future impact of the energy performance of buildings directive 
in Great Britain, and so future building standards, is uncertain. 
3.4.3.9 - Nest (Wales Only) 
Nest is a Welsh government scheme designed to address fuel poverty in Wales. The scheme offers 
free energy efficiency measures to owner-occupier and private rental households who are in receipt 
of a means tested benefit and who live in a home with an energy rating of F or G. Nest also features 
an advice service covering energy efficiency, money management, energy tariffs, benefit entitlement 
checks, and referral to other available schemes (Marrin et al., 2015). This is done through direct 
marketing, and partnerships with local authorities and a wide range of third sector organisations 
including Save the Children, CAB, Job Centre Plus, and Disability Wales. These partnerships are 
designed to support delivery to the wide range of different communities of vulnerable people 
(Welsh Government, 2014). The Nest scheme has delivered significant benefits to a large number of 
households - between 2011 and 2014, advice and support was offered to over 61,000 households 
(4.7% of all Welsh Households (ONS, 2013)), 15,000 of which received energy efficiency 
improvements at no cost to themselves (Marrin et al., 2015).  
3.4.3.10 - ARBED (Wales Only) 
This was a two-phase area-based scheme in Wales, which ran from 2010 to 2015, with the aim of 
improving the energy efficiency of homes in project areas. This was achieved by helping to deliver 
high cost measures such as solid wall insulation and heat pumps (Merlin Homes and Welsh 
Government, 2014; Woosey, 2012). ARBED was a small scheme reaching only 0.8% of the homes in 
110 
 
Wales - phase one delivered measures to 6000 homes, and phase two was targeted to reach 
approximately 4800 homes by the end of 2015, upgrading the majority from an F-grade to a C-grade 
property (National Energy Action et al., 2014). Arbed drew on a range of funding sources including 
the Welsh government Social Housing providers, local authorities, energy suppliers through CERT & 
CESP, and the European Regional Development Fund (National Energy Action et al., 2014). 
3.4.3.11 - HEEPS (Scotland Only) 
HEEPS describes a raft of measures from the Scottish government aimed at reducing fuel poverty 
through energy efficiency measures. The largest of these is the area-based scheme, which opened in 
2013, and offers funding for local authorities to address fuel poverty in their area (Scottish 
Government, 2016c). The HEEPS Area Based Scheme has a budget of approximately £66 million per 
year (2016/17 figure) (Scottish Government, 2015a). The scheme helps deliver solid wall insulation 
(Scottish Government, 2014) and in 2014/15 alone delivered solid wall insulation to 12,000 
households (Scottish Government, 2016b), representing 2.1% of the 566 thousand solid wall homes 
in Scotland (ChangeWorks, 2012). 
The HEEPS also includes the Warmer Homes Scotland programme, which opened in September 2015 
and has a budget of £16 million per year, currently set for seven years. Like Nest in Wales, it is 
targeted at vulnerable households who are either tenants or owner-occupiers. It offers energy 
efficiency improvements such as insulation, and new heating systems to houses that are not on the 
gas network (Scottish Government, 2016b).  
The HEEPS loan scheme opened in April 2015, and offers zero-interest rate loans to owner-occupiers 
and private landlords to cover the cost of both energy efficiency measures, and connections to the 
gas network. Loan amounts vary depending on the measures being installed, but can be up to 
£10,000 for the installation of solid wall insulation, and a maximum of £15,000 if multiple measures 
are being installed in the same house. Landlords with multiple properties can borrow up to £100,000 
with a maximum of £15,000 per house. Repayment terms vary depending on the value borrowed, 
but can be up to 10 years (Scottish Government, 2016a; Energy Saving Trust, 2015). There is also a 
pilot equity-release scheme due to open late in 2016 whereby home owners and landlords will be 
able to finance energy efficiency measures with a loan which will be repaid when the house is sold 
(Energy Saving Trust, 2016a).  
The position of NEST, ARBED, and HEEPS policies as in place in the devolved administrations is 
significant. This is because fuel poverty is a devolved issue, and therefore the devolved governments 
have the power to introduce their own policies to address fuel poverty. The Scottish government in 
particular appears to be attempting to address some of the well-documented barriers to energy 
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efficiency deployment, such as the upfront cost barrier and principle-agent problem. It appears that 
the policy design has taken lessons from the failing of the Green Deal by offering loans for retro-fit 
on an interest-free basis, and from Warm Front in offering area-based solutions (see below). This 
implies that the devolved administrations may have a stronger capacity for policy learning; taking 
lessons from previous policies. 
3.4.4 - Previous Supplier Obligations 
Prior to the ECO and the Green Deal, there were a number of other obligations on suppliers to 
improve the energy efficiency of the domestic sector, these are briefly set out below. 
3.4.4.1 - Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) 
CERT delivered a range of low-cost energy efficiency measures to domestic households in Great 
Britain. Although there was a priority target group (based on receipt of particular benefits), it was a 
generalist policy. CERT brought considerable benefits in terms of bill reductions to the domestic 
sector. However this was, as the name suggests, principally designed as an environmental policy 
(Ipsos MORI et al., 2014). This is an important difference because although it did feature a priority 
and a super-priority group of vulnerable consumers, it was principally a desire for environmental 
action, rather than affordability, that led to the design of the CERT. The CERT ran from the 1st of 
April 2008 to the 31st of December 2012 with a target to reduce domestic carbon emissions by 293 
million tonnes by means of supporting improved energy efficiency in domestic properties, achieving 
73.4 million tonnes of CO2 savings were secured via professionally installed insulation, 51.2 million 
tonnes of CO2 saving through lighting, and 24.3 million tonnes of CO2 saving through alterations to 
heating systems (OFGEM, 2013g). 122.5 million tonnes of CO2 were saved in the priority group (this 
includes 16.6 million tonnes of CO2 in the super priority group). 
The obligation was placed on any supplier which had in excess of 250,000 customers (this was raised 
from 50,000 in December 2011). Carryover was permitted from EEC 2 (discussed below). In total, 
101.3% of the target was met, however British Gas did not meet its commitments and was 
financially penalised by OFGEM in 2014 (OFGEM, 2014e). Those suppliers who exceeded their 
obligation were able to carry over excess measures to the ECO (OFGEM, 2013g). 
In the first three years of CERT, large portions of obligations were met through the distribution of 
low-cost compact florescent light bulbs (CFLs), however it became clear that more bulbs had been 
distributed than could ever realistically be used (~304 million) - and this, along with the phasing out 
of incandescent bulbs by the EU meaning that savings from CFLs were no longer deemed additional. 
This led in the fourth year to a rule change which excluded CFLs (Rosenow, 2012a). In year five, 
levels of insulation increased in a surge of activity to meet the obligation (OFGEM, 2013g). In 
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addition to the design of CERT allowing over-deployment of CFLs, the method of accounting for 
carbon savings incentivised suppliers to insulate lofts to a partial depth (OFGEM, 2010a), rather than 
the full recommendation of 270mm (Energy Saving Trust, 2016c) i.e. more credit was earned for 
insulating two lofts to 50% depth, than one loft to 100% depth. Although this is consistent with 
actual carbon savings, it means that homes may need to be visited again, requiring the numerous 
barriers to energy efficiency take-up (set out above) to be overcome a second time. This implies a 
lack of effective policymaking capacity for energy efficiency within BEIS, as it is anticipated that a 
profit-maximising organisation is likely to take advantage of the cheapest route to delivering energy 
efficiency – indeed the policy was specifically designed on that basis. This means that a number of 
suppliers will have received credit for measures such as CFLs that provided little additional carbon 
saving. 
It is evident that towards the end of the CERT scheme, it was becoming more difficult for suppliers to 
deliver additional carbon savings, with the average cost of carbon reductions increasing significantly 
towards the end of the scheme (Ipsos MORI et al., 2014). This is likely owed in part to the lowest 
hanging fruit already having been taken, as well as installers increasing their charges to suppliers in 
part as a response to the uncertainty relating to the forthcoming change to the ECO and Green Deal 
(Ipsos MORI et al., 2014). This demonstrates the importance of policy certainty for ensuring 
measures are delivered at lowest cost. The transition between the CERT and ECO does not appear to 
have been well managed, with the number of installations experiencing a cliff-edge reduction, as 
policy was redirected from a simple policy focussing on delivery of low-cost measures, to a complex 
multi-targeted policy focussing on delivering high cost measures, accompanied by a new loan 
scheme (see Figure 28). 
Although the CERT was not without its short-comings, it led to the delivery of loft insulation to 6.8 
million homes (both DIY and professionally installed), and cavity wall insulation to 2.8 million homes 
(OFGEM, 2013g). There were significant challenges gathering data relating to the bill-savings 
households experienced as a product of these measures (Ipsos MORI et al., 2014), however these 
measures will continue to support affordability of energy in millions of households for a number of 
years.  
3.4.4.2 - Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP)  
CESP ran alongside CERT, from October 2009 to December 2012, and aimed to deliver 19.25 million 
tonnes of CO2 reductions through measures to the domestic sector in low-income areas of Great 
Britain, identified as being Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England and Wales, and Data Zones 
in Scotland. CESP was an obligation for suppliers with over 50,000 domestic customers, and 
113 
 
generators who generated more than 10 TWh/year (OFGEM, 2009b). CESP led to ~75000 external 
solid wall insulation installations, ~60,000 new heating controls being installed, ~43,000 replaced 
boilers and ~23,500 lofts insulated, however still only realised 84.7% of its obligation (OFGEM, 
2013h). 
CESP had a number of innovative design features. The first of these is a 'whole house bonus' - which 
meant greater accreditation was given where more than one measure was installed in the same 
house. This led to two or more measures being installed in 60% of houses, although only 20% had 
three or more (OFGEM, 2013h). Although not entirely effective, this bonus shows an 
acknowledgement of the benefits of attempting to maximise deployment of measures within a 
household, once barriers had been overcome. The other bonus was area based - when 25% or more 
of the dwellings in one area were treated by the same generator or supplier, however this faced 
challenges in implementation because the boundaries of low income areas (as measured by the 
LSOA) did not necessarily follow the boundaries of communities/estates. This again, although not 
without challenges, encouraged the leveraging of localised advertising, and information spreading by 
word of mouth (Ipsos MORI et al., 2014).  
Although CESP was considerably smaller in scale than CERT, it still delivered significant benefits. In 
addition to the improvements in thousands of homes, CESP is credited with helping the 
development of institutions in the solid wall insulation industry – in January 2013, 39% of all 
installations of solid wall insulation installations in Great Britain were attributed to the CESP (Ipsos 
MORI et al., 2014).  
3.4.4.3 - Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) - Periods 1 & 2  
The EEC was the precursor to CERT and CESP, and ran from 2002-2008. This was imposed upon 
energy supply firms with more than 15,000 customers for EEC1, and 50,000 customers for EEC2. It 
aimed to deliver 130 TWh of energy savings from the domestic sector in order to reduce carbon 
emissions, with the target divided based on number of customers, with at least 50% of reductions to 
be from priority group. Excess measures were carried over from EEC1 to EEC2, and then on to CERT, 
which led to EEC2 achieving 144% of its target reductions (OFGEM, 2005, 2008).  
3.4.4.4 - Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance (EESoP) - Periods 1-4 
These were the first supplier obligations of this type in Great Britain, delivering a range of measures 
including condensing boilers, with the four periods of EESoP running from 1994 to 2002. Initially it 
applied only to electricity suppliers, but gas suppliers were introduced from EESoP 3 (Rosenow, 
2012a). Compared to later obligations, these early EESoP targets were very limited (Staniaszek and 
Lees, 2012), however they laid the groundwork for the supplier obligation model.  
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3.4.4.5 - Warm Front 
Although not a supplier obligation, another significant past policy was the Warm Front scheme. This 
was introduced in 2000 and was a government-funded scheme delivering energy efficiency 
measures to households in receipt of particular benefits (Boardman, 2009). Vulnerable consumers 
entered the scheme through a network of local referral organisations, often cited as a strength of 
the scheme (DECC, 2014j). The exact design of the scheme shifted throughout its life, with a National 
Audit Office report in 2009 triggering an increase in the maximum per-household spend (National 
Audit Office, 2009). In 2011, criteria for eligibility was changed, with the range of qualifying benefits 
being reduced, alongside the introduction of an energy efficiency standard assessment (DECC, 
2014j), something some have suggested made the targeting of warm front too narrow (DECC, 2014j). 
The narrowing of the criteria coincided with budgetary cuts (DECC and Carillion, 2013). From 2005 to 
2013, the scheme was managed by Carillion Energy Services (formerly EAGA) (DECC, 2014j). Over 1.5 
million homes were supported by Warm Front between 2005 and 2013, 922,000 of which received 
major measures such as new heating systems and cavity wall insulation (DECC, 2014j). The total cost 
over this eight year period was £2.1 billion, with spending ramping down towards the end of the 
period (DECC, 2014i). The scheme eventually closed in 2013 (DECC and Carillion, 2013). 
3.4.5 – Impact of Energy Efficiency Governance on Affordability 
This section has demonstrated some significant shortcomings with the governance structure in Great 
Britain which holds back deployment of energy efficiency measures. 
Previous policies have predominantly been designed around the supplier obligation principle, each 
iteration of which have had some design issues, but have also yielded some successes (albeit from a 
fairly low baseline) - millions of homes have now been insulated, and the CESP supported significant 
growth in the supply chain for solid wall insulation. The design of the Green Deal suggests that BEIS 
(then DECC) lacks institutional capacity for policy learning, as it was based not on the successes of 
the past, but on a pro-market, anti-interventionist ideology. This appears to be what Metcalfe (1993) 
eluded to in suggesting that often in policymaking ideology can override evidence. The pro-market 
ideology (an ideology also reflected in the reduction of energy efficiency requirements for new 
buildings) in part led to the complex institutional structure which appears to have contributed to the 
policy’s failure. A lack of institutional capacity to join up different policy areas is also apparent – had 
the Green Deal been successful, it had the potential to fundamentally undermine the energy retail 
market. BEIS’ institutional capacity regarding effective design of energy efficiency policy is further 
called into question by the shortcomings in the CERT regarding CFLs, and the accreditation of loft 
insulation under the ECO not supporting a right-first-time approach. 
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The ECO demonstrated the political nature of energy bills. Cuts were made that appeared to have 
little impact on domestic consumers’ bills, but undermined long-term affordability through reduced 
funding for energy efficiency and further undermining the energy efficiency supply chain. Cuts were 
such that deployment rates do not appear to be sufficient to meet the fifth carbon budget, which 
will require even greater action in other areas. Given energy efficiency measures can be some of the 
most cost-effective ways to reduce carbon, this is likely to inflate the costs of meeting the target. A 
lack of transparency in policy costs meant that it was possible that suppliers realised significant 
windfall savings from the cuts, and there was no mechanism put in place by the government to 
ensure that cost savings were fully passed through. The way the cuts were managed, with an uplift 
to suppliers that had delivered a portion of their obligations already, appears to prioritise the 
interests of suppliers over the interests of either consumers, or those firms in the energy efficiency 
industry. This is reflective of a supply-side bias in policymaking.  
The introduction of minimum energy efficiency standards for private rental properties had the 
potential to significantly improve an important part of the building stock. However, the weak design 
that was eventually introduced appears to prioritise the interests of landlords – an issue that was 
further exacerbated by the removal of the Green Deal, without announcement of a replacement 
policy.  
Finally, the EU has been shown to be a particularly important institution in delivery of energy 
efficiency policy through standards for new products. The EU is able to enforce regulation which 
spans across borders, which can alter entire markets for goods. It is not clear however, following the 
2016 vote for the UK to leave the EU, what the enduring impact of European policy will be on 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers.  
 
3.5 - Addressing Fuel Poverty 
3.5.1 - Fuel Poverty Strategies 
As noted above, improving energy efficiency is now a key part of addressing issues of fuel poverty 
because this reduces energy needs and so means a fuel poor household is more easily able to meet 
its energy needs. A number of strategies have been developed which take this approach. As set out 
above, fuel poverty is a devolved issue, and therefore there are separate fuel poverty strategies for 
England, Scotland and Wales. This is in contrast to the ECO, the largest policy for energy efficiency 
deployment, which is a national policy.  
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3.5.1.1 - England 
The English fuel poverty strategy was launched in 2015 (HMG, 2015a), and was the first for over a 
decade. It was based on the LIHC indicator of fuel poverty (see chapter 1), and set out a new target: 
'…to ensure that as many fuel poor homes as is reasonably practicable achieve a minimum energy 
efficiency rating of Band C by 2030' (HMG, 2015a, p.12). This target replaces the previous target, 
repealed in 2013 (HMG, 2013c), to as far as was reasonably practicable, eradicate fuel poverty 
completely by 2016. The repeat of the wording 'reasonably practicable' is an important feature of 
both targets, because it was this wording that led to the failure of a judicial review in 2008 launched 
by Friends of the Earth and Help the Aged, based on concerns that the government was not doing 
enough to address fuel poverty. The judge ruled that 'everything reasonably practicable' does not 
imply an unlimited level of funding to achieve the objective, that by formulating a strategy the 
government had complied with its legal obligation, and accepted that the government had made 
sufficient effort to comply with its target (Boardman, 2009). 
Although the focus on energy efficiency as a path to addressing fuel poverty is consistent with fuel 
poverty literature (See: Boardman, 2009; Ekins & Lockwood, 2011; Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, 
2013; Stockton & Campbell, 2011; CSE, 2014), the strategy offers very little in terms of new 
measures, other than £3 million of funding for pilot projects for energy efficiency deployment (HMG, 
2015a). The other policies that are referenced in the strategy are the ECO, the Green Deal, and low 
energy building regulations. All of these have been either reduced in scale, or cut completely in 
recent years. This implies that fuel poverty is not a high priority for the government. This may be 
linked to the fact that people who are less well off financially are less likely to vote than their more 
well-off counterpart (JRF, 2015; IPPR, 2013a). 
Little consideration has been paid to the significant barriers to energy efficiency measures. Rather 
than taking a 'right-first-time' approach, the strategy contains interim targets of all fuel poor homes 
to be upgraded to EPC grade E by 2020, and then EPC grade D by 2025, ahead of grade C by 2030 
(HMG, 2014), meaning that the same property could potentially be revisited three times on the path 
to 2030, therefore requiring barriers to energy efficiency to be overcome on three separate 
occasions. This supports the notion that BEIS does not have a high degree of institutional capacity 
for energy efficiency policy making, in that lessons have not been learned from incentives for loft-
insulation under CERT and ECO which encouraged installers to only partially insulate properties. 
Instead, designing the fuel poverty strategy to require all grade E fuel poor properties to be 
upgraded to grade C where technically possible by 2020 would be consistent with a right-first-time 
approach. This approach was not taken however. 
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The commitments that the government makes in the strategy are largely connected to considering 
what actions are required to meet the fuel poverty target, making better use of information, focus 
energy efficiency where it can make the most impact, monitoring delivery of measures, and 
supporting other bodies attempting to deliver fuel poverty measures (HMG, 2015a). Arguably, these 
are all things that the government should be already doing to meet the challenges of fuel poverty. 
This, alongside a target which appears to have little legal force, results in a fuel poverty strategy for 
England which appears to offer little additional value in the aims of reducing fuel poverty beyond 
existing energy efficiency policies. 
3.5.1.2 - Wales 
The Welsh fuel poverty strategy was published in 2010 and features a target to, as far as is 
reasonably practicable, eradicate fuel poverty in Wales by 2018 (Welsh Assembly Government, 
2010), again with no clear criteria defining 'as far as is reasonably practicable'. The strategy does 
however include some practical steps that would be taken to ensure the targets were met such as 
building a referral network to ensure policies had maximum reach, and outlines a new scheme to 
improve access to, and offer funding for, energy efficiency measures for households in the worst 
depths of fuel poverty. The Older People's Commissioner for Wales has however raised concerns 
that, in spite of progress in energy efficiency, the 2018 target is not likely to be met (Older People’s 
Commissioner For Wales, 2014).  
3.5.1.3 - Scotland 
The Scottish government has a target to eradicate fuel poverty by 2016 (Scottish Executive, 2002), 
and in 2011 the Scottish Fuel Poverty forum was commissioned to carry out a review of the Scottish 
Government's approach to tackling fuel poverty. This recommended that a national retrofit 
programme to improve energy efficiency was developed, and this led to the creation of the Home 
Energy Efficiency Programs for Scotland (HEEPS). Although rising levels of fuel poverty in Scotland 
(Scottish Fuel Poverty Forum, 2014) mean it has now missed its November 2016 deadline, the 
Scottish government is continuing to focus on fuel poverty - in June 2015 announced that it was 
making energy efficiency a national infrastructure priority, promising to provide an offer of support 
to all buildings in Scotland, both domestic and non-domestic, to improve their energy efficiency 
rating (Scottish Government, 2015b). 
3.5.2 – Targeting of Relief to the Fuel Poor 
One of the greatest challenges in addressing fuel poverty is effective targeting. This is essential to 
ensure that funds that are allocated to address fuel poverty reach the right households. The 
challenges in identifying exactly which houses are and are not fuel poor has given rise to the use of 
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proxies, which can vary depending on the exact objectives of the policy (See Appendix B). Although 
these proxies allow targeting to be carried out, they are notoriously inaccurate (See Table 2), and 
this leads to potentially large amounts of funding going to non-fuel poor households. Policies can 
broadly be split into those that cast the net wide and so cover a significant percentage of the fuel 
poor, whilst also capturing a large number of people that are not fuel poor (such as CERT priority 
group) and those policies that are very tightly targeted, but were not available to large percentages 
of fuel poor households (such as the post-2011 Warm Front). Although wherever funds or measures 
are received by non-fuel poor households, this will still have supported affordability, accurate 
targeting of priority groups is essential to provide the most relief to where it is most needed 
(Stockton and Campbell, 2011). Table 2 from NatCen Social Research and CSE (2014) shows how a 
number of current and previous policies fit in this balance,albeit this is not comprehensive as winter 
fuel payments are not included. 
Table 2- Fuel poverty targeting efficiencies of current policies (10% Measure),  
Source: NatCen Social Research and CSE, 2014  
Policy Percentage that are Fuel Poor 
Percentage of the Fuel Poor 
Covered/Eligible 
CERT Priority Group 25.2% 75.0% 
CERT Super Priority Group 27.4% 41.1% 
CESP 22.4% - 
Warm Front Pre-2011 30.3% 35.1% 
Warm Front Post-2011 68.8% 16.4% 
Cold Weather Payments 20.0% - 
Warm Home Discount 28.0% - 
ECO HHCRO 37.2% 51.8% 
ECO CSCO 26.9% 12.4% 
Improved capacity for data sharing between different departments of government, and executors of 
energy efficiency policies is often set out as a potential solution to some of the challenges of 
targeting (Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, 2013). This can help policy-makers to understand the 
makeup of society at large and so design better policies, as well as reducing the burden of data-
collection, and allow for proactive marketing of measures to specific households (NatCen Social 
Research and CSE, 2014). The potential of data-sharing has been demonstrated through reforms to 
the pension act which allowed data-sharing to occur for better delivery of the Warm Home Discount 
(DECC, 2016d). Calls for data-sharing such as this assume a continuation of the current top-down 
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method of deployment, whereby strict criteria may be specified by central government for the 
deployment of energy efficiency measures. This overlooks the possibility that an alternative set of 
institutions, with local knowledge, could be well-placed to support better targeting of measures. 
Through whichever means it is achieved, accurate targeting is necessary to ensure measures are 
delivered to those households that are most in need. Given the close relationship between fuel 
poverty and energy efficiency of a property, property efficiency should form a key part of the 
targeting process (Boardman, 2009). To this end, Durham Country Council and The Commission for 
Rural Communities have put together a guidance document for local authorities for how to construct 
a database of housing standards in their area for the provision of accurate fuel poverty relief 
(Commission for Rural Communities and Durham County Council, 2011). This demonstrates the 
potential for local institutions to support energy efficiency deployment.  
3.6 – Governance of Income Policies 
This section sets out policies which are designed to increase income expressly for expenditure on 
energy bills, and such policies are considered in scope for this investigation. 
3.6.1 - Winter Fuel Payments 
Winter Fuel Payments, otherwise known as the Winter Fuel Allowance, makes a single annual 
payment from the government to people of pension age to contribute to the cost of heating in 
winter. Payments are of between £100 and £300, depending on age and living arrangements. The 
cost of this policy amounts to approximately £2.08billion per year (Kennedy and Parkin, 2016b). 
Beatty et al. (2014) carried out behavioural analysis on recipients of the payment and demonstrated 
that the average household in receipt of payments only spend approximately 47% of the payment on 
fuel. This may suggest that the payments are higher than is necessary, and funds could be more 
effective if directed differently. Alternatively, funds could be added directly to recipients’ energy bills 
in the same way as the Warm Home Discount (discussed below). If winter fuel payments are to be 
considered a measure to combat fuel poverty, then questions may also be raised about the efficacy 
of targeting, as only ~26% of fuel poor households in England have at least one occupant over 60, 
(based on the LIHC measure) (DECC, 2016b), meaning a significant amount of money goes to non-
fuel poor households. 
3.6.2 - The Warm Home Discount  
The Warm Home Discount gives £140 off the electricity bill of eligible households, placed as credit 
directly onto the accounts of targeted households, or claimable as a voucher for those households 
with prepayment meters. The ‘core’ group is defined as pensioner households on low-incomes who 
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are in receipt of the guarantee element of pension credit. The ‘Broader Group’ is defined by the 
energy suppliers, based on an OFGEM-set framework (Hough, 2015). In 2014/15, suppliers paid a 
total of £306 million in direct bill support (OFGEM, 2015n). The cost of the Warm Home Discount is 
met by suppliers through a levy on energy bills. It is estimated that in 2014/15 the payments lifted 
172,000 households out of fuel poverty, but the costs levied on bills pushed an additional 74,000 
households into fuel poverty (based on the 10% measure of fuel poverty) (Hough, 2015). An 
alternative arrangement could be to place eligible consumers on the cheapest priced tariff, as often 
those on low incomes are on standard variable tariffs (OFGEM et al., 2014), which can be as much as 
£300 more expensive than the cheapest fixed price deal available (CMA, 2015g). 
3.6.3 - Cold Weather Payments  
Cold Weather Payments are made to eligible households who are in receipt of particular benefits 
(see appendix B) during periods of very cold weather. This is classified as when the average 
temperature at a specified regional weather station is recorded, or forecast to be, 0°C or below for 
seven consecutive days between 1st November 31st March. Payments are fixed at £25/week. The 
total cost of the scheme varies significantly from year to year - over winter 2012/2013 payments 
totalled £146 million, whereas in winter 2013/14 they totalled £27,500 (Kennedy, 2014). Payments 
are made out of the government social fund. Cold Weather payments are usually paid within three 
working days of being triggered, and if recipients have internet access, they can monitor if payments 
have been triggered in their postcode area (Kennedy and Parkin, 2016a). 
 
3.6.4 - Impact of Governance of Income Policy on Affordability  
Income policies set out above provide  support specifically for expenditure on energy to over eight 
million households (DWP and ONS, 2016). However, there is evidence to suggest that the winter fuel 
payment, by far the most expensive of the policies, is poorly targeted and that nearly half of the 
funds are not spent on fuel (Beatty et al., 2014). Given that between 50% and 90% of Big Six 
customers (depending on the firm) are on high-priced SVTs (CMA, 2015j), and this is closely 
associated with vulnerable consumers (Kuzemko, 2015b), it is also possible that simply by offering a 
suppliers’ cheapest tariff to those customers who receive a Warm Home Discount, much of the cost 
burden on other consumers could be relieved (although there is a risk this could drive suppliers to 
increase average prices). The scale of these policies is far larger than Britain's energy efficiency 
policies. In England there is the £25 million tax-payer funded Local Authority Central Heating fund 
(DECC, 2015p), the £88 million Green Deal Communities scheme DECC, 2014g), the £16 million NEST 
scheme in Wales (Welsh Government, 2014), and £74 million HEEPS scheme in Scotland (Scottish 
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Government, 2014). When combined with the bill-payer funded £770 million post-cut ECO budget 
(National Audit Office, 2016b) gives a total of £973 million on energy efficiency – less than half of 
that spent directly funding energy expenditure by bill-payers, and the vast majority of the energy 
efficiency budget is funded through bills, rather than taxation. 
It is also important to note that while these policies provide short term relief from high bills, 
payments are kept up perpetually – this is in stark contrast to the lasting relief offered by a one-off 
installation of energy efficiency measures. Assuming that public expenditure is a good indicator of 
what is considered important by a government, energy efficiency policy appears to be the poor 
cousin to policies boosting income (particularly focussed on a core voter demographic of the 
Conservative party (Ipsos MORI, 2015c)) - this demonstrates both the political nature of energy 
policy, and how demand-side measures are often receive less support from policymakers. 
This imbalance of funding between direct bill or income support, and energy efficiency measures, 
drivers up energy bills whilst doing focussing less resources on long-term bill reductions. This 
therefore undermines long-term affordability. If funds for direct bills support were redirected, or 
matched, towards energy efficiency measures, then lasting affordability of energy could be 
delivered. The impact on affordability of this weak support for energy efficiency measures is 
exacerbated by the lack of connectedness in policy-making of different areas of energy policy. If 
those on receipt of bill support that are not already on the cheapest tariffs were moved onto them 
large sums of money could be saved and redirected to energy efficiency projects. Under the current 
regime however, energy suppliers receive significant windfalls, paid for by the tax-payer, through 
income/bill support delivered via consumers who are on high-price energy tariffs. It is therefore 
clear that more joined-up policy making in this area could yield significant befits for the affordability 
of energy, particularly for vulnerable consumers. However, there is evidence that government may 
not have the institutional capacity to deliver such joined-up policymaking such as this. 
The payment of income policies specifically for expenditure on energy is the least-interventionist, 
most ‘status-quo’ means to supporting affordability of energy in that it requires no changes to any 
aspect of the governance framework. However, as set out above, it does not necessarily represent 
good value for consumers, and delivers large taxpayer-funded windfalls to energy suppliers. 
However, it is likely that in absence of reform to support a more affordable energy system, that a 
number of consumers are likely to be reliant upon these income policies. This means in order to 
remove them; other steps must be taken to ensure that issues of fuel poverty are not worsened.  
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3.7 – Conclusion 
Following the setting out the literature pertaining to the amount of energy domestic consumers use 
and drivers for the amount of energy they need, this chapter has taken a fresh look at energy 
efficiency policy through a governance lens. This demonstrated that the governance structure in 
Great Britain is not supportive of delivering energy efficiency measures, and this has negative 
implications both for general affordability, and for fuel poverty.  
Institutions involved in the policymaking process appear to lack institutional capacity to ensure that 
policies are successful. There are limited signs of policy learning, and in some areas they display a 
significant lack of connectedness in policymaking – both with regard to the Green Deal having the 
potential to undermine the retail market, and how the large payments made via the warm home 
discount, and winter fuel payment could be reduced if suppliers were required to place these 
consumers on their cheapest tariff. At present these policies appear to lead to significant windfalls 
for suppliers. 
The choice of policy measure seems to be led by ideology, as opposed to outcomes. Policymakers 
have chosen to repeatedly scale back the supplier obligation, while neglecting to introduce 
ambitious regulation in its place; with reduced standards in the new-build sector, and only weak 
standards in the private rental sector – this is in spite of the evidence from the eco-design directive 
of the benefits that regulation can bring to delivering high standards of energy efficiency. All the 
while, billions of pounds are spent supporting the bills of some groups of domestic consumers. 
Existing and previous policies to deliver improved energy efficiency are consistent with a top-down, 
supply-focussed model of governance, whereby the focus of policy-making is to ensure consumers’ 
energy needs are met through increasing levels of supply of energy. Policies to improve energy 
efficiency are very much an after-thought in this system. An alternative governance structure would 
allow energy efficiency to become a central pillar of energy policy, with additional supply of energy 
as a last resort, as opposed to the first port-of-call.  
This chapter has taken a fresh look at energy efficiency policy through a governance lens. Currently, 
there is little in the literature which specifically examines the impact of governance on energy 
efficiency, and nothing which examines it in conjunction with governance affecting prices and tariffs. 
This thesis will go on to add to the analysis in chapters one and two by means of primary research, in 
order to establish what might be altered in future to improve the successes of energy efficiency 
policy-making. The following chapter will set out the methodology which will be used to carryout 
primary research, before the results of that research are combined with the information contained 
in this, and previous chapters. 
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Chapter 4 - Methods 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
Having examined the policy and academic literature, this chapter describes the methodology that 
underlies the primary research which was undertaken for this thesis. It begins by setting out where 
the thesis is situated in the literature, and the establishment of research questions that are 
investigated. The methods of primary data-collection are then reviewed, including the selection of 
interviewees, the use of semi-structured interviews, and the steps gone through in carrying out the 
data collection. The ethical and methodological risks are also considered, followed by how the data 
was analysed, how interview transcripts were coded, and how that information was then used.  
4.2 - Literature 
The first three chapters of the thesis have set out the body of academic and policy literature in the 
context of governance and affordability of energy. Previously, few links have been drawn between 
governance of the energy system in Great Britain, and the levels of affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers, so literature on prices, tariffs, the retail market, and energy efficiency was 
reviewed through a governance lens. This analysis will then be combined with primary research from 
Great Britain and Denmark to form recommendations for reform of the governance structure. This 
thesis is firstly able to expand the body of literature regarding affordability of energy by offering 
additional explanations for progress, or lack thereof, in pursuit of an affordable energy system. This 
thesis also expands the governance literature – offering a case study of the impacts that governance 
can have on outcomes and practices with respect to affordability. There is also limited research 
which takes a holistic approach to affordability – combining an examination of pricing and tariff 
policy with consideration of the role of energy efficiency. 
4.3 - Research Questions 
The research questions generated by the literature review are as follows: 
1. Are current governance arrangements regarding pricing and tariffs supportive of affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
2. Are current governance arrangements regarding domestic energy-efficiency supportive of 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
3. What lessons may be learned from the Danish system of energy governance which may be 
beneficial to affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
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4. How might the governance structure in Great Britain be reformed to improve affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers? 
4.4 - Data Collection 
4.4.1 - Interviews 
In order to answer the above research questions, primary research was combined with knowledge 
already available in policy and academic literatures. Primary data was collected by means of semi-
structured, one-to-one interviews (Longhurst, 2016). An interview is described by Gray (2004) as 'a 
conversation between people in which one person has the role of researcher' (Gray, 2004, p.213). 
This technique was chosen because it allows access to information from individuals with privileged 
knowledge (Mason, 2002; Denscombe, 2010). A semi-structured (as opposed to structured or 
unstructured) style of interview was chosen in order to ensure that research questions could be 
addressed effectively, whilst still allowing the freedom to ask additional question to probe more 
deeply into areas of interest. The chosen methodology for data collection has implications for other 
aspects of the methodology – for example, semi-structured interviews on a broad topic are unlikely 
to produce data suitable for quantitative data analysis. This was considered when carrying out 
analysis of the collected data (see below). 
4.4.2 - Identifying Interviewees 
Interviews were taken from across the spectrum of stakeholders in the energy systems in Great 
Britain and Denmark. Selection of interviewees focussed on those institutions with formal policy-
setting roles, with supply of energy to domestic consumers, and with interests in energy efficiency, 
or consumer welfare. Academics and other knowledgeable industry commentators were also 
selected. A broad range of interviewees were chosen in order to limit any sampling error whereby 
any one particular group of actors might be disproportionately represented (See Figure 29 and 
Figure 30). Once an initial list of intended interviewees was established, contact was made to 
request/arrange interview. Where possible, this was carried out through chains of existing 
connections - i.e. those who were already known to the researcher were contacted directly, and 
those whom were not known personally by the researcher were either 'cold-contacted' or contacted 
by means of an introduction from a mutually-known party. Generally, approaches elicited positive 
responses, or recommendations of others within the same organisation to contact. Wherever this 
did not occur however, an alternative representative from the same type of institution was sought in 
order to maintain the balance of interviewees – i.e. to ensure that one type of institution was not 
disproportionately represented (see Figure 29 and Figure 30). Initially, all prospective interviewees 
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were contacted by means of email. An explanation of the project, and an outline of the sorts of 
questions that would be in the interview was included in this first contact email. 
Table 3 shows a list of the interviewees (they are not identified by name in order to comply with 
requirements for anonymity). Figure 29 and Figure 30 show a breakdown in graphical form of the 
broad range of different types of interviewee to show the relative balance of different categories of 
respondent. The smaller sample size in Denmark is owed to budgetary constraints limiting the 
amount of time that could be spent in the country, and a lower response rate from prospective 
Danish interviewees led to a narrower breadth of stakeholders. 
Table 3 - Interviewees by Number, Location, Institutional Category and Job Description 
Interviewee Country Organisation Category Individual Job Role 
Interviewee 
001 
UK Industry Body Senior Executive 
Interviewee 
002 
UK Industry Observer Senior Consultant 
Interviewee 
003 
UK Network Company Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
004 
UK Small/Medium Energy Company Head of Strategy 
Interviewee 
005 
Denmark Industry Observer Director 
Interviewee 
006 
Denmark Industry Body 
Retail Market and Energy Efficiency 
Specialist 
 
Interviewee 
007 
Denmark Supplier (Heat - Municipal) Project Manager - Energy Planning 
Interviewee 
008 
Denmark Supplier (Large) Senior Strategy Advisor 
Interviewee 
009 
Denmark Government Construction and Energy Efficiency 
Interviewee 
010 
Denmark Government Senior Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
011 
UK Small/Medium Energy Company Policy & Regulatory Director 
Interviewee 
012 
UK Academic Senior Position, Energy Policy 
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Interviewee 
013 
UK Academic Senior Position, Energy Policy 
Interviewee 
014 
UK Local Authority Senior Role, Energy & Environment  
Interviewee 
015 
UK Government Body - DECC Civil Servant, Energy 
Interviewee 
016 
UK Consumer Advocate Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
017 
UK Industry Observer Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
018 
UK Network Company Director 
Interviewee 
019 
UK Big 6 Energy Company Policy Director 
Interviewee 
020 
UK Environmental NGO Head of Energy 
Interviewee 
021 
UK Small/Medium Energy Company Wholesale Director 
Interviewee 
022 
UK Environmental NGO Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
023 
UK Anon Senior Regulatory Expert 
Interviewee 
024 
UK Government Body - Other Senior Position 
Interviewee 
025 
UK Big 6 Energy Company Public Affairs 
Interviewee 
026 
UK Environmental NGO Senior Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
027 
Denmark Industry Body Manager of International Affairs 
Interviewee 
028 
UK Industry Observer Senior Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
029 
UK Government Body - Other Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
030 
UK Government Body - DECC 
Senior Civil Servant - Energy 
Efficiency 
127 
 
Interviewee 
031 
UK Local Authority 
Senior Sustainability & Climate 
Change Policy Role 
Interviewee 
032 
UK Government Body - DECC Civil Servant - Fuel Poverty 
Interviewee 
033 
Denmark Government Advisor - Energy Policy 
Interviewee 
034 
Denmark Academic Senior Position, Environment 
Interviewee 
035 
Denmark TSO Senior Energy System Developer 
Interviewee 
036 
Denmark Academic Senior Position, Energy Policy 
Interviewee 
037 
Denmark Bank 
Divisional Vice President - 
Sustainability 
Interviewee 
038 
Denmark Academic 
Senior Position, Energy Use & 
Buildings 
Interviewee 
039 
Denmark Government Special Consultant - Welfare 
Interviewee 
040 
UK Consumer Advocate Senior Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
041 
UK Big 6 Energy Company Policy & Regulations Manager 
Interviewee 
042 
UK Local Authority Sustainability Programme Manager 
Interviewee 
043 
UK Consumer Advocate Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
044 
UK 
Demand Reduction Technology 
Manufacturer 
Public Affairs & Strategy Director 
Interviewee 
045 
Denmark 
Supplier (Electricity) Energy Policy Specialist 
Interviewee 
046 
European 
Level 
European Commission Senior Energy Efficiency Specialist 
Interviewee 
047 
UK Government Body - other Senior Energy Efficiency Specialist 
Interviewee 
048 
UK Government Body - other Energy Policy Specialist 
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Interviewee 
049 
Denmark Government Senior Energy Efficiency Expert 
Interviewee 
050 
Denmark Regulator Senior Energy Policy Expert 
Interviewee 
051 
UK Network Company Senior Energy Policy Expert 
Interviewee 
052 
UK Small/Medium Energy Company Senior Energy Policy Expert 
Interviewee 
053 
UK Price Reporting Agency Senior Market Analyst 
Interviewee 
054 
UK Big 6 Energy Company Public Affairs Executive 
Interviewee 
055 
UK Consumer Advocate Senior Executive 
Interviewee 
056 
UK Regulator Senior Civil Servant, Energy Markets 
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Figure 29 - GB Interviews by Category, Source: Author's Own 
 
Figure 30 - Denmark Interviews by Category, Source: Author's Own 
4.4.3 - Carrying out interviews 
Before beginning the interview, irrespective of the medium (i.e. Face-to-face, video-call, or 
telephone), the researcher explained the background to the research, and the format for the 
interview, verified mutual understanding of time constraints, explained ethical considerations such 
as anonymity and confidentiality, and asked the interviewee to sign a consent form covering these 
matters. This included permission to use audio-recording equipment. All interviewees consented to 
audio recording of the interview, however there was one instance of the interviewee requesting that 
the recording device be stopped so she was able to make a comment 'off the record'. The same 
Industry Observer
Network Company
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discussion preceded all telephone and web-based interviews, however the consent form was sent 
electronically so the interviewee was able to query any matters and give informed consent for the 
interview. Interviewees then returned the form either electronically or by post.  
Open questions were asked throughout the interview in order to give the interviewee opportunity to 
give expansive answers, beginning with a question which was likely to be easy for all interviewees to 
answer. This was done to allow the interviewee to relax and acclimatise to the interview process 
(See: Mason, 2002), and so answer later questions more fully. This initial question was 'What is your 
opinion of the general state of the British domestic sector in terms of energy efficiency?' 
(substituting ‘British’ for ‘Danish’ in interviews in Denmark). This was chosen as a very broad 
question that any interviewee was likely to be able to answer easily, be it from informed 
understanding of the state of the housing stock, or from general impressions or anecdotal evidence. 
It was chosen because it was both easy to answer, yet possible that it would yield some useful 
information. Although the researcher prepared a list of topics to cover during the course of the 
interview, the order and fashion which they were addressed was allowed to change slightly to fit 
with the natural flow of conversation. This allowed both the researcher, and the interviewee, the 
flexibility to explore areas of particular interest or relevance (Bryman, 2012), this is one of the 
benefits of a semi-structured interview style.  
Following the interview, those interviewees that requested it were sent a copy of the transcript of 
the interview. This was done to help ensure transparency of the process, and to maintain good 
relations with interviewees.  
The majority of interviews were carried out face-to-face, however occasionally it was necessary to 
carry out interviews by phone or via web-link. Generally, this was a product of geography, such as to 
enable interviews with Danish interviewees who were unavailable when the researcher was visiting 
Denmark. On occasion, it was also requested by the interviewee because it was easier to fit phone 
interviews in between their other engagements. Potential issues were identified with carrying out 
interviews by web-link such as the interviewee having access to compatible technology. To address 
this, a range of web-link packages were offered such as Skype, Facetime or Google Hangouts. This 
issue was further reduced by offering telephone interviews, owing to telephones being a much more 
universal and ubiquitous technology. Interviews via web-link were however considered preferable to 
telephone interviews because they allow for virtual face-to-face communication by means of a web-
cam. Of those interviews that were not carried out face-to-face, the majority were carried out via 
web-link, and a small number were carried out by phone. Specialist equipment was also purchased 
to ensure telephone interviews could be recorded effectively.  
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All interviews were recorded by means of a dictaphone. This was done to enable the full content of 
the interview to be captured, without the need for in-depth note taking. This enabled the researcher 
to listen to the interviewees' responses carefully, noting key points of interest or possible follow-up 
questions as they occurred. Some note-taking was also performed in case of equipment malfunction, 
and to facilitate the smooth flow of the interview. Any additional thoughts were added to notes 
directly following the interview, and these were then examined during the transcription process to 
add any additional insight that might improve the record of the interview. Interviews generally 
lasted approximately one hour, however a small number of interviews were shorter, generally owing 
to the busy schedule of the interviewees. Two interviews were in excess of two hours. Interview 
recordings were periodically checked as the primary research was carried out to verify good 
interview practice was maintained across the interview period. 
4.4.4 – Interview Questions 
As set out above, interviews were semi-structured, the majority of interviews covered all areas of 
the questions, however on some occasions, due to the overlapping nature of the questions, some 
questions were not asked directly because they had already been covered in an answer to previous 
questions. 
Great Britain Questions 
• What is your opinion of the general state of the domestic sector in Great Britain terms of 
energy efficiency? 
• What is your perception of the cost of domestic energy in Great Britain? 
• In your opinion, are there any opportunities at a governance level, to reduce domestic 
customers' bills? 
o [If so, what are they?] 
• In your view, does the governance structure of the energy system enable the reduction of 
energy demand in the domestic sector?  
o [If so, how? / If not, why not] 
• In your opinion, how would you assess the situation regarding fuel poverty in Great Britain? 
 
• In your view, is there a connection between governance and fuel poverty?  
o [If so, in your view, what alterations should be made to the governance of the 
energy system to help alleviate fuel poverty?] 
 
• Are the governance challenges of reducing the energy demand, or at least the energy needs, 
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among the fuel poor manifestly different to reducing demand amongst the rest of the 
population?  
 
• Is there anything further you would like to add? 
 
Denmark Questions 
• What is your opinion of the general state of the Danish domestic housing stock in terms of 
energy efficiency? 
• In your view, does the governance structure of the energy system enable the reduction of 
energy demand in the domestic sector?  
o [What in terms of governance, do you think is the biggest barrier to energy demand 
reduction in the domestic sector?] 
• In your opinion, is there an appetite among the institutions in the energy industry for 
creating a greater role for demand-side measures?  
• In your opinion, how would you assess the situation of affordability19 of energy in Denmark? 
 
• In your view, is there a connection between governance and affordability of energy?  
o [If so, in your view, what alterations should be made to the governance of the 
energy system to help alleviate issues of affordability?] 
 
• Are the governance challenges of reducing the energy demand, or at least the energy needs, 
among the those who struggle to pay for their energy needs, manifestly different to 
reducing demand amongst the rest of the population?  
 
• Is there anything further you would like to add? 
 
4.5 - Data Analysis 
After each interview, it was transcribed verbatim in order to support the process of thematic 
analysis. Quality checking of interview practice was also carried out during this process. This was 
done to ensure that the researcher was not asking leading questions or introducing any other form 
                                                          
19 In early interviews, the term ‘Fuel poverty’ was used, however it quickly became clear that this is not a term 
widely understood in Denmark, and so required considerable explaining. The situation for low income 
households was explored with sub-questions.  
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of bias. Notes taken during the interview were also combined with the transcripts at this stage. The 
coding software package 'Nvivo' was used to support the coding process. The researcher's 
inexperience with this particular software was identified as a potential barrier, and so the researcher 
attended a workshop on the use of Nvivo, and made use of online resources in order to maximise 
productivity. The researcher was also able to ask questions and share experiences with a social 
science research group, an informal group of social science PGR students present on the campus.  
Coding of transcripts was an iterative process, with a large number of parent and child nodes 
developed on the basis of the content of the interviews (For full list, see appendix K). At the end of 
the coding process, data was re-examined on multiple occasions to see if it might fit better under an 
alternative or additional node. This enabled key themes to emerge from the data, which were then 
examined. Codes were interpreted individually, and in relation to one another, in order to identify 
what may be learned from the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Interviews were designated a number, 
rather than a name, in order to limit identification of interviewee when analysing and reassigning 
codes. This was done to avoid introducing bias to the analysis, although the efficacy of this process 
was limited by the researcher's familiarity with the data. The researcher practiced a self-critical 
approach to address this issue. When identifying key themes in the data, the nature of the 
interviewee was considered, to examine if a large number of interviewees of the same category 
shared a similar view. This was done to avoid over-representation of the views of any one group, and 
to highlight ‘industry lines’ on particular topics. The ‘categories’ of interviewee used are aligned with 
those used in Table 3. 
When writing up the results of the interviews, key themes were identified from the responses of 
interviewees. These themes were identified in reference to the existing literature as set out in 
chapters two and three, the definition of governance set out in chapter one, and with reference to 
the researcher’s own understanding of the area which was developed throughout the research 
process. This process acknowledges the researcher as an important actor in the research process, 
and allows emergent concepts to be identified (See: Ritchie, Spencer & O’Connor, 2003 and Spencer, 
Ritchie & O’Connor, 2003). Reflexivity was used during this stage of the analysis to ensure that any 
pre-existing views did not affect the outcomes of the research (see below), and so the results 
sections offer a complete view of all relevant themes that emerged from the interviews.  
In the results chapters, Quotes from interviewees have also been used in order to exemplify themes 
within the data and bring greater clarity to the results, and tables have been used to set out the 
range of interviewees which expressed support for each of the key themes identified. This is not an 
attempt to convert qualitative data into quantitative data but is done to highlight where views may 
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be clustered within a particular category of interviewees, or held by a broad range of interviewees 
from different categories. Data is displayed in this way to highlight spread of a particular view among 
different classes of respondent, not to attach weight to different themes to suggest that one theme 
is ‘more true’ than another. The risk of misinterpreting this information in a quantitative fashion is 
set out by Galvin (2015):  
It has also been important to show the tenuous nature of the subtle shift from qualitative to 
quantitative results in some studies, where figures are given for the percentage or proportion 
of the interviewees who expressed some particular belief, etc. Findings of this kind could be 
taken to imply that people in general in this situation are like this, i.e. that it is reflected in 
the target population. This produces misleading results, and it is recommended that 
qualitative research of this kind remain strictly qualitative and not try to quantify proportions 
of specific types of responses. 
(Galvin, 2015, p.10) 
Conversion of qualitative data into quantitative is appropriate only for large data-sets derived either 
from surveys or from with much narrower, fully-structured interviews.  
4.6 - Methodological Dangers, and Solutions 
There are a number of potential shortcomings of semi-structured one-to-one interviews which were 
considered when carrying out field work and analysis, in order to minimise impact on the research. 
4.6.1 - Objectivity 
A lack of objectivity during interviewing manifests itself as a researcher's own personal views, 
beliefs, or experiences influencing the outcomes from the interviews (Russel-Bernard, 2011). This 
was managed by the researcher recognising and being mindful of this risk, and giving the 
interviewee space to give full and free responses to questions (see: Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Additional clarity was gained by periodically, throughout the interview, checking understanding with 
the interviewee (see: Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The semi-structured nature of interviews ensured 
they were carried out to a consistent framework. 
4.6.2 - Validity and Reliability 
Validity and reliability relate to the need to design a methodology which is appropriate for 
accurately examining the phenomenon in question (Russel-Bernard, 2011). In order to help ensure 
interviews are both valid and reliable, interview questions were carefully chosen to address all 
research questions, and an interviewer prompt sheet was used to ensure that these areas were all 
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consistently covered, and that when moving onto a new subject area, the phraseology of the 
question was maintained. Denscombe (2010) suggests the use of triangulation can support validity 
of the data, this is the process of checking of data against other sources. However, Mason (2002) 
suggests triangulation to be a risky approach to validity because it assumes the existence of 'one, 
objective, and knowable social reality'(Mason, 2002: 190) that may be effectively explained if viewed 
from many angles. In an attempt to address this balance, a large number of interviews were carried 
out from a range of stakeholders to ensure data was not skewed significantly by potentially 
individualistic views. Responses were critically analysed with reference to policy documents, 
consultation responses, other interviewees responses, researcher’s own knowledge, and possible 
political or financial motivations. Although it is important to note that this practice does not imply 
that isolated views were discounted, as any such views may be considered valid and interesting.  
4.6.3 - Interviewer Effect 
The 'Interviewer effect' is explained by Denscombe (2010) as the issue that 'Interviewers, and 
interviewees come to that, have their own preferences and prejudices, and these are likely to have 
some impact on the chances of developing rapport and trust during an interview' (Denscombe, 
2010: 178). The researcher was able to limit the impact of any prejudices he may hold by being 
mindful of his own behaviour (reflexivity, discussed below), and consistently conducting himself in a 
neutral and professional manner. It is not possible however to affect the interviewee's reaction to 
the researcher, beyond attempting to foster rapport, and a relaxed and trusting atmosphere. 
Projects with access to more than one researcher may be able to tailor researcher choice to 
minimise impacts of the interviewer effect, however the financial limitations of this project 
prevented such a strategy being adopted here. This effect may have been partially reduced during 
online or telephone interviews however, as the technology can partially 'mask' the identity of the 
researcher (Denscombe, 2010).  
4.6.4 - Reflexivity 
The presence of the researcher in the research process may affect outcomes, something which is not 
limited to the interview process. The concept of reflexivity acknowledges that the history, views, 
biases and beliefs of the researcher may have an impact on the way the research is conducted, or 
the results that are produced. In order to avoid this, the researcher reflected on his place in the 
research, and was mindful of how he may be affecting the outcome (Creswell, 2003; Bryman, 2012).  
Mason (2002) suggests reflexivity can also be taken in a wider sense to mean continuously thinking 
critically about what is being carried out and why, calling for the researcher to consistently challenge 
any assumptions he may, sometimes unwittingly, be making. Mason (2002) goes on to say that 
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researchers should subject themselves to the same level of scrutiny as their data. Reflexivity was 
practiced throughout the project to attempt to minimise any distortions brought about by the 
researcher’s history or preconceptions. Reflexivity prompts were included on the prompt sheet for 
interviews. Advice was also sought from other researchers throughout the project in order to discuss 
methodologies and research conclusions as they developed. 
4.6.5 - Power 
The perceived imbalances of power between the researcher and the interviewee may lead the 
interviewee to hold back in answering some questions (Cohen et al., 2007). The researcher exercised 
reflexivity in relation to this risk, being sure to make every effort to foster an equal relationship of 
rapport, and ensuring that the interviews were held either on 'mutual ground' or a place familiar to 
the interviewee (Cohen et al., 2007). This was generally easily achieved by scheduling interviews at 
the interviewees place of work or at an independent meeting facility.  
4.7 - Ethical Considerations 
4.7.1 - Informed Consent 
It was essential to gain informed consent from all interviewees. Confirming consent was simple; 
being secured by use of consent forms. However, as Mason (2002) explains, ensuring consent to be 
informed is less straight-forward. In order address this, full background information on the aims and 
methodologies of the project were given to potential interviewees when first making contact. This 
gave them opportunity to ask any questions before consenting to the interview. E-mail was 
preferentially used as a mode of contacting potential interviewees, as the delayed nature of 
response allows potential interviewees to consider involvement fully. It was also made clear to 
interviewees that they have the right to withdraw from involvement at any stage of the process. 
None of the interviewees were considered 'vulnerable', so they were all able to give informed 
consent on their own behalf. 
4.7.2 - Anonymity  
Keats (2000) identifies that anonymity may leave the interviewee feeling 'freer' to respond to 
questions honestly, and Silverman (2006) goes further, identifying the need to protect the identities 
of participants in qualitative research simply as 'common sense'. In this project, those interviewed 
are kept anonymous in all cases, although identification by classification of interviewee and 
description of job role helps to contextualise the data. This practice was explained to interviewees 
both verbally, and on a written consent form. All interview data was stored separately to any 
information that could be used to identify interviewees. Interview transcripts and recordings were 
137 
 
stored electronically on 2 USB sticks, one kept on-site in a locked filing cabinet when not in use, the 
other stored in a locked box off-site. This was done to observe prudent back-up procedures without 
the use of a 'cloud' back-up, which may be considered less secure.  
4.7.3 - Confidentiality 
Interview transcripts were kept confidential, and data was kept secure as outlined above. 
4.7.4 - Researcher Safety 
The safety of the researcher was guaranteed at all times. No high-risk situations were experienced.  
4.7.5 - Boundaries to Research 
It is necessary to highlight some of the related areas which were not explored in detail during the 
process of this investigation. These are considered important in wider debates around affordability 
of energy, but lie outside the bounds of this research project. 
Domestic Consumers - The term 'energy consumers' can usually be taken to include domestic, 
industrial, services, and transport consumers. However, this project is limited to examination of the 
domestic sector. It is acknowledged that what may generally be termed as 'domestic consumers' are 
likely to make extensive use of transport. However, this form of consumption is not addressed. 
Domestic consumption in this project is framed as energy consumed in or around the home. It is not 
taken to include ‘embedded’ energy, that is energy required to produce products possessed by 
domestic consumers (i.e. the energy consumed by a fridge when it is in use will be considered, but 
the energy that was used in its production will not). 
Effect of income on affordability – As set out in previous chapters, policies affecting income are 
connected with macro-economic or social welfare decisions - such as levels of taxation or income 
support. Although income forms an essential part of the context to understanding affordability of 
energy, examination of related policy lies largely outside the bounds of this thesis. For this reason, 
policy recommendations which would improve affordability, but lie outside the realms of energy 
policy, e.g. increasing pensions, will not be made. The exception to this is where policies are 
designed to increase income expressly for expenditure on energy bills.  
Heating fuels beyond electricity and gas - this PhD focuses on the affordability of electricity and 
mains-supplied gas. Virtually every household in Great Britain is connected to the main electricity 
network to access power for devices and appliances, and approximately 85% of households make 
use of the gas grid to provide energy for space and water heating (CAB, 2014). Those households 
that rely on other fuels for space and water heating make use of electricity (9%), Heating Oil (4%), 
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Solid Fuels (1%), District Heating (1%), and LPG/Bottled Gas (1%) (Baker, 2011)20. Due to limitations 
in time and resources, discussion of cost drivers will focus on electricity and gas. This captures the 
costs affecting 94% of households' heating fuel supply, and ~100% of households' electricity supply. 
4.8 - Conclusion 
This section has set out the use of semi-structured interviews across a wide stakeholder base to 
support answers to research questions. The selection of interviewees focussed on those institutions 
with formal policy-making roles, supply of energy to domestic consumers, with interests in energy 
efficiency, or interests in consumer welfare, as well as industry commentators. Interviewees were 
approached via email to facilitate giving a full background to the research in order to secure 
informed consent. Interview questions were selected in order to encourage interviewees to relax 
and so support response-giving. Interviews were transcribed in full and then coded on an iterative 
basis using Nvivo to gather themes before drawing conclusions. Particular attention was paid to the 
potential pitfalls of such a methodology, and reflexivity was used at every stage to minimise the risk 
of these occurring. Potential ethical issues such as confidentiality were also considered. Careful 
attention was paid to the methodology to help to deliver a project with a highly robust approach, 
devised in reference to the methodological literature. The following chapters will set out the results 
from the interviews in both Great Britain and Denmark, which were carried out using the 
methodology set out in this chapter. These results are then combined with analysis from the 
literature in the discussion chapter.
                                                          
20 NB. These figures do not sum to 100% owing to rounding, and reliance upon a range of data sources. 
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Chapter 5 - Results 1: Effects of Governance on Affordability of Energy in 
Great Britain 
 
5.1 - Introduction 
This section is the result of thirty-nine interviews carried out with key stakeholders from across the 
energy system in Great Britain, as set out in the previous chapter. The content of this chapter is 
based on the themes which emerged from the interviews. To bring clarity to the results, the range of 
interviewees which supported or opposed such views are given in a table at the end of each section, 
however as set out in chapter 4, these tables are expressly not designed to convert qualitative data 
into quantitative data, as doing so would be methodologically unsound. Individual quotes are used 
where necessary throughout each section to demonstrate an area of interest more clearly. This 
chapter supports the analysis in chapters two and three demonstrating the strong connection 
between the governance structure of the energy system, and the levels of affordability of energy. 
This section follows the structure of the rest of the thesis, by examining the constituent parts of 
affordability. Following this introduction, this chapter begins with examining the issues identified by 
interviewees relating to the tariffs, pricing and the retail market. Following this, issues relating to 
energy efficiency are explored. The fourth section sets out wider governance issues which span 
across energy efficiency and retail challenges, and finally section five concludes.  
 
5.2 – Governance and Pricing, Tariffs, and the Retail Market 
This section sets out the views expressed by interviewees relating to pricing, tariffs, and the retail 
market. Much of government’s response to issues of affordability focuses on reducing prices through 
increased retail competition. However, interviewees identified a number of governance issues 
relating to the energy retail market which undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers 
in Great Britain.  
5.2.1 – Prices 
A range of interviewees suggested one of the primary barriers to delivering a more affordable 
energy system related to issues of price. A common theme was simply that there was an inherent 
challenge to the government’s aim to improve affordability of energy because it has little control 
over the largest constituent of retail energy prices – the wholesale energy price.  
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 ‘People expect politicians to do something about energy bills, but the reality is they can’t do 
much about the price of gas.’ 
(Interviewee 53) 
This view is consistent with the findings in the literature review set out in chapter two, and was 
expressed most commonly by those in small and medium energy companies, however there is no 
clear reason why views should cluster in this way.  
Another common view on pricing related to network charges - a small number of interviewees 
suggested that there may be an opportunity to reduce bills by reforming the network price control 
framework. This supports findings in chapter two, however views varied significantly however 
between those which thought this would lead to significant savings, and others who thought any 
savings would be likely to be marginal. 
When reflecting on price levels, it was reported by a range of interviewees that energy prices in 
Great Britain are not significantly different to a number of other countries in Europe (albeit no 
respondent linked this to a low tax rate, or commented on electricity prices being towards the higher 
end of the spectrum – see chapter 2). Interviewees highlighted that domestic consumers in Great 
Britain still face high energy bills – owed in large part to the inefficient housing stock. This is 
consistent with the evidence set out in chapters 2 and 3. 
‘You can see statistics that show we’ve got lower than average bills in terms of the cost per 
unit in Europe, and yet we’ve got the highest bills, or just about the highest bills in terms of 
overall cost, which shows that we use more energy than other countries.’ 
(Interviewee 23) 
Although a comparison of prices between countries is an oversimplification in that it does not take 
account of income levels and relative costs of living in different countries, or the fact that there is a 
wide distribution of energy prices in Great Britain (see chapter 2), the fact that this belief was 
expressed by a range of different interviewees, but not by those in DECC is worthy of note. This 
implies that the fact that energy prices in Great Britain are not significantly out of step with 
elsewhere is relatively common knowledge within the industry. However, interviewees from DECC 
chose not to mention it. Although this does not imply that those working at DECC are not aware of 
how Britain’s unit prices compare to elsewhere, failure to highlight this fact is consistent with a 
department which focuses primarily in delivering policy on affordability by means of reducing prices 
for consumers by means of supporting competition: 
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'My number one priority is to keep bills down for hardworking families and businesses across the 
country. A fantastic way to do this is by switching energy supplier…'  
(Amber Rudd, Energy Secretary, 2015b) 
Indeed the two-year CMA investigation into the energy market was designed to ‘ensure there are no 
barriers to effective competition in the energy market’ (OFGEM, 2014d). There has been no 
equivalent investigation on how to better deliver energy efficiency measures. The closest 
investigation to date is the Bonfield Review (Rudd, 2015b), however this has incredibly narrow terms 
of reference, focusing on information, installation standards and auditing of measures (DECC, 
2015m). 
  
5.2.2 – Regressive Charging 
A key theme which emerged from the interviews is that the current structure of charges in energy 
bills is regressive, in that it falls most heavily on those on low incomes, or who are fuel poor. 
5.2.2.1 - Regressive Levy on Bills 
As was set out in chapter two, a number of costs for social and environmental policies, such as the 
ECO and the RO are placed on bills. Several respondents highlighted that levying charges on energy 
bills in this way is regressive, as the charges do not reflect a consumers’ ability to pay, but drives up 
prices for all. Charging for the ECO in this way is particularly counter-productive given that the ECO is 
specifically designed to address fuel poverty. 
‘…I don't think really it is right that energy efficiency is paid for by households, because if it 
should be paid for by anyone, it should be directly out of progressive taxation, rather than 
regressively, which I think the energy company obligation is because poor households should 
 Policy and energy prices 
Category 
In
d
u
st
ry
 O
b
se
rv
er
 
N
et
w
o
rk
 C
o
m
p
an
y 
B
ig
 6
 E
n
er
gy
 
C
o
m
p
an
y 
Sm
al
l/
M
ed
iu
m
 
En
er
gy
 C
o
m
p
an
y 
Lo
ca
l 
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
B
o
d
y 
– 
D
EC
C
 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
B
o
d
y 
– 
O
th
er
 
En
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l 
N
G
O
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
C
o
n
su
m
er
 
A
d
vo
ca
te
 
O
th
er
 
Government cannot 
control wholesale 
costs 
I I  III  I    I I 
Network charges 
too high 
I I I II      I  
Prices in GB are 
comparable to other 
countries in Europe 
I I I I   II   I II 
142 
 
not be paying for the cost of insulation, that should be coming from people that can afford 
it.’ 
(Interviewee 16) 
A broad range of respondents from different categories put forward this view. It is interesting to 
note that this included all four of the interviewees representing the Big 6 energy suppliers, on whose 
bills the majority of these charges rest. This is consistent with previous occasions when the Big Six 
have objected to the ECO on the grounds it adds costs to their customers’ bills (See: Energy and 
Climate Change Committee, 2013a). These objections should be taken in the context of the large 
suppliers which are required to include levies for a number of environmental and social policy costs 
in their bills, and are losing large numbers of customers to a growing number of new entrant 
suppliers (CMA, 2016c) which are not required to contribute to some of these social and 
environmental policies, including the ECO (OFGEM, 2015f) – giving smaller suppliers a greater 
chance of competing. Given this context, and the fact that the Big Six energy suppliers are 
responsible for some the largest imbalances in the market between fixed-price tariffs to entice 
engaged consumers, and SVTs charging high prices to the unengaged, it seems unlikely that this 
rejection of regressive charging is necessarily genuinely related to a strong concern for the welfare 
of their customers. However, if these charges were to be taken out of energy bills and placed into 
general taxation, it would be the large suppliers that would have most to gain, in that their reduced 
costs could either be taken as additional profit, used to further reduce the price of their fixed-price 
deals to undercut some of the new low-priced market entrants, or used to reduce the cost of their 
SVT. Given the lack of competition in the area of the market occupied by customers on SVTs, and 
lack of transparency regarding the true cost of some policies (see chapter 2) there would be little 
pressure on suppliers to do the latter of these options. 
This funding model, particularly in the case of the ECO, is based on the notion that retail market 
competition will help to keep delivery costs to a minimum (CSE, 2014a), although a lack of a fully 
competitive retail market appears to undermine this argument (see chapter two). There was no 
consensus around why, given the number of respondents that consider these charges as regressive, 
that these charges continue to be levied through energy bills. The appropriate method of funding for 
social and environmental policies is considered alongside the institutional arrangement in chapter 
seven. 
5.2.2.2 - Regressive Tariff Structures 
Some interviewees also suggested that it is not just the charges in the bill which are regressive, but 
also the charging structure. Currently, with each additional unit of energy that is consumed, the 
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average unit price becomes cheaper. This is owed to the common ‘fixed standing charge + unit 
charge’ structure, meaning that as consumption increases, the standing charge is spread over more 
units. This not only has the effect of economically rewarding higher levels of consumption, it also 
means that customers on low incomes who typically consume smaller amounts of energy (CSE, 
2011), face a high per-unit cost than their high-income counterparts. This also means that the 
majority of consumers face a charge even when consuming no energy at all.  
‘At the moment you pay less incrementally for more energy that you use, so if you’re in fuel 
poor household not necessarily using a lot you’re still paying quite a bit rather than having 
say a model where you can go for a survival tariff… that lets you run your fridge, give you X 
number of hours of TV a day and a light bulb – whatever the basics are.’ 
(Interviewee 20) 
Interviewees suggested that this regressive tariff structure should be replaced with one which was 
more progressive, which did not penalise low levels of demand and so was beneficial for low-
demand consumers. A number of different structures were proposed, but most reflected the idea 
that lower levels of consumption should be proportionately cheaper than higher levels. Interviewees 
that identified the problems with the tariff structures were generally those with a specific social 
focus, such as consumer advocates and environmental NGOs. No energy suppliers of any size 
highlighted issues with the charging structure. This may be because each energy supplier will design 
a charging structure which best reflects their underlying costs, which will generally fit a fixed-cost + 
variable-cost structure.  Possible alternative tariff structures designed to focus on affordability are 
explored in chapter seven. 
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5.2.3 – Retail Market Engagement 
Lack of consumer engagement through switching is an important part of the explanation for issues 
with affordability in the current system. A number of interviewees commented on the switching 
behaviour of domestic consumers, stating that there are a number of customers who are unengaged 
with the market and so do not shop around to find the best priced energy tariff, staying on high-
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prices SVTs for long periods. This results in suppliers being able to make significantly higher revenues 
from these unengaged consumers, than from their engaged counterparts. A number of interviewees 
supported the views set out in chapter two, that this means that unengaged consumers, who are 
often poor or otherwise vulnerable (OFGEM, 2015k), are in effect subsidising the energy bills of the 
more engaged consumers who switch supplier often to get the lowest prices.  
‘They [The Big Six] have got sticky customers that have been with them for their whole lives 
that don’t know how to switch, or that they even should switch, they will be sticky customers 
that the can charge a standard tariff for… basically they’re rent-seeking from people that 
have never switched, and making high profits off those customers.’ 
(Interviewee 51) 
The majority of those which commented on the level of unengagement in the market discussed the 
need for further engagement. However, two interviewees (one industry observer, and one from an 
environmental NGO) discussed the promotion of switching as a convenient policy response to high 
energy bills in that it came at practically zero cost to the government. A small number of 
interviewees went further in their criticisms however, suggesting that the subsidisation of engaged 
consumers by the unengaged was an inevitable consequence of a liberalised energy market – which 
was introduced specifically on the premise that it would offer better value to consumers. 
 ‘I went to endless debates about do we want liberalisation, what is liberalisation going to do 
to the fuel poor, and we just didn't get it crystallised to this simple statement - the non-
switchers are subsidising the switchers, there is no other definition for it. Absolutely none. It's 
not coming out of the companies’ profits, it's coming out of the non-switchers.’ 
(Interviewee 12) 
This highlights the harm experienced by the least engaged consumers, who are frequently on low 
incomes or otherwise vulnerable (CMA, 2015g). It is interesting to note that the widespread support 
was for the lack of engagement being the core problem, rather than the reliance upon a competitive 
market itself. This either implies that in spite of low levels of engagement, that a competitive market 
does on balance deliver benefits to consumers, or that retail competition has become so embedded 
as a concept, that most respondents are unable or unwilling to question it as a basic principle. A 
possible solution to this issue is discussed in chapter seven. 
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5.2.4 – Cutting The ECO: Politically Motivated 
There was little consensus around why the cuts to the ECO in 2014 took place, but there is little 
support for the idea that it stemmed from a genuine desire to protect the most vulnerable in 
society. A number of different reasons were offered for the reason the ECO was cut such as internal 
politics between Ed Davey and parts of the Tory Party leading to renewable subsidies being 
protected, a general lack of understanding from the general population about what cutting the ECO 
means made it a soft target, a political reaction to Ed Miliband’s price-freeze proposal, and lobbying 
activities of the large energy companies. The latter of these received most support, and the political 
power of suppliers to influence governmental policy is explored in more detail below.  
A combination of any, or all, of these factors could have contributed to the eventual cuts to the ECO. 
What is possibly most interesting to note is that only one interviewee, who worked for DECC (and 
therefore arguably likely to be supportive of the government), implied that the cuts were the result 
of genuine governmental concern for the welfare impact that levels of energy bills were having, and 
even she then went on to contradict herself by then suggesting it was as in response to the Ed 
Miliband’s price freeze announcement.  
‘…And just to pick, a political response to that storm [political and media interest in prices], 
when you’ve got to do something, to pick on the only bit of the energy bill that gives you any 
chance of paying less in future, i.e. the levies around energy reduction, including ECO, is just 
bizarre. Counterfactual irrational therefore completely political’ 
(Interviewee 47) 
 
This demonstrates that although there was not widespread agreement about why the ECO was cut, 
it appears that there is an agreement that the reason was a political, rather than a social motivation. 
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This demonstrates how potentially unstable energy policies can be – that they can be made and 
unmade quickly, in response to a shifting political landscape, as opposed to in order to deliver the 
greatest levels of consumer protection.  
The selection of the ECO for the cut also demonstrates a pervasive narrative of energy efficiency 
obligations as primarily the cause of high prices, rather than a significant opportunity to reduce bills 
in the long term. The majority (£30-£35) of the £50 reduction referred to in the above quote was the 
result of cuts to the ECO: 
'British households will benefit from proposals that will be worth £50 on average, thanks to 
Government plans to reduce the impact of energy company bill rises...While the Government cannot 
control the price of energy in the global market, it can help bill-payers by reducing the impact of 
social and environmental programmes on their bills’  
(DECC, 2013c: Online) 
 Cutting the ECO: Politically Motivated 
Category 
In
d
u
st
ry
 O
b
se
rv
er
 
N
et
w
o
rk
 C
o
m
p
an
y 
B
ig
 6
 E
n
er
gy
 
C
o
m
p
an
y 
Sm
al
l/
M
ed
iu
m
 
En
er
gy
 C
o
m
p
an
y 
Lo
ca
l 
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
B
o
d
y 
–
 D
EC
C
 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
B
o
d
y 
– 
O
th
e
r 
En
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l 
N
G
O
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
C
o
n
su
m
er
 
A
d
vo
ca
te
 
O
th
er
 
Reaction to 
price freeze 
I   I  I    I  
Protect 
renewables 
I           
Soft target     I  I   I  
Supplier 
lobbying 
    II  I I  I II 
Genuine welfare 
concerns 
     I      
 
5.3 – Governance and Energy Efficiency 
Interviewees highlighted a number of challenges to improved deployment of energy efficiency 
measures. Some of these support information in the literature, highlighted in chapter three. These 
are included because it demonstrates alignment between knowledge in the industry and the 
literature.  
5.3.1 – History of the Housing Stock 
Interviewees identified that one of the most significant factors affecting affordability of energy for 
domestic consumers is the prevailing low standard of thermal efficiency in the housing stock, partly 
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linked to the housing stock being particularly old. This is linked to housing design in Great Britain 
having historically focussed more on aspects of design such as ventilation, light, damp-proofing and 
property size, rather than on energy efficiency. Regulations referring to minimum levels of 
achievable heat were not introduced until 1969 (Boardman, 1991), by which time approximately two 
thirds of today's housing stock had already been constructed (See Figure 35). 
‘…we’ve got a very energy inefficient housing stock, we’ve got one of the oldest housing 
stocks in Europe, and we’ve had very poor building standards in terms of energy efficiency 
historically, which has only been corrected relatively recently compared to other countries.’ 
(Interviewee 28) 
This view was echoed by a range of interviewees from different categories. The widespread 
knowledge and acceptance of poor energy efficiency standards is of note because it demonstrates 
that both policymakers and other industry stakeholders are aware of the issues. In spite of this being 
by its nature being a long-term issue, this awareness has not led to the development of highly 
effective systems to address it effectively – indeed efficiency standards for new-build properties 
continue to be cut. This demonstrates how awareness of an issue, although necessary, is not 
sufficient for it to be solved. 
 The old and inefficient housing stock presents a unique challenge 
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5.3.2 – Barriers to Energy Efficiency Deployment 
Interviewees from across the sector also demonstrated a strong understanding of the barriers to 
deployment of energy efficiency which are identified in the literature. Interviewees highlighting 
particularly the hassle factor, and the role of the agency problem in the private rental sector. 
Although there was a wide spread of different categories of interviewee supporting each of these 
established barriers, there were some instances where answers appeared to cluster. For example, all 
three of the DECC interviewees identified the agency problem in the private rental sector as a 
significant barrier to improved energy efficiency. The timing of these interviews may be significant in 
that they took place in the lead up to the publication of the new obligation on landlords to improve 
energy efficiency standards to a minimum of grade E (DECC, 2015n), when the interviewees would 
certainly have been working on, or at least aware of, this project. However, it is not possible to know 
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if this response was in the forefront of interviewees minds due to the work they were undertaking, 
or if this was a widely-held view within DECC, and therefore the policy was developed.  
It is evident that across the industry there is an awareness of several the established barriers to 
energy efficiency which are noted in the literature. What is particularly of note however is that of 
those barriers identified in the literature, the one which had least support among respondents was 
upfront cost – the barrier which the Green Deal was principally designed to address. This could 
suggest either that the Green Deal was poorly conceived, or that those interviewed felt that the 
Green Deal was successfully alleviating this barrier. The latter however appears unlikely given the 
widespread expressed distain for the policy. A small number of respondents also suggested that 
currently energy prices were too low to lead consumers to invest in energy efficiency measures. 
‘What you really want is you want people to feel the pain of energy prices because that will 
help drive the right decision making’ 
(Interviewee 15) 
Although it is true that low prices would reduce consumers' motivation to invest in energy efficiency 
measures (Eyre, 2010), this also assumes that much of consumers’ decisions not to investment in 
energy efficiency measures was based on economically rational decision making, which is often not 
the case (Gillingham et al., 2009). A higher energy price would create a stronger economic incentive 
to investment in energy efficiency measures, however increased prices would serve to undermine 
affordability of energy significantly (whilst also doing nothing to address other barriers to take-up). 
Although there were only four interviewees which expressed this view, the fact that one of these 
was a senior civil servant within DECC, with direct involvement for development of energy efficiency 
policy, is likely to be significant. This view frames households as economically rational actors, a view 
which is likely to influence policy design. This takes no consideration of the fact however that a 
number of households have never considered installing loft or cavity wall insulation, or feel they are 
already doing enough to cut their energy consumption (Consumer Focus, 2012). This view is 
symptomatic of a governmental department which attempts to deliver affordability through market 
forces. This view was observed by Mallaburn & Eyre (2013),who note that some ministers, 
regulators, and public officials have claimed that market forces will on their own bring about cost-
effective energy efficiency measures, a view that may be attributed more to an ideological 
standpoint, than scientific evidence gathering (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2013). 
A new barrier, not identified in the literature which was identified by interviewees was that energy 
efficiency measures do not attract sufficient political capital to be worth prioritising for 
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policymakers, on the ground that large supply-side projects such as the construction of a new power 
station would generate greater political value.  
‘…you don’t get the nice pictures of dear nice George Osborne in his hard hat and high-vis 
jacket standing in front of a light bulb changing program in the same way that you do in 
front of a nice big new nuclear plant or something similar – I’m being faintly facetious there 
but I think there is a political point on the optics that works well as a photo call, as a story.’ 
(Interviewee 20) 
Although some policy-makers may support policies beyond those which bring significant political 
capital, the perceived political value of commissioning large infrastructure projects may work to 
reduce interest in domestic energy efficiency. This is because energy efficiency is a policy option 
which is both inherently dispersed, and may in of itself be of limited importance to consumers 
(Consumer Focus, 2012) - who are also voters. These barriers will be considered in the proposed 
changes to the governance structure, set out in chapter seven. 
One of the major challenges highlighted in the successful delivery of energy efficiency measures was 
the lack of long-term planning. Many interviewees criticised policy uncertainty, widely framed as the 
“stop-start” nature of energy efficiency obligations, and called for a more long-term approach to 
policy-making. This would enable companies to build stable business models and longer term 
investment plans – this affects both those delivering energy efficiency measures, and those who 
manufacture the products. One of the major challenges to addressing this issue is the short-term 
cyclical nature of parliamentary terms and spending cycles.  
 ‘I think it comes back to the stop-start, so you have one scheme that you’re working on, then 
you have to pause for breath and you have to get up to speed with a multitude of regulations 
and rules and a new structure and a new framework, and not only do we have to get up to 
speed with that, local authorities have to, housing partners have to, the brokerage system, 
everybody who’s playing in this market has to understand.’ 
(Interviewee 25) 
‘…another element of ECO that frustrates us which is the short-term periods, so 2 years – 
extension – 2 years – extension. What we want to do for business is offer long term certainty 
to the suppliers, as well as to the construction industry, so that means we need to go beyond 
parliamentary terms.’ 
(Interviewee 29) 
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This demonstrates the importance of a governance structure that is able to deliver greater long-term 
planning of energy efficiency policy. This need, and how this can be met, will be discussed in chapter 
seven. It is interesting to note that all the interviewees from the Big Six energy suppliers, who are 
responsible for delivery of energy efficiency measures highlighted this point. This suggests that 
although suppliers generally do not appear supportive of energy efficiency obligations (see below), 
they also wish for any policies which are put in place to be stable and predictable. This demonstrates 
the importance of the governance structure in supporting effective deployment in energy efficiency, 
in that the barriers to deployment affect not only potential recipients of the measures, but the 
supply chains responsible for delivering them also.  
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5.3.3 – Suppliers as Poor Executors of Energy Efficiency Policy 
Interviewees highlighted a number of issues relating to energy suppliers as executors of energy 
efficiency policy. The idea that suppliers’ lobbying played a part in the cutting of the ECO is 
consistent with the position of interviewees from the Big Six arguing for the costs of the ECO to be 
taken out of the energy bill (see above). It also raises questions regarding why suppliers may have 
lobbied in such a way, and if it is appropriate for suppliers to be responsible for a social policy which 
they appear to played a role in having cut. Indeed, several interviewees highlighted that suppliers 
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may not be the most appropriate delivery body for social and environmental policies such as the 
delivery of energy efficiency measures. 
5.3.3.1 – Energy Efficiency: Against Suppliers' Interests  
It was frequently observed by interviewees from almost the full range of categories that it is against 
the interests of energy suppliers for energy efficiency policies to be ambitious or successful, as 
reduced demand for energy would lead them to suffer reduced revenues. This means that although 
it might be more cost effective from an overall system perspective, it is not in the interests of those 
individual firms who profit from the generation and sale of energy. 
‘[Suppliers] are energy retailers, they’ve got to sell energy. It’s almost like asking petrol 
stations to be responsible for the fuel efficiency of cars. So, a petrol station can do things like 
remind people that excessive braking, excessive acceleration increases your consumption, 
but you wouldn’t expect a petrol station to see people driving up and going “That’s a really 
inefficient car you’ve got, we need to replace it!” ‘ 
(Interviewee 11) 
A very small number of interviewees suggested that some suppliers, in particular British Gas, were 
changing their business models to one more heavily based on deployment of energy efficiency 
measures – however this is called into question by British Gas’ decision to cut five hundred jobs from 
its energy efficiency arm (Centrica, 2016a) shortly after the announcement that the successor to ECO 
would be smaller in size (HM Treasury, 2015b). One interviewee did offer a contrasting view, 
expressing her bewilderment at the way that suppliers were so against the ECO, on the grounds that 
they could simply increase their unit prices of offset lost volume: 
 ‘I don’t understand why the big 6 are so anti it [ECO]. I don’t get it. If you haven’t got 
upstream business, and your primary metric for profit, and primary influence on profit is 
number of customers, why are you worried about selling those units of gas, because you’re 
still going to be making... and this is how they think about it, they think we need to make £30 
per customer, or whatever, they don’t think ‘we need to sell each customer this many units of 
gas’ because if it goes down nationally, number of units of gas they sell, it’s a national 
competition for those customers and it would affect everyone in the same way, and you just 
put your supply share of cost up a bit to reflect that increased competition.’ 
(Interviewee 51) 
This view was very much an outlier in that representatives from every other category of interviewee 
expressed that the reduced sales was categorically against a supplier’s interests. Interviewee 51 is 
correct in theory, there is nothing to prevent suppliers taking a greater percentage profit from fewer 
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units, however there are a number of reasons why they may not wish to do pursue that course of 
action. Firstly, this would mean a supplier’s percentage of profit would have to increase, which 
would risk exposing them to political and media pressure as this would be reflected in OFGEM’s 
consolidated segmental statements (see: OFGEM, 2016b). It would also require a shift in business 
model - energy suppliers’ business models are typically characterised by relying on high volumes of 
sales at low margins (BDO, 2014), moving to a model of fewer units and greater profit margins per-
unit would require a significant change in this model. Interviewee 51 also highlights that a suppliers’ 
ownership (or not) of upstream gas assets is relevant. This is true to the extent that many of the 
measures under ECO relate to thermal insulation and therefore are likely to reduce gas demand (as 
gas is the primary fuel used for heating in Great Britain). Two of the Big Six own upstream gas assets, 
one of which is British Gas, which has both the largest share of gas customers, and the largest 
obligation under the ECO. In addition, all of the Big Six own and operate power-stations, which will 
suffer reduced revenues from any measures which reduce electricity demand such as replacement 
of storage heaters.   
A small number of respondents highlighted that fulfilling the obligations was in the interests of 
energy suppliers, but only as a product of the sanctions that were in place in the event that they did 
not meet their targets.  
‘It’s [Suppliers’ delivery of ECO] not a conflict because I have an obligation to deliver ECO, if I 
don’t meet my target then 10% of my global turnover is at risk, OFGEM can charge me, so 
that’s why I do it, I have no choice in the matter.’  
(Interviewee 41) 
 
Although this suggest that on balance, it may be in a suppliers’ interests to meet the obligations that 
are currently in place under the ECO, it does not mean that it is in suppliers’ inherent interests to 
maximise effectiveness of energy efficiency measures, or to lobby for more ambitious policies. This 
implies that suppliers are likely to achieve only the minimum level of deployment to comply with 
their obligation, rather than setting out to maximise benefit to households. This also places 
significant pressure on policy-makers to design policies perfectly, so that they cannot be taken 
advantage of. This is something that they failed to do in the past in multiple instances (see chapter 
3). This reliance upon perfect policy-making risks limiting the efficacy of energy efficiency policy, and 
so inhibits improvements in affordability of energy for domestic consumers. DECC’s policy-making 
capacity in this space is discussed below. 
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5.3.3.2 – Suppliers’ Power: Getting the ECO Cut 
As set out above, a number of interviewees suggested that the Big Six suppliers’ lobbying was part of 
the reason the ECO was cut. It appears that part of the reason that they were so successful in doing 
so lies in the dual responsibility of delivering energy efficiency measures, and their ability to raise the 
bills of  ~70% of domestic consumers at only 30 days’ notice (From figures in OFGEM, 2016c). Not 
only is it not in the interests of suppliers for energy efficiency measures to be successful, but it 
appears that they were particularly against the ECO because of the uncapped costs it imposed upon 
their businesses (See: Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2013a). This occurred in the context 
of their losing customers to a growing number of new entrant suppliers (CMA, 2016c) which are not 
required to deliver the ECO (OFGEM, 2015f), and rising political pressure around levels of energy bills 
(Lockwood, 2016). It is possibly unsurprising therefore that the Big Six energy suppliers moved to 
leverage their political power against the ECO. How this occurred can be seen in the timing of the 
first announcement of the cuts to the ECO and the subsequent price announcements from the Big 
Six (See Figure 31). In October 2013 at Prime Minister's Questions, David Cameron announced the 
'Rollback of the Green Levies' (Cameron, 2013). The details were confirmed in December 2013 when 
the government announced it would be cutting the ECO in order to reduce energy bills. In January 
2014, British Gas, the supplier with the largest ECO obligation, announced a partial reversal of its 
latest price increase (announced in October 2013) based on the assumption that the Government's 
pledge to cut the ECO was carried out (British Gas, 2014). Scottish Power and SSE followed an almost 
identical pattern of behaviour (Scottish Power, 2014; SSE, 2014b). However EDF, Eon and RWE-
Npower took a slightly different approach, choosing to put up prices in early 2014, but stating that 
the level of these increases was lower than it would have been had the government not announced 
cuts to the ECO, again attributing a reduced rise to the Government's policy changes (EDF, 2014; 
RWE npower, 2014; E.On, 2013). This was ahead of the formal consultation process, which began in 
March 2014 (DECC, 2014m), in response to which five out of the six of the Big Six highlighted the 
government’s announcement about cuts to the ECO already being considered in their current prices. 
This implied that if the cuts were not to be carried out, then energy prices would have to be 
increased, and that suppliers would be able to hold government publicly responsible (See Figure 31).  
‘…it's a very clever move by suppliers, knowing that something has been announced but that 
it had to be consulted on, and they kind of made the consolation not really a real 
consultation. Not in any kind of legal sense, there's no way that we can say they [the 
Government] legally haven't consulted properly, they have consulted properly, it's just that 
they're over a barrel and they've allowed themselves to be over a barrel…’ 
(Interviewee 22) 
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Figure 31 - Timeline of Announcements Regarding Cuts to the ECO, Source: Author's Own 
 
This came at a time when, as set out above, energy bills were becoming increasingly political, 
particularly because the opposition was leveraging rising bills for political capital. The level of energy 
bills was being reported regularly as one of, if not the most, significant financial concern for 
households (uSwitch, 2013; YouGov, 2015; DECC, 2014f). This implies that there could have been 
significant negative political implications for the government had the cuts not been carried out as 
originally proposed. In spite of the majority of the respondents to the consultation objecting to the 
cuts, they were confirmed in July 2014 (DECC, 2014n). The cuts were in fact slightly greater than was 
originally announced, however no energy company announced additional bill reductions to reflect 
the greater-than-expected cut, a point which went uncommented upon by the government or 
OFGEM.  
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A number of interviewees highlighted that suppliers are politically powerful, this is supported by 
Lockwood et al. (2013) and Mitchell (2008) who comment that not only do energy suppliers control 
the energy bills of the majority of the population, and are relied upon by the government to avoid 
the lights going out, as well as to create employment. It appears that suppliers were able to provide 
significant resistance to the level of energy efficiency targets in the domestic sector, and although it 
is not possible to attribute the outcome of the consultation entirely to the actions of the energy 
supply companies, it appears that considerable political pressure was placed on the government by 
the energy companies. This is consistent with issues of regulatory capture set out in chapter one 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Veljanovski, 2012). 
It appears that it was the dual responsibilities of deployment of energy efficiency measures, and 
control over prices for the majority of the population, which gave the large suppliers such significant 
political power – which grows as prices become more politically salient. Had suppliers instead been 
in favour of energy efficiency action and so been calling for the targets to be maintained, the 
outcome may have been different. This again highlights that energy suppliers may not be the most 
appropriate institution for deployment of energy efficiency measures (discussed further in chapter 
seven). 
It is interesting to note that the two groups which did not highlight the political power that suppliers 
hold are the government, and energy suppliers themselves. This could be explained either by the 
fact that this is simply how it appears to individuals outside the relationship looking in. Alternatively, 
it could be the result of neither party wishing to shine a spotlight on the power that suppliers can 
exercise over the government. Given the above set out example of the imposition of cuts to the ECO, 
the latter reason appears more compelling.  
5.3.3.3 – Targeting of Energy Efficiency Measures 
Ensuring accurate targeting of energy efficiency measures can present a significant challenge for 
policies designed to address fuel poverty (Boardman, 2009). Although the existing relationship 
between suppliers and customers was one of the original motivations for allocating responsibility for 
energy efficiency to customers (CSE, 2014a), it is not clear that the relationship that customers have 
with their suppliers is sufficiently strong to render it particularly useful. A number of interviewees 
highlighted that suppliers have only limited information regarding their customers, other than their 
consumption information, which is often only collected once or twice a year. A significant 
contributor to suppliers' lack of detailed knowledge about the specific circumstances of individual 
consumers was sometimes attributed to a lack of data-sharing between different governmental 
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departments, and between the government and the energy companies deploying energy efficiency 
measures due to issues of data-protection  
‘…the energy companies don’t know who is fuel poor, because they don’t have the data, so 
one of the things is to provide access to this kind of data, for example welfare recipients from 
DWP so there’s some kind of exchange over there as well but they go automatically into 
privacy laws and privacy issues over there.’ 
(Interviewee 29) 
The exception to this issue is in the administration of the Warm Home Discount, for which a revision 
was made to the Pensions Act (NatCen Social Research and CSE, 2014). There was no clear 
consensus view among respondents regarding why issues of data-protection could be avoided for 
the warm home discount, but not for the purposes of deploying energy efficiency measures. Overall 
however, if the ECO were to be delivered by an institution which knew more about the households it 
was targeting, the need for data-sharing would be significantly reduced.  
5.3.3.4 – Trust in Energy Suppliers 
The lack of trust that consumers have for energy companies was highlighted by a number of 
interviewees as a barrier to successful deployment of energy efficiency measures through the ECO. 
Although there is evidence that levels of trust are increasing slowly (Ipsos MORI, 2015a), they are 
lowest amongst those struggling to keep up with energy bills (Ipsos MORI, 2015b), who may be 
considered a priority group for measures designed to improve affordability. 
‘Also, they’re quite a poor agent in other regards in that they’re not particularly trusted by 
the public. If you want to get the public to buy into having someone in their home putting in 
cavity wall insulation or loft insulation, doing solid wall cladding, it really helps if you’ve got 
that message coming from someone they want to believe and who they trust.’ 
(Interviewee 40) 
This is likely to make some households difficult for suppliers to engage with, which ultimately either 
that measures may reach fewer households, or that policies will cost more to deliver than they 
might have if households had more faith in the firms delivering them. This view was put forward by 
interviewees from a range of categories, however the concentration of this view among the Big Six 
energy suppliers is interesting – it appears that they are mindful of the trust challenge they face.  
5.3.3.5 – Local Authorities as Alternative Executors of Energy Efficiency Policy 
Having established that there are multiple reasons why energy suppliers may not be well-placed to 
deliver energy efficiency measures effectively, an alternative executor of energy efficiency policy is 
157 
 
worthy of examination. A number of interviewees from a range of different categories proposed that 
local authorities could be a strong alternative to energy suppliers for the delivery of energy 
efficiency measures, for a range of different reasons. Interviewees highlighted that local authorities 
have a good knowledge of their surrounding area, in terms of both where the most vulnerable 
households are, which could therefore be prioritised, as well as the nature of the housing stock in 
the area – this would help to avoid issues of data sharing – set out above. 
‘Local authorities are probably more attuned to their community needs, and they probably have a 
better handle on who is vulnerable and who isn't, and they probably have a better handle on what 
are the most appropriate measures locally.’ 
(Interviewee 56) 
Deployment by local authorities could also help to address issues of lack of trust, given that it was 
suggested by a number of interviewees that local authorities generally well-trusted institutions. The 
one significant challenge to the local authority model however is one of funding. Central 
government funding to local authorities in England has dropped by over a quarter since 2010 (DCLG 
and ONS, 2016). To be successful, local authorities would have to be sufficiently well-funded to set 
up and maintain energy efficiency deployment schemes. Assuming such funding was forthcoming, 
local authorities may offer a strong alternative to energy suppliers for the deployment of energy 
efficiency measures.  
‘…energy demand reduction, fuel poverty, that can come from local authorities as well…. 
[but] if you fundamentally weaken local authorities at the core, they won’t be able to do 
anything well. So, we need a strong Local Authority sector that is funded, empowered, and 
obligated to do the whole fuel poverty alleviation bit.’ 
(Interviewee 47) 
Although moving responsibility for energy efficiency deployment to local authorities would be 
unlikely to be successful without policy and institutional development, local authorities may be able 
to play a valuable role in the delivery, or facilitation of, energy efficiency improvements in their local 
areas. This is explored more extensively in chapter seven. 
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5.4 – Broader Governance Issues 
5.4.1 - Institutional Capacity 
A number of interviewees highlighted that both the government, and OFGEM lack the capacity to 
fully understand the and make effective policy for, the energy sector. 
In the case of OFGEM this is consistent with the findings in chapter two, that it may not be 
sufficiently well equipped to understand the operation of the network companies in order to put in 
place an effective revenue control mechanism - the degree to which a network is likely to 
successfully inflate cost forecasts is affected by the capacity of the regulator (Kuzemko, 2014). If a 
regulator is able to effectively critique a business plan, then prices will be kept low. However, a 
number of interviewees suggested that OFGEM does not have the necessary institutional capacity to 
do this effectively.  
Questions are also raised around the government’s capacity to design effective policy, particularly in 
the area of energy efficiency. The reduction of government capacity, in favour of expertise lying in 
the hands of private firms, was part of the long-term project of privatisation which spanned the 
1980s and 1990s, however this has left government with limited capacity to address market failures 
(Kuzemko, 2015a). This is problematic because as set out above, the reliance on a supplier obligation 
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for delivering energy efficiency measures places greater pressure on BEIS to design policies which 
accurately target appropriate measures to appropriate households, and cannot be ‘gamed’ by 
suppliers, something which is in their interests. This is because their motivation is not one of 
maximising social benefit of deployment, but to maximise delivery against the policy criteria in order 
to avoid sanctions. 
‘… the energy system is becoming even more complex, it’s always been complex but it’s 
getting even more complex and not many people within government understand the 
different complexities and they don’t have the resources to go and look at those, but the very 
large energy companies do have the resources to do that, it’s in their interests to understand 
every implication of every policy and how they interact and so government tends to rely on 
suppliers, or energy companies, to explain to them actually how things work, and that is a 
very very powerful position for those companies to be in.’  
(Interviewee 26) 
 
‘This goes back to the whole regulatory capture thing, because all of the knowledge about 
network regulation, ok OFGEM have got some, but they ship a hell of a lot out to 
consultancies like Oxera on their behalf, but all of the knowledge about how the system 
operates, how the networks work, what stuff costs, is with the networks, and although they 
might think they’re basing their evidence on the best available data, which they might be, 
the networks might have a much better understanding of how things work.’  
(Interviewee 51) 
 
As both quotes suggest, this lack of capacity on behalf of government and OFGEM creates an 
imbalance of power, in favour of private firms in the industry who are able to leverage their superior 
understanding of the energy system to maximize value for themselves. In the case of suppliers, their 
political power stemming from control of energy prices was set out above. In addition to this, the 
views of the interviewees suggest that they also have a secondary base of power stemming from 
their superior understanding of the sector in which they operate. If OFGEM and government had a 
greater understanding of the industry they both oversee, this imbalance of information would be 
lessened, and with it, the balance of power redressed to some extent. 
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5.4.2 - Power of non-state actors 
In addition to the political and informational power that those involved in the energy industry wield, 
interviewees across a range of categories highlighted the political power of the building lobby, and 
of landlords, in affecting policies around energy efficiency.  
 ‘…zero-carbon homes is quite a complex batch of regulation, and you can image the friends 
of the party in the house-building fraternity would have been very ready to see that go…’ 
(Interviewee 55) 
 
‘So this change now is a bit of a watering down of some of those things because it says the 
default must be E if you can’t rent out F & G but I’m very disappointed by the very weak 
position, they don’t have to do it if there’s a net cost... The landlords’ association will be 
scaring them witless, and they do this, I know they do this, I think it’s unforgivable.’ 
 (Interviewee 24) 
This relates closely to the principal-agent problem which was identified as a barrier to energy 
efficiency deployment. Neither housebuilders, or landlords, have an interest in raising the energy 
efficiency standards of their properties. Improved standards will simply result in additional costs for 
them. If they are able to influence policy in this space, as interviewees suggest, then it is likely to 
reduce the chances of energy efficiency policy being ambitious or effective. 
It appears that in the case of the landlords’ lobby, that this may have had an effect on the minimum 
energy efficiency standard for private rental properties. Although the minimum rental standard that 
was put in place is theoretically beneficial, and was introduced with sufficient timescales to allow 
landlords to make the necessary changes to their properties, the details of the policy were so weak 
that it is unlikely to make a significant difference to overall standards (see chapter three). Although it 
is impossible to prove a conclusive link between any one institutions’ lobbying activities and the 
policy outcomes, the National Landlord's Association claims responsibility for affecting the design of 
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this policy, in achieving the number of exemptions in the scheme (National Landlords Association, 
2015). It is reasonable to assert that without political resistance from the landlords’ lobby, the 
minimum energy efficiency standard for private rental properties may have been more ambitious. 
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5.4.3 – The Role of Regulation  
Part of the reason that the landlords lobby have been successful in arguing for a weak private rental 
sector standard is likely to be the prevailing political ideology. It was widely suggested that many of 
the policy decisions relating to affordability of energy for domestic consumers were the product of 
adherence to an ideology which favoured low levels of regulation or intervention in markets.  
 ‘And also, there are just the politics as well - you've got different ideologies haven't you… 
this government doesn't particularly like regulation because they see it as hindering 
businesses, and there's a full set of impacts you have to do about burdens on business 
hindering growth and all that sort of stuff, and there's also the whole people should be free 
to choose what they want to do those as well so the whole mix of those sorts of things.’ 
(Interviewee 15) 
A number of policy decisions affecting affordability are consistent with this ideology such as the 
design of the Green Deal as an attempt to create a market for energy efficiency measures funded by 
private investors (DECC, 2010), the reductions in building energy efficiency regulations affecting 
new-build properties (DCLG, 2015; HM Treasury, 2015a), and the weak energy efficiency regulations 
on private landlords (DECC, 2015n). The ideological support for the use of market mechanisms, and a 
resistance to using regulation to set stringent energy efficiency standards in housing, has a negative 
impact on outcomes.  
It is possible that the reluctance to introduce regulation which directly affects consumers could also 
relate to the perception of political risk associated with such policy  Mallaburn and Eyre (2013) 
comment on the need for regulation in order to bring about increased uptake of energy efficiency 
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measures, however IPPR (2013b) highlights that the political risk in imposing regulations upon 
domestic consumers, who are also voters, make this option unattractive. An example of this was the 
proposed introduction of the ‘Consequential Improvements’ scheme, which precipitated a powerful 
media campaign (see Mail Online, 2012), and the policy was abandoned soon afterwards. The 
political risk associated with the introduction of regulation was highlighted by interviewees from a 
range of categories, most notable of which were from DECC. It is therefore likely that this may 
influence policy-makers’ proposals.  
Some academics have said you shouldn’t be able to sell a home unless it meets a certain 
minimum level of energy efficiency, that’s a very good idea but it’s politically not appetising – 
politicians are very worried about introducing regulations like that because they think it 
would be unpopular. 
(Interviewee 28) 
 
In spite of this, regulation was highlighted by interviewees from a range of different categories as 
having been particularly effective in delivering improvements in efficiency of appliances and boilers. 
European energy-efficiency product policy sets a minimum standard for a range of electric consumer 
products (EU, 2009) and was proposed by a number of interviewees to be one area of energy 
efficiency policy that has been particularly successful in reducing, or at least limiting growth of, levels 
of electricity domestic demand, with a commensurate effect on energy bills.  
‘One thing which I think is really important is about product regulation, and I think that's potentially 
very important because people are going to carry on having more and more appliances, so if the 
present plans for the product regulation are driven through in Europe, they will at least in a sense 
mean that electricity consumption won't go up quite so much as it might. But without those 
measures it will go up, some peoples' bills will go up.’ 
(Interviewee 17) 
Domestic boiler regulations requiring a minimum efficiency standard of new boilers installed (HMG, 
2013b) were also often highlighted as having been instrumental in reducing domestic gas demand in 
recent years. 
 ‘There’s a plethora of [energy efficiency] policies… the most successful one to date is boiler 
regulation saying you must put in a condensing boiler – very straight forward about ten years 
ago…very effectively it achieved that goal shift of same comfort, less energy.’ 
(Interviewee 44) 
163 
 
It is evident therefore that regulations can play an important role in delivering efficiency 
improvements, which in turn can support affordability of energy. In spite of the opportunities that 
regulation present in supporting energy efficiency standards. There is a prevailing ideology against 
the use of regulation, which is supported by perceived political risk of attempting to do so. The 
potential role of regulations in the redesign of the governance structure is considered in chapter 
seven. 
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5.4.4 – Missing from the Governance Structure: Coordinated Representation  
As set out above, firms in the energy industry, landlords, and the building industry appear able to 
engage with and influence government policy to protect their interests. However, interviewees 
highlighted that there is no institution, or set of institutions, with the capacity to provide a 
meaningful counterbalance to these powerful interests – there is not sufficient representation of the 
interests of consumers, or the demand-reduction industry.  
5.4.4.1 – Lack of Strong Consumer Representation 
Interviewees from a range of categories set out that there does not appear to be an institution, or 
set of institutions, with sufficient institutional capacity to represent the interests of consumers 
effectively and help ensure that the government does all it can to protect the interests of 
consumers. This is particularly problematic owing to the political power of the energy suppliers, 
alongside the building lobby and landlords, which have little motivation to support higher energy 
efficiency standards. This lack of adequate representation, in contrast to the coordinated actions of 
the suppliers and other lobby groups, is consistent with the governance literature which sets out 
that politically effective interest groups are generally better able to influence policy and regulations 
than consumers (VelJanovski, 2012). 
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In spite of there being a number of institutions whose role it is to ensure that the interests of 
consumers are protected, these include, the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG), the Citizen’s 
Advice Bureau (CAB) and OFGEM. It was widely suggested that these institutions may lack the 
resources necessary to carry out this role effectively. 
The Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG) is a non-departmental body which advises government on 
the impact of policy on levels of fuel poverty. Although it is able to provide critique of government 
policy of fuel poverty, it is a poorly funded body, and government is under no obligation to follow 
FPAG's advice. It has born witness to the abandonment of the 2016 fuel poverty target, the reform 
of the fuel poverty definition into something which was virtually impossible to solve, the weakening 
of the ECO, and continuing high levels of fuel poverty. 
‘I have been critical for a long time that FPAG, in spite of being the body advising government, it 
doesn’t have the legitimacy that the Climate Change Committee has for example… they have the 
governance, they have the legitimacy to hold the government to account, and FPAG doesn’t, it’s a 
non-departmental public body which scraps with the government’ 
(Interviewee 24) 
The CAB is also limited in its institutional capacity and resources, which presents challenges in 
providing effective counterbalance to energy suppliers. This is particularly the case relating to 
engagement with fine detail of some energy codes, which are extensive, highly complex, and in a 
constantly changing. 
‘So the whole issue of consumer representation has got diluted, diluted, diluted through about six 
different moves if you could plot them all. And yet the numbers of companies have rocketed. ‘ 
(Interviewee 12) 
OFGEM's range of duties to deliver on all aspects of the energy trilemma creates an inherent conflict 
between its duties (Woodman et al., 2014), and it appears that OFGEM's interpretation of its 
principal duty to protect consumers is heavily affected by its aims of ensuring efficient functioning of 
markets, to the point where its understanding of affordability appears limited to ensuring that prices 
are cost-reflective, and markets function effectively. This is not equivalent however to ensuring that 
bills are affordable.  
‘It’s OFGEM really who, as its role as an economic regulator believe that cost-reflective 
charges are generally beneficial, because they send a price signal to customers about where 
they choose to take their energy from… so I can understand it from a sort of economic theory 
point of view... In reality though, how many customers, even know what they’re being 
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charged for… customers don’t really know, unless they’re very geeky and interested in what 
network charges are... and even if they did, would you really, as a customer, you know, a 
household customer, respond to those prices? I mean, are you going to move house because 
it’s slightly cheaper in London than it is north of Wales to get gas? You might have a price 
signal there but really, in reality, how are people really going to respond to that?’ 
(Interviewee 2) 
There are a number of institutions which are supportive of the affordability agenda. However, there 
appears to be an absence of any institution with both the responsibility and institutional capacity to 
ensure that consumers are well-represented, and long-term affordability of energy is established. 
Those who represent consumers’ interests are unable to provide sufficient counter-balance to 
powerful supply-side interests, and prevailing anti-regulatory, pro-market ideology. The problems 
associated with the under-representation of unorganised groups (such as consumers) have been 
understood for a long time (See: Olson, 1965). Despite this, the interests of consumers remain 
insufficiently represented in the energy system. Chapter seven will set out a possible solution for the 
problem of underrepresentation of consumers.  
5.4.4.2 – Lack of Demand-Side Influence  
Consumers are not the only group who lack coordinated representation to influence policy-makers. 
It is not clear that those with in interest in ambitious energy efficiency policy are sufficiently 
politically powerful to influence the government in favour of stronger energy efficiency policy. The 
interests of the supply-side are supported by a number of large, well-resourced organisations such 
as suppliers and generators who share similar interests. However, demand-side interests are made 
up of comparatively large numbers of disparate institutions from different industries such as 
insulation manufacturers, window manufacturers, appliance manufacturers, energy efficiency 
installation firms and energy service companies. In spite of the presence of some industry bodies 
such as the Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE), it appears that this myriad of 
institutions is not sufficiently coordinated or powerful to lobby government effectively for stronger 
energy efficiency policy.  
‘…there isn’t really a very straightforward counterparty... if we’re ultimately asking the national grid 
and energy companies to make decisions about doing less, maybe the governance structure isn’t 
quite right? Who represents doing less?’ 
(Interviewee 30) 
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If those institutions in whose interests it is to support more ambitious levels of energy efficiency are 
unable to coordinate themselves into an effective political actor, and those institutions whose 
responsibility it is to represent the interests of consumers are unable to do so adequately, then 
there is limited counterbalance to the political power of large supply-side interests. This represents a 
significant risk to affordability of energy for domestic consumers. 
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5.5 – Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the key themes which emerged from interviews with thirty-nine key 
stakeholders from across the energy system in Great Britain regarding the connections between the 
governance structure and affordability of energy for domestic consumers.  
A number of interviewees highlighted that the current structure of tariffs, whereby low levels of 
consumption were charged more on a marginal basis, was highly regressive, and should be 
reformed. This echoes findings of chapter two which suggested tariffs were more reflective of 
supplier interests, than consumer interests. The inclusion of social and environmental levies on 
energy bills was also suggested to be socially regressive, and that removing these levies would create 
a more progressive charging structure. Although this is accurate, it appears that the motivations of 
the group where the calls to remove these charges was concentrated, the large energy suppliers, 
appears to be as a result more for concern to reduce the cost burden upon themselves, than from a 
drive to reduce the price burden on their consumers. The likelihood of this view being the product of 
genuine concern for consumer welfare appears to be particularly unlikely in the context of each of 
the big six suppliers operating tariffs which use unengaged consumers, many of whom are likely to 
be vulnerable, to subsidise the tariffs of engaged consumers.  
Interviewees suggested that lack of engagement in the retail market is harmful to consumers, 
particularly the fuel poor. Some interviewees however considered this a logical outcome of the 
liberalisation of the energy market, implying that the issue was not one of engagement, but of 
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fundamental market design. The latter was a niche view however, which could imply that the pro-
market ideology is so firmly embedded, that many are unwilling or unable to question it.  
The stark contrast in political power of different stakeholder groups is a significant challenge to 
improving affordability. The large energy suppliers appear able to leverage significant political power 
stemming from their control of the majority of domestic energy bills, and their involvement in 
energy efficiency policy. This allowed them to lobby effectively for the cuts to the ECO in 2014, to 
the point where suppliers’ deployment levels were adjusted to ensure fairness between suppliers. 
There appears to have been little consideration of what might be considered fair to consumers 
however. This is in addition to the landlord’s association which claims responsibility for the weak 
private rental policies, and the building lobby which was highlighted as a significant political force. 
Given that policy-makers appear to derive little political value in supporting ambitious energy 
efficiency policy, they may not prove particularly resistant to anti-efficiency lobbying efforts. The 
political power of these large stakeholders is in stark contrast to consumers and the demand-side 
industry, both of whom appear to be under-represented, and unable to wield sufficient power to act 
as a counterbalance to the lobbying forces which undermine action on energy efficiency. This issue is 
likely to be worsened by policy-making institutions such as BEIS and OFGEM appearing to have 
limited institutional capacity in some areas – a view also highlighted in chapters two and three. 
It is also the case that any interest group calling for greater delivery of energy efficiency measures, is 
likely to find themselves fighting an uphill battle. Some recent examples of the most successful 
energy efficiency policy, affecting appliances and boilers, has been delivered through the use of 
regulatory intervention. However, the prevailing ideology in the governance structure at the 
moment is highly resistant to the use of regulation, preferring instead to rely on market 
mechanisms. This means that anyone wishing to advocate greater levels of energy efficiency is facing 
not only a number of powerful interests which are against it, but a prevailing ideology which is likely 
to reject the policies which have historically proved some of the most effective in delivering it.  
This chapter highlights how the current efforts which do exist for delivery of energy efficiency 
measures are undermined by their policy design. Currently energy efficiency measures are delivered 
primarily through suppliers, who it appears have neither the motivation, or the institutional capacity, 
to deliver them effectively. Reallocating this role to another set of organisations, such as local 
authorities, will not only support more effective delivery of measures, but also erodes suppliers’ 
power base in this area as they will no longer have such a legitimate role in debates around energy 
efficiency.  
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Overall, this chapter has highlighted a number of features of the governance structure which shows 
it to be one of the most significant barriers to improving affordability of energy in the domestic 
sector, both relating to tariff and pricing issues, as well as domestic energy efficiency standards. The 
following chapter will examine an alternative set of governance arrangements regarding energy 
efficiency in Denmark, in order to understand what has allowed the country to become an 
international case study for effecting energy efficiency deployment (IEA, 2011). Findings from both 
results chapters will then be brought together in the discussion with findings from the opening three 
chapters to set out recommendations for changes to the governance structure in Great Britain to 
deliver higher levels of affordability of energy for domestic consumers. 
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Chapter 6 - Results 2: Energy Efficiency in Denmark 
6.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the governance arrangements in Denmark relating to energy efficiency, in 
order to shed light on what lessons may be learned for Great Britain. Denmark was selected for 
comparison because it is renowned for its high standards of energy efficiency (IEA, 2011). This 
chapter uses a range of documentation alongside data from eighteen semi-structured interviews 
with representatives from across the Danish energy sector, in order to establish the role that 
governance in Denmark has played in successful deployment of energy efficiency. To bring clarity to 
the results, the range of interviewees which supported or opposed such views are given in a table at 
the end of each section, however as set out in chapter 4, these tables are expressly not designed to 
convert qualitative data into quantitative data, as doing so would be methodologically unsound. 
Individual quotes are used where necessary throughout each section to demonstrate an area of 
interest more clearly. 
This chapter begins by setting out the context of energy policy in Denmark and the current situation 
of different factors of affordability - energy bills, levels of income, and energy efficiency, with 
comparisons to the situation in Great Britain. The impact of the governance structure on energy 
efficiency is then set out, examining such features as building regulations, financing, the political 
landscape, and institutional capacity. The final section concludes.  
6.2 - Context of Energy Policy in Denmark 
The structure of the energy sector in Denmark differs from that in Great Britain21. In 2015, over 60% 
of Denmark’s domestic consumers heated their homes by means of district-heating (DEA, 2015), 
70% of which was produced in combined heat and power (CHP) plants in 2014 (DEA, 2015). The 
district heat networks are operated on a non-profit basis (Danish Energy Authority, 2011) by a 
combination of private supply firms, co-operative groups, and municipalities (Danish Energy Agency 
and DBDH, 2013). Other households meet their space and water heating needs through mains gas 
supply (15%), oil (18%), or solid fuels (3%) (Danish Energy Agency, 2015). In 2016, there were over 
fifty electricity supply and generation companies (Kitzing et al., 2016), many of which are small firms. 
                                                          
21 For an in-depth explanation of the broad institutional arrangements in the Danish energy sector, see 
Lockwood (2015).  
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However there is also one large, predominantly state-owned firm22, DONG, which in 2015 was 
responsible for approximately half of all thermal generation capacity, 25% of all Danish offshore 
wind capacity, and 26% of electricity distribution capacity (DONG, 2015). The gas and electricity 
transmission systems are operated by a state-owned non-profit company - Energinet.dk. The energy 
sector is regulated by the Danish Energy Regulatory Authority (DERA), an independent authority 
which oversees the electricity, gas and district heating markets (IEA, 2011). Government policy on 
energy is set predominantly by the Danish Energy Agency which is located in the Ministry of Energy 
Utilities and Climate. 
There are a number of long-term targets that frame the energy policy in Denmark. In 2010, The 
Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy concluded that Denmark could become independent 
from fossil fuels by 2050, and from the Commission’s work, ‘The Energy Strategy 2050’ was 
published. This sets out the policy instruments needed in order to reach this goal, and names both 
energy efficiency and renewables as the key tools to achieving it (Danish Government, 2011). In 
2012, an agreement was reached setting out a pathway to 2020, consistent with the 2050 goals. This 
gained political agreement from 95% of members of parliament, supported by all parties except one 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2012), and has the following targets to be attained by 2020: 
• More than 35% renewable energy in final energy consumption. 
• Approximately 50% of electricity consumption to be supplied by wind power. 
• 7.6% reduction in gross energy consumption relative to 2010. 
• 34% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative to 1990.  
(Danish Energy Agency, 2012) 
6.2.1 - Energy Prices  
Final electricity prices in Denmark are considerably higher than in Great Britain (see Figure 32). 
Although such comparisons are quite 'broad-brush' i.e. there is variation in pricing between 
customers, and such figures do not consider differences in incomes, or cost of living (both of these 
are examined later in this chapter) these figures demonstrate that Denmark has among the highest 
electricity prices in Europe. The same relationship is true for final gas prices (see Figure 33), however 
the final gas price faced by household consumers is less significant in terms of affordability of energy 
for Danish households than for their British counterparts. This is because fewer Danish households 
have individual gas boilers - 15% of homes in Denmark are heated by gas (Gram-Hassen and Toke 
                                                          
22 The Danish State’s holding in DONG was decreased substantially in recent years with the sale of shares to 
two Danish pension funds, and a firm managed by Goldman Sachs. The state maintains the majority holding 
however (DONG, 2013). 
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Haunstrup, 2011), compared to approximately 85% in Great Britain (CAB, 2014). The majority of 
homes in Denmark rely on district heating, however comparative pricing data between countries for 
district heating is not readily available. Although there is much variation in district heating prices 
within Denmark (Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, 2015), the Danish Energy Agency asserts that 
only 4% of households spend more on district heating than they would if they were to heat their 
home with an individual gas boiler (Danish Energy Agency, 2014b). It is important to note that a 
number of Danish district heating systems are run on gas, and therefore changes in wholesale gas 
prices will affect both households with individual gas boilers, and those who rely on district heating. 
It is also important to note that the underlying ‘basic price’ in Denmark is far lower than in the UK, 
the majority of Denmark’s final electricity and gas price is the product of taxes and levies.  
 
Figure 32 - Domestic Electricity Prices for European Household Consumers in Second Half 2015, Source: Eurostat, 2015a 
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Figure 33 - Domestic Gas Prices for European Household Consumers in Second Half 2015, Source: Eurostat, 2015b 
  
6.2.2 – Domestic Energy Demand & Energy Efficiency  
Average domestic energy demand in Danish households is declining (Danish Energy Agency, 2015c), 
with average demand per-dwelling falling 14% between 2000 and 2012 (ODYSSEE, 2013) particularly 
in use for heating, to the point where it offsets the increasing numbers of households (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2013). Although final energy demand per dwelling is slightly higher in Denmark than in 
Great Britain (Danish Energy Agency, 2013; OFGEM, 2013f), when figures are adjusted for climatic 
differences, this relationship reverses. Climate-adjusted average per-household demand is 
approximately 10% higher in Great Britain than in Denmark (ODYSSEE, 2013). Although these figures 
do account for differences in climate, they do not account for the typical dwelling in Denmark being 
slightly larger than that in Great Britain (Kristensen, 2007), or adjust for possible differences in 
average internal temperature.  
This level of demand would be considerably higher if Denmark had not put in place such high levels 
of energy efficiency. In Figure 34 below, the energy efficiency standards of the domestic sector in a 
number of European counties are shown, based on the average U-values for walls, roofs, floors, and 
windows. U-values are a measure of heat loss per square metre of surface area (and so indicate the 
standard of insulation) - a lower value signifies a higher standard of insulation. .Denmark is 
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consistently high up the ranking, whereas the UK is consistently much further down the rankings23. 
Denmark is now considered to have one of the highest standards of energy efficiency of buildings in 
the world (IEA, 2011). 
 
Figure 34 - Average U-Values of Walls, Roofs, Floors & Windows, Source: ACE and Energy Bill Revolution, 2015 
The comparatively high energy prices for domestic consumers in Denmark and high energy efficiency 
standards, mean that the investigation will focus primarily on the role of governance in delivering 
such high-energy efficiency standards, rather than impacts on pricing policy. 
6.2.3 - Household Income 
Equivalised disposable income can be used to compare the income of households in different 
countries. It is based on the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is 
available for spending or saving, divided by the number of 'equivalised adults' - which are calculated 
based on household members' ages. This is done to account for differences in household size and 
composition (for more details see Eurostat, 2014). In Denmark, the equivalised median household 
disposable income is considerably higher than that in the UK24 (Eurostat, 2015a) - with median 
equivalised disposable income in a Danish household of €27,861, compared to in the UK where it is 
€20,528 (2014 figures). However when the relative spending power of the different currencies is 
taken into account (expressed by means of the purchasing power parity) this difference becomes 
smaller with Denmark with a PPP of 22,458 and the UK with a PPP of 22,297 (2014 figures) (Eurostat, 
2015d). Together this implies that although Danish households have higher incomes, this difference 
is largely counterbalanced by the higher cost of living in Denmark. The UK shows greater levels of 
income inequality and a greater percentage of the population in severe poverty (2010 figures) – 
classed as having an equivalised income below 50% of the median (OECD, 2014). The wider income 
distribution in the UK leads to higher levels of poverty than in Denmark. 
                                                          
23 Comparable data for Great Britain, rather than the United Kingdom is not available.  
24 Figures for Great Britain, rather than the United Kingdom are unavailable. 
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6.3 - Comparing Affordability 
Denmark was selected for study because of its high standards in domestic energy efficiency, 
something which offers one of the greatest opportunities for improving affordability of energy in the 
domestic sector in Great Britain. However, a brief examination of levels of affordability of energy in 
Denmark adds useful context to this analysis.  
Making direct comparisons of affordability of energy between different countries is challenging 
owing to the fact that, as set out in chapter one, what may be considered 'expensive' or 'affordable' 
can be seen as subjective (Owen, 2010), and normative (Feitelson and Chenoweth, 2002; Niëns and 
Brouwer, 2013). It is also closely related to other issues such as differing expectation of what an 
adequately warm home may be (Energy Bill Revolution and ACE, 2013), which will affect cost to 
heat. Some comparisons relating to fuel poverty and deprivation exist, which show the state of 
affairs in Denmark to be considerably better than in Great Britain. In Great Britain 10.6% of 
households report being unable to afford adequate warmth, and 8.7% report being in arrears with 
energy payments, whereas in Denmark 3.9% of households report being unable to afford adequate 
heat, and 3.7% report being in in arrears (ACE and Energy Bill Revolution, 2015). Thomson and Snell 
(2013) carried out a study using a range of variables to quantify fuel poverty, which consistently 
demonstrated Denmark to have among the lowest levels among the EU-27 countries. The UK, 
although not amongst the very lowest in these rankings, consistently came considerably lower than 
Denmark. This may be partially explained by higher poverty levels in Great Britain.  
These figures are consistent with the views of the majority of interviewees regarding fuel poverty in 
Denmark, which revealed that fuel poverty is not considered a significant problem in Denmark.  
‘Actually it [Fuel Poverty] is not an issue in Denmark... and I think it’s because of the social 
service system. It’s nothing that’s discussed. I tried to look into the numbers actually, because 
first I googled it because I’d never heard of it, maybe I’m just ignorant or... but no, it’s not in 
the official debate in Denmark at all.’ 
(Interviewee 6) 
The idea that the low levels of fuel poverty in Denmark are related to the high standard of social 
welfare was supported by a large number of interviewees from a range of categories, and is also 
identified in the literature (Healy, 2004), it is also likely due to lower levels of severe poverty (OECD, 
2014). Only one interviewee in Denmark made a link between low levels of fuel poverty, and high 
domestic energy efficiency standards. However, it is worth noting she had worked on issues of fuel 
poverty, and was well aware of the arguments found in literature of fuel poverty in Great Britain 
regarding the need for greater domestic energy efficiency. The view that fuel poverty is not a 
175 
 
significant issue in Denmark, and that this is owed to high standards of social welfare support was 
most concentrated among government respondents. Although it is likely to be in the interests of the 
government to paint a picture of the country as having a strong welfare system, the fact that this 
view was echoed by a range of other categories of respondents suggests that it is not just the 
governmental interests which are leading respondents to offer this view.  
This does not necessarily imply that the level of welfare support, and low levels of general poverty 
offer a full and complete explanation for the high levels of affordability of energy in Denmark 
however. Firstly, it is important to reiterate that fuel poverty is a distinct issue from general poverty, 
and that this relationship is mediated by high standards of energy efficiency. Secondly, it is self-
evident that if standards of domestic energy efficiency in Denmark were lower, there would be 
increased pressure from energy bills for those on low incomes, as well as likely pulling a number of 
additional households into poverty. It is not possible, without an extensive modelling exercise, to 
establish the relative roles of welfare support, and high energy efficiency standards in limiting levels 
of fuel poverty in Denmark. Both of these would be beneficial to households in Great Britain, 
however given the significant potential for improving energy efficiency, and that doing so would 
reduce the amount of social welfare support necessary for a household to establish a good standard 
of living, there remains a strong rationale for studying the impact of the Danish energy governance 
structure on standards of domestic energy efficiency. It is also important to reiterate that issues of 
affordability and fuel poverty are not equivalent, and that high levels of energy efficiency are also 
supportive of affordability of energy for all domestic consumers. 
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6.4 - History of Danish Energy Policy 
6.4.1 - The Oil Shocks 
There are a number of features of Denmark's history that have led to high levels of efficiency in its 
energy system, central to which were the oil shocks of the 1970s brought on by the OPEC 
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embargoes. When this occurred, Denmark's energy system was over 90% dependent on imported 
oil, making it one of the worst affected countries in the OECD (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). The 
impact of the oil shocks and the policy responses to them played perhaps the most significant part in 
shaping Denmark's energy policy today – a view supported by a range of respondents from across 
the energy sector. 
‘…way back in '73, Denmark was maybe the country in the World that was hit hardest by the 
oil crisis... So at that time started the whole development of renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, much more district heating, a lot of things started during the mid-late '70s 
because we were hit so hard by the first oil crisis, and again next by the next oil crisis in '79.’ 
(Interviewee 7) 
In response, the government imposed a number of emergency measures such as extinguishing of 
every other streetlamp, a banning of lighting in shop windows, and a ban on driving on Sundays 
(Danish Government, 2014). More long term measures were also introduced, especially 
diversification of energy supply through the pursuit of renewable generation, greater conversion 
efficiency through more combined heat and power (CHP) generation, and ambitious levels of energy 
efficiency - particularly in the building sector with the introduction of strict building regulations 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2012). Energy taxes were also introduced to encourage energy efficiency, 
the level of which was expanded as the price of oil began to fall (Sovacool, 2013a). 
A significant part of the response to the oil crisis in the 1970s was the rise of municipal level planning 
of heat supply policy (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). Before the oil shocks, domestic heating in 
Denmark was approximately 50% reliant upon oil (Mortensen and Overgaard, 1992). In order to 
address the energy security concerns brought about by the oil shocks, local authorities were 
required to begin assessing the heat demand in their locality and how it was currently delivered. This 
paved the way for regional and local planning of heat provision, written in reference to the first 
Danish Technology Catalogue, which gave information on technologies, costs, and energy price 
forecasts (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). The 1979 Heat Supply Act empowered municipalities to 
enforce a mandatory connection to district heat networks, banning use of other forms of heat 
(Ministry of Climate Energy & Buildings, 2011). This process gave local authorities the opportunity 
and resources to become intimately involved with heat planning of their areas.  
The depth of the problems the oil shocks caused, and the very visible nature of the impacts, meant 
that the Danish people accepted the highly interventionist policy that the government began to 
impose (de Lovinfosse, 2008). This is consistent with views set out in chapter three that the presence 
of large and cheap indigenous energy resources in a country can lead occupants to take energy for 
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granted (Lockwood et al., 2013; Grubb et al., 1991), and therefore to undervalue energy efficiency. It 
is logical therefore in a country with no such indigenous energy resources, energy and energy 
efficiency would likely be highly valued – particularly following such a significant supply shock. This 
supported understanding and acceptance among the public, policy-makers, and private institutions 
for ambitious energy efficiency policies. A range of interviewees explained how this has laid a 
powerful narrative of the need for energy security in Denmark, and energy efficiency as a central 
part of the solution. 
‘I think there are opinions in Denmark that we should focus on reducing energy and I think 
it’s historically based due to the oil crisis, because since then it has been in the public 
awareness that we should use less energy, reduce it a bit. In the last couple of years, it has 
been not that much in focus in the public but I think it starts again due to climate and due to 
the fact that we are running out of oil and gas here.’ 
(Interviewee 33) 
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6.4.2 - History of the Housing Stock 
The oil shocks are not the only historic factor which affects affordability of energy in Denmark, the 
history of the housing stock is also very relevant. At the end of World War 2, almost half of the 
population lived in rural areas, with a significant urban expansion taking place between 1960 and 
1980 (Kristensen, 2007). Between 1975 and 2000, there was large-scale urban regeneration, which 
improved the standards of older dwellings. In the early years, this regeneration of inner city areas 
generally came in the form of destruction of old properties. However, this later gave way to 
retrofitting (Kristensen, 2007). This led to a housing stock that is generally newer (see Figure 35), and 
otherwise of a higher thermal standard than that in Great Britain (ACE and Energy Bill Revolution, 
2015).  
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Figure 35 - Comparison of Housing Stocks in Britain & Denmark, Source: Source: DECC, 2011c and Kristensen, 200725 
6.5 - Policies Supporting Domestic Energy Efficiency 
There are a large number of policies which support energy efficiency of the domestic sector in 
Denmark today, some of which have been in place for a number of years. 
6.5.1 - Taxation 
Energy taxes were introduced for all households in 1977 following the first oil shock (Sovacool, 
2013b), and since then have been a motivator in the uptake of domestic energy efficiency measures 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2012). As energy prices began to drop back down in the 1980s and 90s, the 
level of taxation kept retail prices high, serving to keep up pressure to improve energy efficiency 
standards (Sovacool, 2013a). A carbon tax was added in 1996 (Togeby et al., 2008), and VAT on 
energy is charged at 25% (Espensen et al., 2014). 
‘…after the oil crisis was fading out a little bit and the energy price was starting to go down, 
the state decided to make an energy taxation that, so to speak, levelled out the price so that 
when the prices went down on oil, the taxation went up so that people would still have the 
same energy price, and that was the main reason for that was to give an incentive, to keep 
the incentive for energy savings.’ 
(Interviewee 5) 
 Although these taxes are not specifically hypothecated, the Danish government did introduce a 
number of publicly funded energy efficiency policies alongside the introduction of energy taxation. 
These included information campaigns, energy audits, and retrofit of public and residential buildings 
                                                          
25 NB. Time periods do not correspond exactly owing to restraints of available data. 
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(Sovacool, 2013b). Energy taxes now form a significant part of government income and therefore are 
unlikely to be reduced in the foreseeable future. Revenue from all space heating and electricity 
(including both industrial and domestic consumers) is valued at approximately DKK 20billion 
(approximately £2.2bn26)  - ~1% of Danish GDP (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). In electricity, taxes 
equate to approximately €0.10/kWh (Espensen et al., 2014), and in gas, just over €0.05/kWh, making 
up more than 61% of the unit price (Eurostat, 2015c) (Approximately £0.08/kWh and £0.04/kWh 
respectively27) (see Figure 32 and Figure 33)28. The high level of tax on energy was referenced by 
interviewees from across the range of interviewee categories as having been effective in 
incentivising high deployment of energy efficiency in the domestic sector.  
 ‘…the state needs the revenue from these energy taxations and if somebody suggests 
to change, or to reduce the energy taxation in some sector, the state will immediately say 
“well, fine if you can compensate by giving us similar revenue from a different sector”.’ 
(Interviewee 5) 
6.5.2 - Building Regulations 
There is a long history of strong building efficiency policy in Denmark (Sovacool, 2013a), with 
building regulations for energy dating back to 1961 (Energiklyngecenter Sjaelland, 2014) and having 
been periodically tightened, particularly in response to the oil crisis. The effect of improving levels of 
building regulations can be seen below: 
 
Figure 36 - Building Regulations: Energy Consumption in New Buildings in Denmark, Source: Danish Government, 2014 
Danish building regulations are based on setting a maximum level of energy use per square metre. 
From 2015, the required standard for new builds was 30kWh/m2 + 1000 kWh divided by the floor 
area (Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2010) and from 2020 this is reduced further to 
                                                          
26 Conversion Rate DKK1.00 = £0.11 (07-04-16) 
27 Conversion Rate €1.00 = £0.801 (14-06-14) 
28 For district heating, the tax is levied on the fuel burned, not the heat supplied (Danish Energy Authority, 
2005), therefore owing to variation in efficiencies of different plant, and different fuel sources, a per-unit level 
of taxation is not easily calculable. 
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20kWh/m2 (Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2011). These levels not only represent a 
requirement for new buildings to perform far better than the average (which is currently 
135kWh/m2 (Danish Government, 2014), but also sets out a clear pathway for future action so those 
in the building industry are aware of future requirements.  
Owing to the significant difference between new-build standards and the average existing home, 
and the fact that ‘most of [the] existing buildings will remain in use until after 2050, since turnover in 
the building stock is only around 1%-2% a year’ (Moller Andersen et al., 2012, p.121), much policy 
attention is now being paid to the existing housing stock. Unlike the regulations for new buildings, 
retrofit standards refer to specific individual features or items within the upgrade or extension, such 
as roofing, windows, doors, and walls (Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2010). Some 
measures are only required if deemed to be cost-effective29, however there are a number of items 
which are required to comply to minimum standards listed in the building regulations irrespective of 
cost-effectiveness. These are generally those which affect the external envelope of the property 
such as windows, roofs, walls, floors (Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2010). In 2014, 
the Danish government published a strategy for the retrofit of existing homes (Danish Government, 
2014) which set out commitments to upgrade or review standards for various aspects of home 
renovation contained within the building regulations. Other routes to support improved retrofit of 
existing properties are also set out, such as the launch of the 'Bedre Bolig' [Better Homes] initiative 
(see below), consideration of introducing a sub-target to the energy efficiency obligation to be met 
in existing properties (see below), and a pathway for the review and tightening of requirements on a 
regular basis so policy can reflect technical and cost developments (Danish Government, 2014). 
Retrofit policies have supported significant improvements in the housing stock, as can be seen in 
Figure 37, which sets out the actual energy consumption of houses in 2011 by construction period. 
When compared to Figure 36, it can be seen that levels of actual consumption are significantly below 
the level set by the building regulations of the period.  
                                                          
29 '… structural measures are deemed to be cost-effective if the annual saving multiplied by the lifetime, 
divided by the investment, is greater than 1.33 which amounts to the measure concerned paying for itself 
within 75% of its expected lifetime' (Danish Enterprise and Construction Authory, 2010). 
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Figure 37 - Energy Consumption in Dwellings in 2011 by Construction Period in Denmark,  
Source: Danish Government, 2014 
Interviewees from a range of categories supported the ideas that a combination of building 
regulations and high levels of taxation on energy were significant contributors to delivering high 
standards of energy efficiency in the domestic sector in Denmark.  
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6.5.3 - Energy Efficiency Obligation 
Since 2006, in Denmark there has been an obligation on all energy network companies (electricity, 
gas, and district heat), as well as the oil sector30, to support energy reduction through advice, 
consultancy, or payments to end users who install efficiency measures (i.e. residential or industrial 
customers) (IEA, 2011), as well as improving efficiencies within their own operations (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2014a). This means there are four-hundred and seventy-nine companies involved in the 
obligation – seventy electricity grid operators, three natural gas distributors, four hundred district 
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heating companies, and six companies within the oil sector (Danish Energy Agency, 2014a). The 
commitment is divided between network types (i.e. x% of the total target is given to the gas network 
companies, y% to district heating networks and z% to electricity networks etc.) the target for each 
individual network is then administrated by the industry body (e.g. the district heating association). 
The total reduction targets are imposed for a given period, and have been ratcheted up over time 
(Bundgaard et al., 2013) - see Figure 38. Currently the target stands as equivalent to saving 3% a year 
of total end use consumption (excluding transport) (Danish Energy Agency, 2014a)31.  
 
Figure 38 - Development in the Danish Energy Efficiency Obligations Target, Source: After Bundgaard et al., 201332 
To reduce administrative burden, if a standard measure is installed (e.g. windows, a new boiler etc.), 
then accreditation of savings is based on the level of savings accrued within the first year, which are 
then weighted based on the lifetime of the measures, banded as 1-4 years, 5-15 years, or 15+ years 
(Staniaszek and Lees, 2012). In the case of more bespoke projects, such as large industrial measures, 
then savings are accredited based on calculations of improved efficiency (Togeby et al., 2009; 
Staniaszek and Lees, 2012). 
Similar to the ECO in Great Britain, the obligated firms are able to recover the costs of the scheme 
through their charging of customers (Bundgaard et al., 2013), and there is no hard-and-fast cap for 
these costs. In 2012, the average cost of savings was €0.05 per kWh saved (approximately 
£0.04/kWh33), which was lower than anticipated (Danish Energy Association, 2012). There are some 
                                                          
31 In 2013 total energy use, excluding transport stood at approximately 405PJ (112 TWh) (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2015c). 
32 NB. The value for 2005 (0.6PJ) shows savings from the previous system and is estimated based on reporting 
from utilities (Bundgaard et al., 2013).  
33Conversion rate  €1.00 = £0.79 (12-06-12) 
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concerns that the costs will increase as opportunities for cheaper measures are being exhausted, 
and targets increased.  
‘…now they increased the ambition of the scheme to 1.75% a year, whereas the first scheme was 
about 1% a year, and that was probably relatively easily achievable, whereas 1.75% is a bit more. But 
now it’s becoming increasingly costly and difficult to find these savings because a lot of the low-
hanging fruit have been harvested already.’ 
(Interviewee 27) 
Interviewees that held this view were predominantly from energy supply/network companies, as 
well as one from an industry representative body – this suggests that these increasing targets 
represent genuine concerns for the companies who deliver them. 
Unlike the ECO however, the obligation does not specifically target reductions on the domestic 
sector. It permits firms to find savings wherever they can do so most cheaply. Interviewees from a 
range of different categories explained that this has led to the majority of measures being delivered 
to commercial customers where large savings can be realised in a single installation (Bundgaard et 
al., 2013).  
‘… [households] are not worth going for, it’s too small and too expensive, so they focus on 
industry and that’s actually quite remarkable because we’re the only country in the EU that 
goes for industry, but we have been very successful in that.’ 
(Interviewee 36) 
In spite of this, in the earlier years of the obligation the levels of savings realised in the domestic 
sector were approximately in line with the domestic sector's share of total demand (Danish 
Government, 2014). There was no consensus on why there continues to be some focus on domestic 
properties however proposed reasons included possible government pressure to deliver measures in 
the domestic sector, or the opportunities for district heating companies being able to easily contract 
with building owners such as flats where they can offer advice based on benchmarking total heat 
consumption against other similar buildings on their network. 
 ‘There’s an understanding of this problem [limited focus on domestic consumers] and 
it has been written in the political deal between the minister and the DNOs that there must 
be some focus on the household sector, so there is an understanding of this and I suppose if 
they came out with a big zero then the deal would be off I guess or prolonged the next time 
or harsher demands would be imposed or more emphasis would be put on the household 
sector…’ 
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(Interviewee 50) 
‘…if we have a street, with similar buildings, we can compare them. We can see that number 
5 uses 30% more energy than number 7, which uses 20% less than number 11, or whatever. 
So we can compare them and we can tell them you should do something with your energy 
demand. Because we can see, we can benchmark them. And we can tell them "you have a 
building which is similar as your neighbour but you use much more energy, so we advise you 
do something about it".’ 
(Interviewee 7) 
Also unlike the ECO, obligated companies are unable to carry out the majority of improvements 
themselves, instead having to contract with trades-people, consultants, engineers etc. (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2014a). Some of the obligated firms do however avoid this requirement through the 
arm’s-length operation of energy efficiency firms which work can be passed on to (Togeby et al., 
2009). As under the ECO, savings can be traded between companies on a secondary market (Danish 
Energy Association, 2012).  
The power to impose legal obligation for energy efficiency are set out in the natural gas, electricity, 
and heat supply acts, however in significant contrast to the ECO, the Danish Supplier Obligation 
operates not by means of a legal obligation, but a negotiated agreement between the energy 
minister and the network companies to meet targets (Danish Energy Agency, 2014a; Hamilton et al., 
2010). There is no licence obligation to fulfil, and no sanctions if targets are not met (Bundgaard et 
al., 2013), however this does not appear to weaken firms' resolve to meet their obligations, indeed 
in 2008, electricity distributers exceeded their target by 25% (Hamilton et al., 2010). A range of 
interviewees commented upon the design of this mechanism, and how it required a more mature 
relationship between government and industry. It was suggested by respondents from a range of 
categories that the consistent meeting of targets in spite of there being no penalties for not doing so 
may be because if the sector were to fail to uphold its end of the agreement, then a legal obligation 
will be enforced in future. This process of agreements leads to reduced need for regulation and a 
reduced administrative burden, which could be sizeable given the number of obligated firms (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2014a).  
‘…the new Efficiency Directive for the EU where all 28 member states have to do something 
and then again how the governments choose individually to do this together with the sector 
is of course up to them and in Denmark we have chosen to do this - we have a government 
that has asked us to play ball and then made a voluntary agreement. But of course if we 
didn’t make this agreement voluntarily they would just politically tell us what to do.’  
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(Interviewee 45) 
The success of the design of the policy may also relate to the institutions on whom responsibility is 
placed. Giving the obligation to network companies was highlighted as bringing a number of benefits 
including reduced conflict of interest, as successful demand reduction would not necessarily reduce 
revenues for a network in the same way it would for a supplier. It is also the case that energy 
companies, particularly in district heat, are owned either by cooperatives of those connected to the 
network, or the municipalities in the area (Lockwood, 2015), meaning it is the owners, or residents 
of the area, that benefit from effective deployment of energy efficiency measures. In the case of 
district heat networks reduced consumption would lead to reduced revenue for supplying heat. 
However issues of conflict of interest are limited by the fact that heat networks are required to 
operate on a non-profit basis (IEA, 2014), so reduced revenues owing to reduced demand has no 
impact on profits. This is a significant contrast to the supplier obligation structure in Great Britain. 
 
‘It has worked, to some extent there can be a conflict but you have to be aware that until 
now, our obligation has been on the distributors, not on the retail sales companies, and the 
conflict for the distributors is maybe a bit smaller’. 
(Interviewee 49) 
 
‘Most of the energy companies in Denmark are owned by the consumers themselves…So 
that’s also what makes quite good sense, that why sell your owners something they don’t 
need?’ 
(Interviewee 6) 
A number of respondents, particularly those from the Government, suggested that the network 
companies do not object to delivering these energy efficiency measures because it allows them to 
develop new revenue streams, and form stronger relationships with their customers. However, one 
representative from an industry body suggested that many of the smaller heat networks object to 
the policy because they find it difficult and inconvenient to meet their contributions. 
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6.5.4 - Information & Coordination 
Interviewees from a range of categories highlighted the important role that the information schemes 
in Denmark play in supporting delivery of energy efficiency measures in Denmark. A number of 
information schemes have been set up including The Danish Energy Agency’s 'case-bank' which gives 
real-world examples of households that have made energy renovations. This clearly sets out the 
different options for different types of house renovation - costs, process, and energy savings (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2015b).  
 ‘You can use the information campaigns and we have a lot of information campaigns 
and case examples and how much money can you save by doing this. Our [Case-Bank] 
website is very good on this – we have spoken to 20 people having their house, new 
windows, new roof, whatever and saying how much they paid, how much they have saved on 
energy bills and stuff like that.’ 
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(Interviewee 33)  
The value of the 'Bedre Bolig' [Better Homes] program was also highlighted by a range of 
interviewees. This is a Danish Energy Agency initiative, which is another source of information, 
training advisors to provide detailed bespoke information. Inspired by the UK's Green Deal, Bedre 
Bolig advisors are trained and accredited to give advice on how best to carry out whole-house 
retrofits to improve the energy efficiency of a domestic home. 
‘…the idea is that you or I as a person living in a house could go to one of these people [Bedre 
Bolig Advisors], and they could help us in the way that they'll say 'Ok, this is your house, I had 
a look at it, you can like change with windows that will give you this much, you can change 
the roof, that will give you this much, or you can put some insulation on it or whatever is 
needed'  
(Interviewee 10) 
The scheme also aims to facilitate better links between trades, so the advisor is able to connect the 
home-owner with all the trades, and potentially also the financing through means of a partnered 
financial institution, necessary to carry out the retro-fit. Although the information scheme is 
modelled on the Green Deal, there is not an equivalent pay-as-you-save mechanism (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2014c). Some respondents suggested that this was owed to the availability of finance 
through other routes. Similarly to the Green Deal assessment however, interested households are 
often required to pay for a Bedre-Bolig plan to be drawn up, however they are able to shop around 
to find the best quote for the plan (SparEnergi, 2016).  
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6.5.5 – Finance 
As set out above, there are strict rules around energy standards when renovating properties that 
lead to the standard of energy efficiency being improved. This is supported by easily-accessible 
finance. In Denmark, it is common for home owners to extend their mortgages, or remortgage their 
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properties, to allow them to pay for renovation works. The exact value and terms of which vary 
depending on the property the loan is being mortgaged against, the financial situation of the 
individual taking the loan, and the term of the loan (Frederikshavn Municipality, 2014). Interest rates 
for these loans can typically be between 5-8% (Frederikshavn Municipality, 2014), however some 
institutions offer rates of 3% and below (Frederikshavn Municipality, 2014; Nykredit, 2015a). A 
number of respondents highlighted that this gives a number of homeowners’ access to affordable 
finance, which is instrumental in supporting energy efficiency retrofit. Some banks are  starting to 
offer bespoke products for energy renovation - for example Nykredit, who has ~45% of the mortgage 
market (Nykredit, 2015b), has gone into partnership with DONG to offer advice on potential 
upgrades to properties, and the financial opportunities available to enable them to be carried out 
(Nykredit, 2014). It is interesting to note that government respondents were most common in their 
highlighting that finance was accessible, and that this facilitates retrofitting of energy efficiency 
measures. This may be related to work the government had carried out focussing on the barriers and 
facilitators to retrofitting of energy efficiency, which was undertaken in the lead up to the interview 
period. This work examined and rejected the Green Deal finance mechanism. Alternatively, this 
could imply that the government has an over-inflated idea of the role that mortgage finance plays in 
facilitating retrofit. However, the fact that interviewees from other groups also voiced the same 
views makes this less likely. One government respondent commented however that there are some 
banks which are yet to understand the value in offering such loans to households, and so part of the 
Government’s retrofit policy is to improve understanding of opportunities among financial 
institutions. 
The challenge with a financing mechanism which is reliant upon mortgages however is that it is 
inevitably tied to the value of property, meaning those with very low-value properties have limited 
access to finance to improve them (Frederikshavn Municipality, 2014). In areas where there is large-
scale migration from rural areas into cities, rural properties are losing value, preventing their owners 
leveraging finance against them. 
‘…in the part of Denmark where the economy is not very good, people cannot afford it, you 
cannot take more lending money in your building because the building is not really worth 
anything, so even it might be economically feasible to do the renovation, if the house is 
worth nothing then improving the house it will still not be worth anything because it’s in the 
wrong place.’  
(Interviewee 38) 
This was exacerbated by the widespread falls in house values following the 2008 financial crash 
which left a number of consumers facing negative equity in their property and so without access to 
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what would otherwise be a common form of finance. A recent survey revealed that one in ten 
Danish households believe themselves to be in negative equity (Apt Capital Management, 2015). 
This issue was highlighted by some interviewees, but interestingly was not mentioned by the 
government respondents who highlighted the benefits of this financing mechanism. It is possible 
either that the government is not aware of the challenges, or more likely (given the work that has 
recently been undertaken in this space) that they are less willing to highlight the possible 
shortcomings in a funding mechanism which is foundational to their retrofit policy. It is possibly less 
surprising that energy suppliers and networks did not discuss these financing opportunities or issues, 
owing to there not being directly involved in this part of the retrofit supply chain. 
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6.6 –  Broader Features of Governance  
6.6.1 - Relationship Between Government and Industry 
A range of interviewees discussed the collaborative nature of the relationship between the 
government and private firms in the industry, explaining how they work together to establish new 
targets and policies. Lockwood (2015) sets out how this tradition for consensus building and the 
strong collaborative relationships between actors in the governance structure are crucial in the 
success of Danish energy policy. This is particularly evident in energy efficiency policy making. As set 
out above, the supplier obligation is set through a process of negotiation between the government 
and the obligated parties. This allows government to take on the role of a facilitator (Schmidt, 2002), 
and gives obligated parties ownership and involvement of the process and means that they do not 
feel like they are simply forced into action.  
‘…either they can tell us what we need to do, or they can politely ask as to take part of this, to have 
an ownership of the process and empower us for what we see is the best solution.’ 
(Interviewee 45) 
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This is a mature form of relationship, which is contingent upon a balance of knowledge between 
government and the private sector - government and industry both need the capacity to understand 
the policy which is being negotiated. As set out above, government will, by its nature, always have 
the power to impose regulation, which was suggested it would willingly exercise if there was 
significant resistance from obligated parties. However, if government does not understand the 
subject area is it unlikely to be able to negotiate, or wield its power effectively (Kuzemko, 2014; 
Lockwood et al., 2013). This process of negotiation between government and firms is not limited to 
the supplier obligation, but also extends to product standards, and building regulations.  
6.6.2 - Political Consensus 
The relationships between political parties are also a significant feature of the governance structure 
in Denmark. There is a high degree of political consensus around some issues such as the need to 
tackle climate change, and the importance of energy efficiency as a central pillar of Danish energy 
policy.  Lockwood (2015) attributes this in large part to the presence of a proportional 
representation electoral voting system. This has created a multi-party system, which makes coalition 
governments commonplace (Cusack et al., 2007). This has led to a level of relative stability in the 
political landscape, leading to a continuity of policy, with particular buy-in around particular issues 
such as energy efficiency (Lockwood, 2015). The importance of the political consensus was 
highlighted most commonly by those interviewees which worked for the government. This is 
perhaps unsurprising as a collaborative or combative nature between parties would be likely to have 
a significant impact on the day-to-day lives of those that develop policy which is later to be passed 
through parliament. 
‘There's broad support in the political parties in parliament that this is something that we 
have to do… there's a broad consensus that we have a problem and we have to do something 
about it, and one of the things that we will have to work on is efficiency because up to 2050, 
that's where we will harvest most results in terms of getting a more efficient society, or more 
intelligent energy usage.’ 
(Interviewee 9) 
With negotiation for energy efficiency targets and product standards, and political consensus 
building around key policy areas, there are very few dissenting voices to stand in the way of chosen 
pathway (See: Grubb et al., 1991; Lockwood et al., 2013). This of course is not necessarily always a 
positive thing, as it can build a strong degree of policy lock-in, however in this instance this structure 
of governance works to keep Denmark on a path of increasing levels of efficiency and deployment of 
renewables, fostering more affordable energy. 
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This gives a strong element of stability and credibility to policy-making; stakeholders know that 
policy is not going to radically change direction after every election and are able to plan accordingly. 
It is interesting to note that this consensus is not necessarily founded on similar values, but can be a 
product of overlapping goals. This was set out by one interviewee in reference to the adoption of the 
Energy 2050 agreement:  
‘Whether or not they cared about climate didn’t make a bit of difference, the idea of not 
being dependent on the middle east for oil was really appealing…That’s where you find the 
explanation of the fact that you get 172 out of 179 members of parliament supporting this 
agenda because we have the very right wing… that really are not convinced about climate 
and are not sure that it’s a problem, and if it is a problem then the free market will fix it, as 
far as they’re concerned if you could just block the middle east out…[then it is worthwhile] 
‘(Interviewee 34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6.3 - Developing Expertise 
Energy technologies are a significant source of income for Denmark. In 2011, they accounted for 
10.4% of Danish exports, equating to approximately DKK 80billion (Approximately £8.7billion34) 
(Danish Energy Agency et al., 2012). Figures are not suitably subdivided to calculate what portion of 
these can be attributed to energy efficiency, but approximately one fifth of all Danish energy 
technology companies work in the energy efficiency sector (Lean Energy Cluster, 2014). A range of 
interviewees highlighted the significant economic role of energy technology companies has a 
bearing on the policies that are developed. The high standards of regulation in the Danish market 
drive Danish energy efficiency firms to advance quickly –  developing products and expertise for 
meeting strict national regulations, which can then be exported at high value. Four firms in particular 
were referred to by interviewees:  
                                                          
34 Conversion Rate DKK1 = £0.11 (07-04-16) 
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• Velux - A window manufacturer 
• Grundfos - A manufacturer of pumps - particularly for heating and air conditioning 
• Danfoss - A manufacturer of heating, cooling, and control products 
• Rockwool - An insulation manufacturer 
 
‘…right after we came through with the 'Bedre Bolig', there were actually four companies - 
like four big Danish companies – Velux, Danfoss, Grundfos and Rockwool… that are very big 
companies in Denmark came through with a deal that matched ours quite a lot and that's 
because they found out that if they could get people to make renovations in their home they 
could sell more windows, they could sell a lot of technology to do that kind of stuff. So I guess 
one of the important things it to try and figure out where do we have some common 
interests with these companies…’ 
(Interviewee 10) 
This is significant because it means there are powerful interests supportive of ambitious energy 
efficiency standards. This is because it gives large firms a safe market in which to develop advanced 
high-efficiency products, allowing them to gain competitive advantage when exporting to other 
countries.  
Together, the collaboration to negotiate targets between government and industry, the strong 
cross-party support for energy efficiency, the powerful voices speaking out in favour of tighter 
regulations helps to deliver a stable policy environment. This is significant because it enables firms to 
develop new products, and make investments with confidence that the policy landscape will not 
unexpectedly change around them (Lockwood et al., 2013). This not only encourages investment, 
but also supports lower costs of capital which helps to make products and product development 
cheaper. 
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6.7 – Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the policies and the governance structure in Denmark relating to energy 
efficiency, and has highlighted some significant differences between the Danish governance 
structure, and that which is present in Great Britain. The context of the governance structure in 
Denmark is very different to that of Great Britain. Denmark is characterised as having high domestic 
energy bills, which are kept artificially high through taxation, however there are also very high 
standards of energy efficiency. Alongside a supportive social system, this supports few issues of 
affordability, and low levels of fuel poverty.  
The oil shocks of the 1970s were key events in Danish energy history, and contributed to supporting 
a more interventionist ideology where the government was willing to intervene in markets to 
promote high energy efficiency standards. Ambitious energy efficiency standards were introduced at 
this time alongside high energy taxation, and a narrative of energy efficiency being intimately 
connected to delivering energy security also started to develop. The same is not true for the impact 
of the oil shocks in Great Britain, instead security was provided from supply-side policies including 
greater exploitation of North Sea oil supplies (Helm, 2002). This demonstrates how a countries’ 
supply of natural resources can have a significant impact on its energy policy (Kuzemko, 2013)– in 
Denmark security was connected with energy efficiency, whereas in Great Britain it was connected 
to self-sufficiency, and alternative routes of supply. 
Denmark’s equivalent policy to the ECO appears to play less of a role in the deployment of energy 
efficiency measures to the domestic sector than the ECO does in Great Britain, although some 
measures are still delivered to households. The governance relating to Danish policy is very different 
to that in Great Britain. Firstly, it is based on agreements, rather than regulations backed by 
sanctions. This functions on the idea that if the energy companies do not meet their commitments, 
then the government will begin to regulate – it is the threat of regulation which encourages them to 
comply. This demonstrates the power that government has over the industry. This is in stark 
contrast to the situation in Great Britain where the government responded to political pressure from 
suppliers to reduce the regulations, and so reduce their expectations for delivery. In Denmark, these 
measures are delivered by the network companies, rather than the supply companies (which in the 
case of district heating operate on a not for profit basis). This helps to alleviate some of the conflict 
of interests that are faced by energy suppliers in Great Britain which are required to deliver 
measures which will inherently harm their core business interests. Placing the obligation on energy 
networks could offer an alternative delivery model in Great Britain, however as is seen under 
network revenue regulation, it is not clear that OFGEM has sufficient institutional capacity to ensure 
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that costs were kept to a minimum, and the different ownership structure in Great Britain would 
also make it less likely to be successful. 
The nature of relationships is shown to be important in the governance structure in Denmark. There 
is strong collaboration between the government and firms in the industry in the development of 
energy efficiency targets. It is not clear however that such a process could be easily fostered in Great 
Britain. Currently the firms with greatest responsibility for deployment of energy efficiency measures 
are the energy suppliers, landlords, and housebuilders. As set out in chapters three and five, it is not 
clear that governmental departments have adequate institutional capacity in the energy efficiency 
policy-making space to ensure that the balance of power did not lie with the firms in the industry. It 
has already been seen that the energy supply companies, and landlords in Great Britain are able to 
influence government policy. The nature of lobbying in Denmark is very different – there are a 
number of powerful demand-side interests which benefit from increasing levels of energy efficiency 
standards, and therefore lobby for higher standards. Part of the reason these firms are powerful is 
that they have become economically important for Denmark, exporting their advanced energy 
efficiency technology to other countries. 
Finally, the cross-part consensus which exists around the importance of energy efficiency, and the 
need to transition away from fossil-fuels, is an important feature of the governance landscape in 
Denmark. This has helped to build a stable investment landscape for energy efficiency supply chains. 
Although there was cross-party consensus in the development of the Climate Change Act in Great 
Britain, this has not translated into agreement regarding the centrality of energy efficiency to 
delivering on that commitment, meaning that the stability enjoyed by firms in Denmark, does not 
exist in Great Britain.  
The unique nature of governance structure in Denmark is central to supporting high standards of 
energy efficiency. This helps to support good levels of affordability, in spite of higher energy prices. 
The following chapter will set out proposals for improving affordability of energy for the domestic 
sector in Great Britain, where appropriate drawing on the lessons from the Danish governance 
structure which have been set out in this chapter. 
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Chapter 7 - Discussion: Proposed Solutions for Issues with Governance 
for Affordability 
 
7.1 – Introduction 
Previous chapters have examined the policy and academic literature, as well as results from primary 
research to set out how the governance structure in Great Britain impacts the levels of affordability 
of energy for domestic consumers, and set out how the governance structure in Denmark is supports 
affordability of energy for Danish households. This chapter brings all these findings together. An 
over-arching theory under which a number of these issues may be grouped is set out, and solutions 
are also offered to the issues in the governance structure to support the delivery of a higher 
standard of affordability of energy for domestic consumers. 
The recommendations in this chapter are not intended to be overly prescriptive, setting out 
proposed solutions in minute detail, rather to highlight the key hallmarks of an alternative 
governance structure which is more supportive of an energy system which delivers high standards of 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers, and how they interrelate. The majority of the 
proposals here are not quick-fixes, but would take time to implement, and although none of the 
recommendations in this chapter are wholly reliant upon one another, progress in one area is likely 
to support progress in others. 
This chapter draws together evidence from the literature chapters (chapters one, two and three) 
and the primary evidence from interviews in both Great Britain (chapter five) and Denmark (chapter 
six). This is done by proposing changes to the governance structure in order to rectify the issues 
identified in the current structure which undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers 
in Great Britain.  A conclusion is offered at the end of the chapter which sets out how many of the 
changes relate to the central need to change the prevailing policy narrative.  
7.2 - Changing the Narrative: ‘Affordability = Low Prices’ vs. ‘Affordability = High 
Efficiency’ 
An over-arching theme that has emerged from the research is one of the importance of narrative. 
There is a pervasive narrative present in the governance structure in Great Britain whereby 
affordability is considered as best achieved through pursuit of low prices, delivered through market 
mechanisms, and founded upon basic market principles such as cost-reflective pricing. This 
'affordability = low prices' narrative not only channels the policy solutions that are put in place, but 
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also serves to crowd out other narratives which may be more beneficial to improving the 
affordability of energy in the British context, in particular the narrative of 'affordability = high 
efficiency', discussed below.  
This 'affordability = low prices' narrative appears a common-sense approach, making it easy for 
policymakers to communicate, however it treats energy as a ‘normal’ good - no different from 
bread. However, this is not the case - energy has no easily substitutable alternatives, and the 
amount consumed is not simply a product of consumer choice, but is directly affected by the 
property the consumer lives in, and appliances he/she owns. Framing affordability of energy as 
relating primarily to price levels allows policy-makers to pursue simple, short-termist measures such 
as cutting the ECO or renewable subsidies (see chapter three), whilst supporting the idea that low 
prices are best achieved through encouraging consumers to engage in the retail market in order to 
drive competition. 
Framing affordability purely as a price and market issue also allows policymakers to work within a 
narrow policy area, delivering low cost policies (a priority for government given the current focus on 
austerity), achievable within the electoral timetable. This framing is also coherent with traditional 
supply-side policy-making, and can be used to support political projects in other areas. For example, 
the idea that energy prices are linked to international energy markets is used to promote 
development of new indigenous energy sources such as new nuclear power and fracking. These may 
be perceived by policymakers as creating greater political capital than measures to improve energy 
efficiency. The drive to reduce prices is also used by policy-makers to justify reductions in subsidies 
for renewables.  
This narrow narrative also means policymakers can claim that by attempting to facilitate the smooth 
operation of the market, they are doing everything that can be done to deliver affordable energy to 
consumers. The OFGEM referral to the CMA announced as being to 'once and for all clear the air and 
allow the CMA to ensure there are no further barriers to effective competition' (OFGEM, 2014c) was 
coherent with this position. This also allows policymakers to pass much of the responsibility for 
achieving affordable energy onto the consumer, stating that low prices are available in the market, 
but it is the consumer's responsibility to go out and find them. This is characterised in a government 
press release: 
'13.5 million households across the UK are missing out on their share of £2.7 billion by 
sticking with their energy company. By shopping around and taking advantage of the best 
energy deals on the market, millions of people can save around £200 - and some can save 
even more'                 (DECC, 2015o: Online)  
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However, as set out in previous chapters, this means that under the current design of the market, 
engagement in the market is a prerequisite to accessing the lowest prices. Although this benefits the 
engaged consumer who switches, this arrangement leads to significant harm for those on low-
incomes, the elderly, or otherwise vulnerable, who are some of the least likely to switch supplier 
(OFGEM et al., 2014), and most likely to be in fuel poverty. These consumers are subsidising the bills 
of those engaged consumers who shop around. Overall this means that switching is a route to 
improving affordability for the individual, but not for those that do not engage and therefore face 
higher prices as a consequence. What is more, it is not clear that significant benefits would be 
achieved if all households were to become simultaneously engaged.  
Part of the attraction to policymakers and other stakeholders of the 'affordability = low prices' 
narrative is its coherence with a pro-market ideology. It is interesting to note however that the 
government's support of market mechanisms in the retail market is not entirely mirrored by policies 
affecting the wholesale market. For example, BEIS is currently overseeing the introduction of a 
capacity mechanism designed encourage the building of new generation gas plant by financially 
supporting them outside the market (DECC, 2016a), as well as committing to the construction of 
Hinkley Point C, a new nuclear plant with a 35-year subsidy contract priced at more than double the 
day-ahead market price in 2016 (BEIS, 2016b; OFGEM, 2017b). This in spite of modelling showing 
that the equivalent power could be produced by a combination of renewables, energy efficiency and 
interconnectors for £1bn a year less than the cost of Hinkley Point C (ECIU, 2016). This suggests that 
the government is willing to intervene in one market to support a particular generation technology, 
but is less willing to make significant interventions in another market to support affordability of 
energy. This suggests that the dedication to the 'affordability = low prices' narrative is, if not a 
conscious choice by policy-makers, at the very least a demonstration of ‘wilful blindness’ not to see 
the alternative policy solutions such as high levels of energy efficiency deployment because they are 
not coherent with other policy goals (Geels and Schot, 2007).  
As set out in chapter one, dedication to particular forms of policymaking can become heavily 
embedded in the governance system (Kuzemko et al., 2016), which can lead to ideology overriding 
evidence and channelling decisions by policy-makers (Metcalfe, 1993; Geels and Schot, 2007), and 
this appears to be occurring in Great Britain’s energy system. The 'affordability = low prices' 
narrative fails to consider that although there are opportunities to reduce energy prices in Great 
Britain, and these are important to investigate, prices are not significantly out of step with those in 
Europe, and the largest opportunity to improve affordability of energy in Great Britain is in the 
energy efficiency of the housing stock. It appears that the 'affordability = low prices' narrative, 
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although useful to policymakers, holds back affordability of energy for domestic consumers by 
crowding out other policy solutions. 
This thesis therefore proposes a transition to a new narrative, which will be hereby referred to as 
that of ‘Affordability = High Efficiency’, signifying a move away from the market-based approach to 
delivering affordability, to one where high levels of end-use energy efficiency is put at the centre of 
policy to support affordability of energy, and the importance of energy as an essential good is 
acknowledged. The Danish example demonstrates the significant affordability benefits of placing 
high standards of energy efficiency at the centre of policymaking in energy, as opposed to an added-
extra, as is often the case in Great Britain. A transition in narrative would help this to change. 
7.2.1 – Pathway to a New Narrative 
Narratives can be considered both lenses through which people view the world, and avenues for 
political influence (Bushell et al., 2017). Alternative narratives may be deployed in such a way to 
challenge the regime, and emphasise the opportunities arising from alternatives (Smith and Raven, 
2012). Smith and Raven (2012) set out how support for the energy transition may be gained through 
reframing fossil fuels away from being considered as cheap, plentiful sources of energy, towards 
being insecure and responsible for climate change. Affordability could be similarly reframed away 
from being principally a product of low prices, towards being a product of high energy efficiency 
standards. However, successfully contesting established orthodoxy and replacing it with an 
alternative narrative is challenging. It requires engagement by interested parties with policymakers 
at a range of levels to challenge the assumptions which underlie the current policy regime, and to 
begin to cultivate support and a perception of legitimacy for the alternative narrative (Kuzemko et 
al., 2016), as well as engaging with individuals in order to influence public sentiment (Bushell et al., 
2017; Campbell, 1998). This could both be used to develop an interest in energy efficiency measures 
as a route to reducing bills, but also a desire to see policymakers take steps to make energy 
efficiency measures more easily accessible.  
One of the major barriers to the change in narrative was set out in chapter five, in that the so called 
‘supply-side’ institutions such as the energy suppliers are well resourced and politically powerful 
(Kuzemko et al., 2016), whereas ‘demand-side’ interests are significantly less so. However, if the 
other recommendations set out in this chapter are also pursued, the political salience of institutions 
lobbying in support of energy efficiency measures as a route to protecting consumers is likely to 
increase. 
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7.3 - Strong Consumer Representation 
As was set out in chapter five, one of the challenges to building comprehensive policy around 
affordability of energy is the lack of a high-capacity institution to represent consumers’ needs. This 
thesis therefore proposes the introduction of a new consumer advocacy institution. 
It would be important for a new consumer advocate to be a well-resourced body with a high level of 
capacity to understand and question the arrangements in the energy sector, with a brief to offer 
critical insight into policy and regulation, and challenge government and OFGEM. Its focus should be 
the protection of the long-term interests of all domestic consumers, ensuring that policy is put in 
place so the energy transition can occur, with minimal negative impact on consumers. This would 
mean that those consumers who wish to engage fully with the energy system by means of offering 
generation or flexibility services, are able to do so (Hoggett, 2016), but at the same time that those 
consumers that are unable or unwilling to engage, either in this way or through switching, are well-
represented.  
The new advocacy body should take a nuanced understanding of the needs of consumers, avoiding 
the 'affordability = low prices' narrative. To be as effective as possible, its remit of enquiry should 
expand beyond the policies affecting the production and distribution of energy, to other areas 
affecting energy consumption such as building regulations, and product policy. This is because, as 
has been demonstrated in previous sections, some of the most important decisions affecting 
affordability of energy relate to policies which lie outside the areas currently presided over by BEIS 
(e.g. building regulations). This would require a strong connection with a range of other institutions, 
including (although not limited to) BEIS, DCLG, DWP, Treasury, OFGEM, EU-DG Energy, CAB, 
suppliers, networks, generators and local authorities. Affordability of energy is not a siloed issue 
within BEIS, but spans across different departments’ remits. This broad remit would allow 
recommendations to be made based on joined up, coherent policy-making between parts of 
government, such as the reform of the winter fuel payment.  
This broad remit and understanding of affordability will also allow the new consumer advocate to 
make policy recommendations which take consideration of other policy objectives, such as the need 
to move to a low-carbon energy system. This will help to create pressure to avoid short-termist, 
narrow decision-making such as that which led to the reductions in the FiT, justified on the basis of 
small bill reductions35. 
                                                          
35 These have led to a significant slowdown in the solar energy sector, however only reduced the average 
household bill by ~£5 (HM Treasury, 2015b).  
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There are examples of high-capacity, effective consumer advocates in energy systems in a number of 
other countries, and any new consumer advocate institution would be most effective if its design 
could be based on best practice from these. Examples include the Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) 
consumer advocacy body which has capacity-building and research as central activities. An ability to 
carry out independent and robust research is an important ability for any organisation wishing to 
interrogate the energy market and if necessary, challenge the prevailing ‘received wisdom’ in the 
industry, and so challenge policy-makers and other actors. 
Arizona’s Residential Utility Consumer Office (RUCO) is also worthy of consideration. Energy prices in 
Arizona are regulated, and suppliers must apply to the Arizona Corporation Commission to increase 
their rates. The RUCO reviews every such application and then plays an active part in the hearings 
which are used to assess the case for such increases, representing the interests of the consumer 
(RUCO, 2017). It would be unable to carry out such a role effectively without a detailed 
understanding of the operation of the industry, and the impact on the costs faced by suppliers. 
Fremeth et al. (2014) show that US states which have a consumer advocate body generally enjoy 
lower prices than they would do if there were no consumer advocate body in place. This shows the 
import role that a consumer advocate can play in affecting outcomes for consumers. Holburn and 
Bergh (2006) set out that consumer advocates are often put in place by policymakers that are 
concerned that they will not win a forthcoming election, in order to create a legacy of protection for 
their vulnerable voters. This demonstrates both the political nature of energy policy, and that 
consumer advocates can help to bring both lasting protection and policy stability, spanning across 
changes in government – the value of which was shown in Denmark to be highly supportive of 
improved affordability of energy.  
The need to introduce new institutions to remedy the shortcomings of the existing governance 
structure is also recognised by Mitchell et al. (2016) in far-reaching proposals to introduce a number 
of new institutions and changing the roles of others to better-facilitate the transition to a low-carbon 
energy system. This demonstrates support for the idea that it may be necessary to fundamentally 
alter the fabric of the governance structure in order to produce different outcomes of the system. 
Within Mitchell et al. (2016)’s framework (hence forth the ‘IGov framework’) is the Climate and 
Energy Policy Committee (CEPC) which carries multiple roles, primary of which is to provide a stable 
political consensus on how the UK can decarbonise its energy system. This is facilitated through a 
‘national conversation’ combining the views of all stakeholders in the industry. It would also monitor 
progress against energy policy goals (including affordability) and make recommendations to 
government. In addition it would help provide coordination across government to deliver building 
regulations and retail market rules which both protect consumers, and are fit for the future (Mitchell 
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et al., 2016). There are clear parallels between some of the responsibilities of the CEPC in the IGov 
framework, and the proposals in this thesis, and these proposals should be considered as 
complimentary rather than competing. Both proposals identify the need for a new institution with 
responsibility which spans across government departments, and the capacity to understand and 
make recommendations on policy. It is indeed possible that a new advocacy function could be 
nested within the CEPC of the wider IGov framework. A new consumer advocate would take time to 
develop, however, the more institutionally robust it can be made, the more effective it is likely to be; 
therefore a lengthy process would likely prove worthwhile. 
The introduction of a new consumer advocate body is not reliant upon the change in narrative set 
out above, but would be significantly more likely if such a change took place. The current narrative is 
based on the principle that best outcomes for consumers are delivered through the cultivation of a 
competitive retail market. However, moving away from such a belief, and beginning to acknowledge 
that other measures may be necessary to deliver for consumers, could help to unlock the 
understanding of a well-resourced consumer advocate as an important part of a governance regime 
which protects consumers.  
7.4 - Responsibility for Energy Efficiency: Moving the Obligation to Higher Capacity 
Institutions 
7.4.1 – Local Authorities: Well Placed to Deliver and Facilitate Energy Efficiency 
As set out in chapter five, there are a number of issues relating to energy suppliers being the primary 
institution responsible for delivery of energy efficiency measures. However, there is support for the 
idea that there are significant opportunities for the obligation to be moved to an alternative 
institution such as local authorities (LAs). By their nature, LAs have an inherent interest in improving 
the lives of those in their area of responsibility. This could remove the need for threat sanctions, 
which under current supplier-led models could potentially harm consumers if they resulted in bill 
increases. They are generally well-trusted (IPPR, 2014) and they have significant knowledge of the 
building stock and social issues in their region, all of which could help them to address issues of 
targeting those most in need (Wade et al., 2007).  
Local authorities across the country have also demonstrated their potential though the Local 
Authority Central Heating Fund (DECC, 2015p) and the Green Deal communities scheme (DECC, 
2014k), as well as being demonstrated more fully in Wales and Scotland under the area-based 
HEEPS, and the Nest schemes. Before responsibility could be fully reallocated to LAs, that every 
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opportunity should be taken to learn from the experiences in the devolved administrations, as well 
as observing the essential role that local authorities provide in the energy sector in Denmark. 
A number of suppliers partnered with LAs for the delivery of their ECO obligations. Although this 
alleviates a number of the issues regarding trust because it allows the schemes to be branded by the 
LA, it continues to give large supply firms power over policies which are not inherently in their best 
interests to meet. It inevitably also influences the design of delivery because the suppliers’ primary 
objective remains to avoid sanction rather than deliver best outcomes for householders in a 
particular area. Giving sole responsibility for energy efficiency obligations to LAs would not only take 
this element of power away from the large firms, it would also allow LAs to take ownership of the 
schemes; laying the foundations for them, alongside a new consumer advocate, to begin to act as a 
counterbalance to the power of supply-side interests. LAs would be able to provide a local voice in 
support of energy efficiency, to help to start building political pressure for improved energy 
efficiency policy.  
7.4.2 - Improved Targeting for Fuel Poor Households 
It is well-established that effective targeting is one of the most important aspects of a program to 
address fuel poverty (Boardman, 2009). LAs have the institutional capacity to  improve the targeting 
of energy efficiency measures to the households that are most in need, both because of their 
significant local knowledge of the area (Platt et al., 2012), and because of their existing obligations. 
LAs have an existing statutory duty to gather information on health and wellbeing needs of their 
constituents (Department of Health, 2011) and where necessary to offer grants for improved heating 
systems for disabled individuals (HMG, 1996). This could be added to existing information they hold 
regarding claimants of some benefits such as housing benefit. Although this use of this data may 
require changes in the law (DWP, 2014), the granting of access to data of a different arm of local 
government is likely to lead to fewer issues than sharing data with private institutions. LAs will also 
be able to build up a comprehensive picture of levels of fuel poverty in their area, this was previously 
a requirement on LAs, but was discontinued in 2010 (FOE, 2011). 
LAs are well-positioned to build partnerships with a wide range of welfare institutions (CAG 
Consultants et al., 2011; Community Energy Plus, 2013), children's centres (ACE et al., 2015b), Home 
Improvement Agencies, and social landlords (Department of Health, 2014). As was demonstrated 
under Warm Front, partnering with a range of local organisation can improve reach of the schemes 
(DECC, 2014j). This would enable cross-referencing of area-based information of deprivation, with 
individual identification of vulnerable consumers which live in less deprived areas. LAs are also in a 
position, where appropriate, to organise street-by-street distribution of energy efficiency measures 
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(ACE et al., 2015a; Boardman, 2007), rather than suppliers whose customers are distributed over 
wide geographic areas. LAs will also be able to build a database of the housing stock in their area to 
establish which houses are likely to benefit most from various measures, as has been done by 
Durham County Council (Commission for Rural Communities and Durham County Council, 2011) – 
something which is essential to a successful targeting scheme (Boardman, 2009).  
7.4.3 - Able-to-pay households 
In order to maximise the value of financial resources, it is essential that subsidised measures are 
targeted at those most in need – i.e. the fuel poor. However, it is likely, particularly if the LA is 
employing an area-based approach, that LA operatives will come into contact with households which 
may not qualify for direct financial support, but would still benefit from improved energy efficiency. 
LAs will be able to leverage expertise gained from delivery of fuel poverty measures in taking the 
opportunity to explain the benefits of energy efficiency to able-to-pay households, which measures 
are appropriate for the household. As was seen in Denmark through the development of the 'case-
bank' service and 'Bedre Bolig', accessibility of information tailored by property type, can support 
energy efficiency improvement. There is no reason why similar measures would not be successful in 
Great Britain. This information could also be coordinated with existing local third sector 
organisations, along with providing direction towards other reputable sources of information, such 
as the Energy Saving Trust. LAs are generally well trusted institutions, and so will also be able to offer 
a trusted source of other local information such as which installers in their area are able to install 
which measures. This also offers efficiency installers a route to market, allowing them to partner 
with LAs to deliver measures for both fuel poor, and ‘able-to-pay’ households. This also allows LAs to 
support the growth of SMEs in their area, rather than the value being taken out of the area by 
national delivery bodies such as the energy efficiency arm of a large energy supplier. LAs should not 
seek to hold a monopoly position, as this would risk crowding out innovation in delivery of energy 
efficiency measures, but aim to work alongside any other actors which seek to deliver energy 
efficiency measures – recognising that this will bring significant benefits to households in the region. 
This dual approach of targeting both fuel poor, and ‘able-to-pay’ households is important for 
ensuring that the housing stock of an area begins to become ‘fuel-poverty proof’ – so that if people 
on low incomes moved into a property in the future, they would not find themselves forced into fuel 
poverty because the previous owners had not made efficiency improvements. 
7.4.4 – Collaboration and Support  
Building a structure of strong communication between LAs, such as through existing institutions such 
as the Local Government Association, or Local Authorities Leaders' Boards would allow LAs to share 
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best practice, and collaborate with adjacent LAs to share knowledge and resources across 
boundaries. This would allow a strong capacity to be built among LAs to become powerful and 
effective participants in the energy efficiency sector. 
Not only is it important that LAs are able to support one another, but also by central government 
(ACE et al., 2015a). Although a number of LAs have a successful history with deployment of energy 
efficiency measures (Wade et al., 2007), a number currently lack the staff or expertise to deliver 
measures effectively. Probability of success is likely to be much greater if central government were 
to put in place a framework of funding, training, and information to support LAs to build capacity 
prior to reassigning responsibility from energy suppliers. Lessons from the Nest in Wales, and HEEPS 
in Scotland should be taken, and staff from LAs in England should be allowed to visit their 
counterparts from the devolved administrations to learn from their experiences 
7.4.5 – Reduced Policy Complexity 
Reassigning the obligation to LAs could also help reduce some of the complexity of the obligation, 
which derives from the three targets in the ECO (one of which features a sub-target). Multiple 
targets are required to enable the regulator to ensure that energy suppliers target measures in a 
particular way, delivering on an obligation that is otherwise not in their interests. However, if LAs 
held funds to deliver measures to their areas, the policy could be simplified. This is both because it 
would be in the interests of the institution to deliver maximum benefit for the area as opposed to 
exploiting failings of policy design, and use their knowledge of the area to establish which works 
would create maximum benefit 
7.4.6 - Funding 
A number of funding options remain open for LA deployment of energy efficiency measures. As set 
out elsewhere in this chapter it would be most progressive for funding to be levied through taxation. 
However, it would be technically feasible for funding to continue to come from a levy on bills and 
then passed on to LAs. It is essential that if the obligation were to be reassigned to LAs, that 
adequate funds were allocated to support it. LAs have suffered significant funding cuts in recent 
years (ACE et al., 2015a), and so it essential that this new role does not further stretch already 
limited resources.  
7.4.7 - Transition 
The transition from the supplier-obligation model to a LA-delivered model would take time, and 
should be managed carefully. It is essential that LAs are able to build institutional capacity before 
becoming entirely responsible for the role. This would help to avoid the cliff-edge reduction in 
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measures which was seen following the CERT. Steps, such as sharing of expertise between LAs, could 
be taken in the near term however, to begin this process of capacity building. Chapter six set out the 
key role that municipalities play in Denmark as key local actors in the energy system. The delivery of 
energy efficiency measures through LAs, alongside the growth in LA-owned energy suppliers which 
began in 2015 with Robin Hood Energy, would support the development of LAs becoming important, 
trusted local energy actors.  Once again, although the proposed change in narrative is not 
fundamental to reallocating responsibility for energy efficiency delivery to LAs, it would increase its 
likelihood. This is because energy suppliers were originally assigned responsibility for energy 
efficiency measures because it was believed that competitive pressure would encourage them to 
deliver the measures at least cost. Moving away from a focus on market mechanisms in favour of 
focussing on the most effective routes to delivery of energy efficiency measures would facilitate 
examination of new and alternative policy options for delivery of energy efficiency measures, such as 
via local authorities. A move to local authority deliver of energy efficiency could also support the 
change in narrative, as there will be a greater number of actors with a stake in high standards of 
energy efficiency, and an understanding of the value that they can bring in supporting improved 
affordability of energy. 
7.5 – A New Ideology: Ambitious Regulation for Retrofit & New-Build Home Energy 
Efficiency Standards, Backed by Affordable Finance 
The government has demonstrated a willingness to intervene in the wholesale energy market to 
deliver policy goals, such as through the introduction of the CfD and the capacity market (DECC, 
2016a, 2013d). Significant improvements in energy efficiency could begin to be fostered if this could 
be mimicked in the building sector with a move away from the current ideology which frames 
intervention through regulation as a burden on business (which led to the repeal of both the code 
for sustainable homes, and the zero-carbon homes commitment) (DCLG, 2015; HM Treasury, 2015a). 
The benefits delivered by ambitious regulations can be seen in particular in Denmark, where new-
build properties are subject to ambitious energy efficiency standards which have a clear pathway of 
tightening in the future. Although new-build properties make up a relatively small percentage of the 
housing stock, it is short-termist not to build them to the highest standards of the day.  
It was also demonstrated in Denmark how applying a principle of gradually tightening energy 
efficiency requirements for aspects of retrofitting, such as roofing, windows, doors, and walls can 
help to lift the energy efficiency levels of the existing housing stock. Applying this principle in Great 
Britain would help to ensure that where aspects of a building are changed, new components are of 
the highest standard. As well as improving standards in individual properties, this will help to 
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support development of high-efficiency building practices which can then be exploited in the new 
build sector, and support whole-house retrofit. 
The private rental sector could be used to help create a market for the developing standards of 
retrofit products. Reforming the private rental standard to feature a more ambitious energy 
efficiency target, which could either be based on a higher EPC grade, or based on minimum required 
measures such as (for example) draft-proofing, cavity wall insulation, full loft insulation, and a 
condensing boiler, would be highly supportive of affordability of energy. Although it is important to 
note that any regulation of this kind on the private rental sector may need to be accompanied by 
improved regulation on rent. It is essential that any policy which is designed to improve affordability 
of energy for domestic consumers, does not simply lead landlords to significantly increasing rents to 
compensate.  
Proposals here do not extend to imposing regulation directly upon owner-occupiers to improve 
overall standards in their properties (e.g. at the point of sale). This is on the basis that other 
measures here may be sufficient to deliver energy efficiency improvements in this sector, and 
imposing regulations on households without first allowing an understanding of the importance of 
energy efficiency measures to develop, risks backlash which may undermine the policy – as was seen 
under the consequential improvements scheme (see chapter 5). This is what Roberts (2014) 
describes as the importance of gaining meaningful public consent, rather than imposing change 
upon an unsupportive community. 
Although regulations on owner-occupiers are not proposed, other proposals will support the 
improvement of energy efficiency in this sector, taking inspiration from Denmark. In addition to 
improved access of tailored information, creating wide availability to cheap finance packages to pay 
for energy efficiency improvements, raised against the value of the home-owners’ property could 
help to address the upfront cost barrier. There is an opportunity in Great Britain for the government 
learn lessons from the failure of the Green Deal, and to create a fund to offer straightforward, low-
cost loans to able-to-pay households wishing to install energy efficiency measures. Lessons may also 
be taken from positive examples such as Germany's KfW, which offers low-cost loans to households 
at very low interest rates (Kuzemko, 2015b), and the HEEPS loan scheme in Scotland which delivers 
interest-free loans, backed by the Scottish government to households and landlords for improving 
energy efficiency standards in their properties (Scottish Government, 2016a; Energy Saving Trust, 
2015). A key factor is making interest rates on loans as low as possible, and the system to obtain 
them transparent and straightforward (as it is in Denmark). Alternative innovative financing 
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solutions such as the HEEPS equity release scheme should also be considered (Energy Saving Trust, 
2016a).  
Improved energy efficiency regulations of new-build properties and retro-fit products, alongside 
greater access to energy efficiency finance, will both support, and be supported by a change of 
narrative from ‘Affordability = Low Prices’ to ‘Affordability = High Efficiency’. The change in narrative 
will facilitate a move away from the existing anti-regulatory ideology which persists among policy-
makers, which has framed energy efficiency regulations as barriers to development. Also, the 
strengthening of energy efficiency standards for many retrofit products will help to normalise such 
standards, which could help contribute to a change in public discourse, in the way that fuel 
efficiency of cars is now often a major consideration for motorists, and so foster a new narrative of 
energy efficiency. The presence of a consumer advocate with a cross-cutting policy approach, able to 
critique not just energy policy, but building policy too, could also support the introduction of 
stronger energy efficiency regulations. Regulations could be introduced relatively quickly, 
particularly in the new build sector by reintroducing the code for sustainable homes, and zero-
carbon homes standard. 
7.6 – More Powerful Demand-Side Interests 
As set out in chapter five, the energy supply sector in Great Britain is a powerful political force, but 
this is not matched by actors who support increased levels of energy efficiency. If this balance of 
power were to shift, then higher standards of energy efficiency, and so higher standards of 
affordability, would likely follow.  
The situation in Denmark is very different to in Great Britain. A number of large firms are important 
stakeholders in the high standards of energy efficiency which are put in place in Denmark. Denmark 
has also demonstrated that energy efficiency, as well as bringing significant benefits for consumers, 
can be a significant source of economic growth in the form of large successful companies such as 
Danfoss and Velux. If Great Britain were to nurture expertise in this area, technologies could be 
exported. Many jobs could also be created, both in the development of technologies, and in energy 
efficiency installation firms - a sector that is dominated by SMEs. Both of these areas could support 
strong long-term economic growth (Cambridge Econometrics, 2012), and create additional interests 
which will support the development of ambitious energy efficiency policy. As demand side actors 
grow in economic importance, they will have more resources at their disposal to participate in 
lobbying activities, and as it becomes a more important area of economic activity, its needs are likely 
to be considered more important by policymakers.  
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The proposed change in narrative, although not a prerequisite to the development of demand-side 
interests, is likely to support the expansion of firms which operate in the energy efficiency sector. 
The understanding of these actors as essential for delivering affordable energy will also help to 
increase their political salience, and so create another group able to push back against, and 
constrain, the power of supply-side interests. The reverse is also true however; a shifting narrative 
whereby energy efficiency gains greater importance will increase the political salience of those firms 
engaged in delivering high energy efficiency standards. Allowing local authorities to become 
important stakeholders in the demand-side through delivery of energy efficiency measures will also 
help demand-side interests to be better represented. 
7.7 - Tariffs & Charging: Designed for Affordability  
Although the most effective route to delivering long-term affordability of energy in the British 
context is through improved levels of energy efficiency, there are significant opportunities for 
reform of tariffs to support affordability of energy for domestic consumers, and particularly to 
protect the fuel poor. The need for intervention in the retail market was accepted by the CMA, in its 
proposal for a temporary price cap for PPM customers (CMA, 2016c), this proposal is however 
narrow in scope – something highlighted by a member of the CMA panel, Martin Cave. He called 
instead for a temporary price cap for all SVT customers (CMA, 2016c). This solution is also limited, 
and is reliant upon OFGEM having the capacity to accurately monitor the costs suppliers face in 
order to set an appropriate level for such a cap, something it does not appear to have.  
The tariff structure of most tariffs in Great Britain are currently designed around best outcomes for 
suppliers, rather than best outcomes for consumers, and lead to higher marginal costs for low-
demand consumers, and so to a degree are supportive of higher energy use. This can undermine 
affordability particularly for those on low incomes, who may be fuel poor and often use small 
amounts of energy (CSE, 2015). The evidence in this thesis supports the principle of an alternative 
structure for all tariffs in the market, focussed not on mimicking the cost structures of suppliers, but 
on supporting access to affordable energy for all consumers, whilst rewarding greater levels of 
energy efficiency.  
7.7.1 - Tariff Reform: Rising Block Tariffs 
This thesis proposes a move away from tariffs which are designed around suppliers’ costs structures, 
in favour of tariffs which protect consumers. One possible means to achieving this, whilst helping to 
incentivise greater levels of energy efficiency, is through the introduction of a rising block tariff 
structure (CSE, 2015). There are multiple ways to set such a tariff, but these broadly involve charging 
a lower unit rate for initial units of consumption, and a higher rate for higher levels of consumption 
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(see Figure 39). This has the effect of charging lower prices to consumers with low levels of demand, 
which is heavily correlated with low incomes (CSE, 2015), and higher rates to households with high 
levels of demand which are often in higher income brackets (CSE, 2007), albeit this is not a hard and 
fast relationship. 
 
Figure 39 – Three-Tier Rising Block Tariffs, Source: Author's Own 
7.7.1.1 - The Mechanics of RBTs 
The RBT tariff structure could be based on various principles. For example, the higher blocks could 
generate revenues for supply companies in order to compensate for the low/zero revenues 
associated with low-demand blocks (something which would likely increase the acceptability by 
industry stakeholders). Alternatively, the higher demand blocks could be used to contribute more to 
environmental and social policy costs, in keeping with the 'polluter pays' principle (White and Baker, 
2008). This may present a new challenge for suppliers in setting tariffs to ensure fixed costs are fully 
recovered effectively. However, this risk is not insurmountable, having been managed by the small 
number of suppliers that offer zero-standing charge tariffs (Ebico, 2016). 
A range of different pricing structures based on the rising block principle could be put in place, with 
any number of consumption blocks, at increasing price points. It would be possible, for example, to 
require an initial block of consumption to be free, and later blocks to increase (See Figure 40). 
Alternatively, it would be possible to introduce a two-block system whereby an initial block of units 
is free, followed by a flat per-unit rate (See Figure 41) - as is the case in Flanders in Belgium (CSE, 
2015, 2007; OFGEM, 2009a). A greater number of blocks would reduce the risk of threshold effects; 
however, this need should be balanced with the need for easily understandable pricing structures. 
The design of the block structure fundamentally affects the impact that it will have on society. As 
was shown in (see chapter 3), different domestic consumers have a wide array of levels of 
consumption; the way this rising block structure interacts with those levels of consumption will 
affect who in the population faces differing levels of charges. For example, if a high-rate charge 
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began at 20,000kWh of gas, it will affect many more households than if it began at 30,000kWh of 
gas. This will have a significant impact on how consumers are affected by the change. The size of 
each blocks also has an impact. For example, if the structure in Figure 41 were employed, a large 
volume of demand in block 1 would lead to a higher priced rate in block 2, as this would be 
necessary in order for suppliers to cover their costs. Conversely, a smaller volume in block 1 would 
facilitate a lower price in block 2. However, the less volume that is in block 1, the less beneficial it 
becomes to fuel poor households.  
 
Figure 40 - Three-Tier Rising Block Tariff with Zero-Rated Block 1, Source: Author's Own 
 
 
Figure 41 - Two-Tier Rising Block Tariff with Zero-Rated Block 1, Source: Author's Own 
Rising block tariffs are present in a number of other countries. For example, in Flanders in Belgium 
households can receive a free block of energy, the size of which depends on the number of members 
of the household. Consumption above this free block is charged on a basis which resembles the 
current ‘standing charge + unit rate’ arrangement which is present in Great Britain (CSE, 2015, 2007; 
OFGEM, 2009a) – see Figure 41. RBTs are also in place in California, where they have been operated 
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for approximately 40 years (Public Utilities Commission Of California, 2015). These have been 
criticised for not producing optimal ‘economically efficient’ outcomes, instead creating a trade-off 
between economic efficiency and distributional effects (Borenstein, 2010). However, the RBTs in 
California have been shown to be an important part of relieving pressure of energy bills on low 
income households (Borenstein, 2010).  
The exact design of the RBT (i.e. number of tiers, volume within each tier, and pricing differentials) 
should not be decided without extensive examination and testing in the British context to ensure 
intended outcomes are achieved. Consideration should also be given to which elements of the tariff 
are set – ranging from prescribing all aspects of the tariff, to basic requirements for the initial block. 
Of the limited modelling of the appropriate RBT structure for Great Britain which has been done, 
initial research suggests that a market-wide requirement for an initial free block of units could be 
highly beneficial (CSE, 2015). This is because it would be simple to understand for consumers, simple 
to administer for suppliers (so helping to keep costs down), and setting it industry-wide reduces 
complexity related to targeting. CSE (2015) carried out some modelling work which suggested that a 
tariff regime where the initial 500 kWh of electricity and 1000 kWh of gas were free of charge would 
carry considerable benefits for low income and other vulnerable consumers, with very limited 
negative impact on other consumers (CSE, 2015). 
If such a charging structure were to be introduced, regular reviews of the block structure would be 
required to take account of trends in energy demand (White and Baker, 2008). The efficacy of rising 
block tariffs would be improved with time, as smart meters are deployed, which would allow 
consumers to monitor their energy demand (CSE, 2015). Although smart meters are not essential for 
RBTs as they could be incorporated into existing bill cycles (CSE, 2007; White and Baker, 2008), smart 
meters would significantly improve their utility. This is because, along with monitoring of 
consumption, smart meters would allow the charging structure to operate across different 
timescales e.g. the first units of the day are the cheapest, or cheap units are saved for use in winter. 
This is opposed to them being the first units of the month, quarter, or year (depending on the 
existing bill cycle). It has already been proposed by the CMA that the rollout of smart meters 
prioritises those households on prepayment meters (CMA, 2015f); extending this prioritisation to 
low income areas, identified in collaboration with LAs, would support the efficacy of RBTs. RBTs 
could bring particular benefits to PPM customers as it could reduce the likelihood of their being cut 
off for protracted periods, and could give them access to basic levels of energy even if smaller 
suppliers continued not to offer PPM tariffs. 
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It is highly unlikely that RBTs would be introduced by suppliers in Great Britain without specific 
regulation to introduce such pricing strategies. Prior to the RMR, both rising and falling block tariffs 
were permitted, however only falling block tariffs existed (Hills, 2012). Any suppliers introducing an 
RBT on an individual basis may find that it would be favoured only by engaged low-demand 
consumers, with engaged high-demand consumers preferring tariffs without a rising-block structure 
(CSE, 2008). This would mean that these tariffs would soon become uneconomical for suppliers to 
offer (Owen and Ward, 2010). Other factors which may discourage suppliers from independently 
introducing RBTs include uncertainty of cost recovery for suppliers because RBTs do not reflect the 
way suppliers experience costs (CSE, 2008), potential technical challenges regarding metering (CSE, 
2015), and the administrative burden of managing the tariffs (CSE, 2015).  
Although tariff reform appears to be necessary to support affordability of energy, it would be 
important not to regulate RBTs so closely that innovation and competition are restricted. Any 
prescribed tariff structure should not interfere with the changing role of some consumers in the 
future of the energy system. Increasingly, some consumers wish to participate directly in the energy 
system by means of selling power from solar panels, or offering flexibility services from batteries to 
help balance the grid (Hoggett, 2016). These opportunities for innovation should be supported, 
potentially through a separate payment mechanism, as is currently the case with domestic FiT 
customers.  
Moving away from a pricing structure which broadly reflects the way costs are incurred by suppliers 
implies a departure from fundamentals of competitive market design. Therefore, the introduction of 
an RBT structure would be more likely if a shift in narrative took place whereby affordability was no-
longer principally achieved through the facilitation of competitive retail markets, reliant upon cost-
reflective market signals. 
7.7.1.2 - Minimising Negative Impacts on Consumers 
It is essential that general affordability is not undermined by pursuit of a tariff structure which is 
likely to benefit fuel poor households in particular. Any reductions in welfare, in addition to the 
social implications, could carry political implications which could undermine progress towards more 
progressive tariff structures. The design of the structure should take into consideration the current 
context of households, to minimise the risk of significant bill increases for large proportions of the 
population – most of whom are on SVTs (CMA, 2015j). As set out above, this may be achieved by 
modelling impacts of the tariff structure in relation to the existing distribution of consumption levels. 
There are likely to be a number of households which currently have relatively high bills (as a 
combination of a high-priced SVT and/or a very inefficient property), yet not high levels of income. 
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Although these households would be supported by proposed changes in energy efficiency policy, the 
effects of such policy will take time to disseminate through the population. It is important that 
households are not harmed by changes in tariff policy whilst awaiting energy efficiency 
improvements. This is likely to affect both the design of the new tariff arrangements, and the timing 
of its introduction alongside other policy changes. 
Although no policy can be put in place which absolutely guarantees no negative consequences, there 
are a number of steps that can be taken to maximise value, and minimise risk for consumers. Firstly, 
consideration should be given to if the same rising block structure is appropriate for all households, 
or if for example, electrically heated homes should be subject to a different block structure to those 
households whose consumption is spread across other fuels. The principle of this consideration of 
circumstances is demonstrated in Flanders in Belgium where larger households receive a larger block 
of free energy (OFGEM, 2009a). This suggests an element of targeting may be beneficial, however as 
set out elsewhere, targeting is something which suppliers are not well equipped to deliver 
effectively. As with all policies designed to improve welfare, a balance should be struck between 
simple wide targeting and complex narrow targeting, with consideration of the impact of tariff 
complexity for consumers. 
In addition to the careful design of RBTs, other policy proposals in this thesis would help minimise 
the risk of negative impacts. The restrictions in breadth between highest and lowest tariffs is likely to 
have a flattening effect on the range of tariffs, which will lead to reduced tariffs for SVT consumers 
and the proposed removal of VAT, and environmental and social policy costs from bills would also 
help to reduce bills across the board (set out below). The delivery of energy efficiency measures by 
local authorities is also important, as more effective energy efficiency policy will help households to 
reduce their cost of warmth. It would even be possible, for example, for local authorities to tailor 
their marketing efforts regarding the benefits of energy efficiency to households which may be 
considered at risk of losing out from a new tariff regime.   
Overall, the introduction of RBTs is not without challenges, such as the risk of negative impacts on 
some consumers. However, there are clear social benefits to redesigning tariffs to facilitate access to 
basic levels of energy consumption. The proposed changes should not be introduced without careful 
and regular examination of the tariff design to ensure that it does not undermine levels of general 
affordability. It is also important that this policy is not implemented in isolation, but alongside the 
other policies proposed in this thesis. If, following the modelling of the likely impacts, RBTs are not 
deemed appropriate, then alternative arrangements for designing a new retail market regime which 
is supportive of access to energy for fuel poor consumers should be investigated. Access to energy is 
essential for maintaining a healthy living environment (Harrington et al., 2005; Stockton and 
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Campbell, 2011) – a fact which should form be the basis of retail market design. Therefore, tariffs 
should be designed around delivering what is best for consumers, not based on what is best for 
suppliers (mimicking their cost structures). RBTs would take time to introduce because it would be 
essential to properly model and test the design before widespread introduction. Their introduction 
would be more likely if other proposals set out in this thesis also came to pass, for example, the 
acceptance of a need for government to take a more interventionist approach through the 
introduction of stronger building regulations (see above), could bring with it an acceptance of the 
need to intervene in the retail energy market to better protect consumers.  
7.7.2 – Limited Breadth of Tariffs 
In addition to the introduction of RBTs, the introduction of a maximum price differential between a 
suppliers’ highest price tariff, and lowest price tariff would further help to protect those consumers 
which do not engage in the market (CSE, 2015), and would help to reduce the strength of the 
incentive for suppliers to discourage unengaged consumers from engaging in the market. It should 
be set at an appropriate level to ensure that whilst there remains an incentive for engaging in the 
energy market, in that cost savings may still be realised from shopping around, the degree to which 
unengaged consumers subsidise the bills of engaged consumers is significantly reduced. The effect 
of introducing this policy would likely be a compression of tariffs, with the cheapest tariffs becoming 
more expensive, and the most expensive tariffs becoming cheaper. This would mean that income-
focussed energy policies could provide greater relief because they are often focussed on low-income 
households, who are frequently on the most expensive tariffs owing to being unengaged with the 
energy market. This could be relatively quickly introduced, with reference to the longest fixed-price 
tariffs active in the market. 
7.7.3 – VAT and Environmental and Social Policy Charges in Energy Bills 
Although the level of VAT on energy bills in Great Britain is low by international standards, the 
charging of VAT on energy bills frames energy as a non-staple item. Moving to a zero-rate of VAT on 
energy would be more consistent with charging on other staple items. It may be argued that there is 
a level of consumption above which energy stops being an essential item, and becomes a luxury. 
Therefore, if a RBT tariff structure were to be introduced, it may be possible to apply VAT only to 
higher bands of consumption to reflect this difference between staple and luxury consumption. 
Although there may be practical challenges introducing a reduced rate of VAT owing to the EU VAT 
directive preventing reductions below 5% (EU, 2006), the long-term impact of this directive is 
unclear however owed to the  vote for the UK to leave the EU. If affordability of energy were to be 
considered a suitably significant issue this could become a focus of negotiation with the EU, however 
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its introduction would be entirely contingent upon the Brexit negotiations. It is likely that lost VAT 
revenue would have to be recovered from elsewhere in taxation however. 
Levying environmental and social policy charges from energy bills is a highly regressive funding 
regime. It would be considerably more progressive to raise the funds from general taxation. 
Alternatively, as set out above, if a RBT tariff structure were introduced, these charges could be 
levied for higher levels of consumption, this would be consistent with the 'polluter pays' principle 
(White and Baker, 2008). 
7.8 – Price Comparison Websites 
The proposals of the CMA (2016) to remove the requirement for PCWs to show the whole of the 
market, and allow them to host exclusive tariffs are beneficial to both PCWs and suppliers, but they 
will not benefit consumers. These proposals will require an even greater level of engagement, and 
will by their nature only be accessible to consumers with internet access. This creates a barrier to 
accessing the lowest prices, and particularly excludes a number of poor or vulnerable households 
(OFGEM, 2013c). Of all the proposals set out in this chapter, this could be introduced most quickly, 
by means of not introducing the proposals of the CMA relating to PCWs. 
7.9 - Expanding Institutional Capacity 
It is not clear that OFGEM or BEIS have sufficient institutional capacity to deliver affordable energy 
for domestic consumers. As set out in previous chapters, BEIS has made significant errors in the 
design of energy efficiency policy, and OFGEM is not able to effectively monitor trades in the market, 
or supplier costs and profits, or sufficiently critique the plans of network companies. The benefits of 
strong capacity building for policymaking institutions is set out in chapter 6, as it enables the Danish 
government to have an equal relationship with companies in the energy sector, which would not be 
possible if there were a significant imbalance of information or understanding (something consistent 
with Soskice and Hall (2001)’s definition of Denmark as a Co-ordinated Market Economy). This 
demonstrates the significantly different outcomes which can come from policy-making institutions 
which have a high degree of institutional capacity.  
Steps may be taken to increase institutional capacity. Granting OFGEM greater powers to carry out a 
short-notice detailed audit of an energy suppliers’ trading and pricing activities would help ensure 
that that the prices charged to customers are reflective of the wholesale costs faced by the supplier. 
With regard to the regulated returns of network companies, OFGEM suffers a significant asymmetry 
of information regarding the necessary investment in energy networks. It is essential that it begins to 
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develop its understanding of this area either by training existing staff, or hiring new staff, with a 
greater understanding of the construction and operation of network assets.  
BEIS’s institutional capacity may also be expanded, for example through cultivating mechanisms to 
support policy learning, so to avoid repeating mistakes of the past. Institutional capacity should also 
be developed to interrogate policies to understand how a profit optimising firm may react, so that 
issues such as the widespread deployment of CFLs, and the subsidising of engaged consumers who 
switch by those who do not, are avoided.  
If the government as a whole were to develop greater cross-departmental policy collaboration, this 
could support more coherent, ‘joined-up’, policy development. This would help to reduce issues 
such as those relating to the winter fuel payment subsidising energy suppliers via elderly households 
on high tariffs.  
Other proposals set out in this chapter support the development of institutional capacity among 
policymakers. Firstly, the creation of a new consumer advocate, operating as a ‘critical friend’, will 
support policymakers to avoid pitfalls. A change in narrative away from market mechanisms as the 
primary route to delivery of affordability could help to weaken other aspects of the pro-market 
ideology – such as that which led to the decision to reduce the capacity of government, instead 
allowing expertise to lie with private market actors (Kuzemko, 2015a). 
7.10 - Policy Stability 
As was set out in chapter five, a lack of policy stability in Great Britain creates a significant challenge 
to improving energy efficiency in the domestic sector. This issue is significantly reduced in Denmark 
through the taking of a long-term perspective whereby policies and objectives are set over long 
periods of time with clear end-goal. For example, the commitment to be entirely independent of 
fossil fuels by 2050 (Danish Government, 2011) gives a clear direction to policy-making. This gives 
firms a high degree of investor certainty - any investments that are not conducive to supporting or 
surviving in a future with a decreasing role for fossil fuels are less likely to be successful. The 
ambitious nature of this target is also significant, not only does it indicate general intension, but 
indicates a high level of commitment, setting out the intended velocity to that policy direction.  
Such long-term policy making is however only possible in Denmark owing to the presence of three 
things: 
• Cross-party consensus-building, which is born of a proportional representation voting 
system, this makes multi-party coalitions commonplace (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2003), 
creating an atmosphere in politics where parties are forced to work together. This means 
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when governments change, multiple parties have been involved in setting policies meaning 
there is less disturbance than in the British political system (Lockwood et al., 2016).  
• The mature relationship between the government and the private sector. Targets and 
policies are negotiated between firms and the government; this gives firms ownership of 
policies that are put in place, meaning the amount of pressure to get such policies changed 
is lessened. This is contingent upon policymakers having a high degree of institutional 
capacity to understand the industry.  
• Large firms have significant vested interests in ambitious energy efficiency policy, and so 
leverage their power in favour of continuing high standards.  
With little pressure from either change in government, or from interest groups within industry, a 
level of policy stability is created that allows policies to be made over the long term, giving firms the 
confidence to invest. Reducing policy uncertainty in this way could bring significant benefits to Great 
Britain, where policy uncertainty is noted as having a significant negative impact on firms in the 
energy sector (Watson et al., 2014).  
The value of developing greater institutional capacity and supporting of demand-side interests has 
already been set out, therefore the long-term recommendation for Great Britain based on this 
finding is to make a change in the electoral system to support a greater level of consensus politics, 
which is an essential ingredient for long-term policy making. Although a proportionally 
representative voting system is not a prerequisite to cross-party collaboration (as was demonstrated 
by the Climate Change Act (HMG, 2008)), it is highly supportive of it and therefore should be 
considered. If the building of cross-party consensus can begin without elective reform, then this too 
should be pursued, for example through the creation of the CEPC of the IGov framework (Mitchell et 
al., 2016). A proportional representative voting system would likely take many years to introduce, 
and would take even longer to truly ‘bed in’ because competencies for collaboration within British 
political parties are yet to develop, whereas Denmark has a long tradition of political collaboration. 
However, the level of policy stability it could generate, with the potential to reduce risk and 
significantly increase investment in the energy efficiency sector (and other sectors), would be likely 
to justify such a lengthy and difficult process. 
7.11 - Conclusion 
This section has drawn on the policy and academic literature reviewed towards the beginning of the 
thesis, and on primary data collected in Great Britain and Denmark and demonstrates that there is 
much that may be altered in the governance structure to support affordability of energy in the 
domestic sector in Great Britain. The most significant change is that of narrative, which has 
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previously led to a narrow focus on affordability as limited to minimising short-term prices, and 
promoting a freely operating retail market based on cost-reflecting pricing structures. In the British 
context of low energy efficiency standards, one of the greatest opportunities to improve 
affordability of energy lies in improved energy efficiency, therefore a new narrative of 'affordability = 
high efficiency' is likely to be more beneficial. 
As set out at the beginning of this chapter, although none of the recommendations in this chapter 
are wholly reliant upon one another, the change in narrative would have a supporting effect on a 
number of other proposals, and vice-versa:  
• An ‘affordability = high efficiency’ narrative would make the development of an ideology 
supporting increased use of regulation for new build and private rental properties more 
likely. Conversely, the introduction of such regulations would allow both policy-makers and 
consumers to begin to see the value to affordability of stronger energy efficiency standards, 
helping to put pressure on the existing narrative. The acceptance of the need for a more 
interventionist approach in this way to deliver better outcomes for consumers could lead to 
similar thinking with regard to the retail market, and vice-versa.  
• The reassignment to local authorities of responsibility for energy efficiency deployment to 
the fuel poor, which could also support them becoming facilitators of energy efficiency to 
able-to-pay households, would be more likely to be introduced under the new narrative. 
Also, a new narrative with a greater focus on affordability through energy efficiency, and less 
focussed on competitive pressure on prices, would make exploration of new and innovative 
routes of energy efficiency deployment, more likely. 
• A more powerful demand-side lobby, particularly among energy efficiency firms, could lobby 
government to place more focus on energy efficiency measures as a route to delivering 
affordability of energy. Equally, if energy efficiency were a central part of the government’s 
approach to delivering affordability of energy, the firms involved in delivery of energy 
efficiency would carry greater political salience. The new position of local authorities as 
stakeholders in the demand-side would also be supportive of this change. 
• A stronger consumer advocate could put pressure on the government to place energy 
efficiency at the centre of policy for affordability of energy, so developing a change in 
narrative. Similarly, a departure from the narrative which suggests that consumers are best 
served by competitive retail markets, creates space for the idea of the need for greater 
consumer protection through a stronger consumer representative.  
There are likely to be secondary effects from the changed narrative as well:  
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• The weakening of neoliberal principles such as this also means that policymakers may be 
more willing to bring greater capacity into government, and be less reliant upon private 
actors 
• A reduced focus on cost-reflective pricing structures, in favour of energy efficiency, also 
paves the way for development of new tariff structures such as RBTs.   
Each of these is summarised in Figure 42 below: 
 
  
Figure 42 - Relationship between new narrative and other proposed solutions, Source: Author's Own 
Very few of the solutions proposed in this chapter would be quick to implement. Some, such as the 
maximum differential between a supplier’s cheapest and most expensive tariff, and reversing the 
proposal to allow price comparison sites to show only part of the market, could be introduced 
relatively quickly, as could removing environmental and social policy costs from bills. The 
introduction of rising block tariffs could be achieved as soon as the relevant research was carried out 
to determine appropriate divisions in blocks of consumption. However, other proposals such as 
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cultivating institutional capacity, fostering a new narrative, and electoral reform, could take many 
years to complete.  
Complete replication of the Danish energy sector in its entirety in Great Britain is not likely to be 
viable. For example, Denmark’s reliance on district heat networks delivering low-cost, high efficiency 
heat would be prohibitively expensive to replicate, the use of energy taxes as an incentive for energy 
efficiency would drive more households into fuel poverty, and the fact that many energy suppliers 
are owned as cooperatives of users, which helps to reduce conflicts of interests, stems from a 
unique history of cooperative ownership of many key industries in Denmark, which does not exist in 
Great Britain. However, the lessons from the Danish governance structure set out in this chapter are 
all considered broadly viable for introduction in the British context, given enough time, if they 
occurred alongside the other proposed changes.  
Overall it has been demonstrated that there are a number of issues with the current governance 
structure in the energy sector in Great Britain, and this has a significant negative effect on 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers. However, there are a number of viable changes to 
the governance structure which may be introduced in order to address many of the current issues. 
The proposals set out here place the interests of consumers at the centre of the governance 
structure, and demonstrate that a reformed governance structure could produce very different 
outcomes, through which affordability of energy for domestic consumers could be significantly 
improved. 
The following chapter will go on to discuss how these proposals align with the research questions 
that this thesis investigates, as well as setting out their place in the existing literature, so to highlight 
contributions to knowledge that have been made. The proposals here also shed light on useful 
future avenues for further research, so these too will be examined.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
8.1 - Introduction 
This thesis set out to understand the impacts that the governance structure of the energy system 
has on affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain, and how governance may be 
changed to improve affordability. This section summarises and concludes the research that was 
undertaken. An overview of the background to the research is given, followed by responses to each 
of the research questions. The contributions to knowledge are identified, and limitations to the 
research are then examined alongside future avenues of possible study. Finally closing remarks are 
given. 
8.2 - Background to the Research 
Affordability of energy has significant political, social, and system design implications. Affordability 
of energy is defined in this thesis as a product of three interrelated factors - level of household 
income, level of energy bills (which are a product of unit prices and levels of energy demand, 
mediated by tariffs and the retail market) and the amount of energy that a household needs to 
maintain a healthy living environment. However, the factors which are most relevant to the energy 
policy of affordability are energy bills, and energy efficiency, both of which are considered in the 
context of household income. This thesis examined the impact that energy governance has on each 
of these factors of affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain, and the 
implications for energy policy. The energy governance structure in Denmark was also analysed, in 
order to draw lessons from an energy system with high levels of affordability, backed by high 
standards of energy efficiency (IEA, 2011). 
Following a review of the affordability and governance, policy literatures were examined to set out 
the governance affecting the different costs contained within domestic electricity and gas bills in 
Great Britain. This was followed by a study of the drivers of domestic energy demand, and a review 
of the governance affecting different policies that exist in Great Britain to support domestic energy 
efficiency. The methodology which supported the gathering of primary data was then set out, 
followed by analysis of the interview data collected pertaining to both Great Britain and Denmark. 
Finally, findings were discussed in reference to the literature, and policy proposals were developed 
to support a transition to a more affordable energy system.  
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8.3 - Answering the Research Questions 
Although there is much which is understood about affordability, fuel poverty, costs in the bill, and 
the barriers to deployment of energy efficiency, there is currently a significant gap in the literature 
that brings these factors together and examines the impact of governance on affordability of energy 
in the domestic sector in Great Britain. The research questions that this thesis examined to address 
this gap were: 
1. Are current governance arrangements regarding pricing and tariffs supportive of affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
2. Are current governance arrangements regarding domestic energy-efficiency supportive of 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
3. What lessons may be learned from the Danish system of energy governance which may be 
beneficial to affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
4. How might the governance structure in Great Britain be reformed to improve affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers? 
In order to set out how this thesis responds to these questions a brief summary of how the results 
relate to each of these questions will be addressed in turn. 
1. Are current governance arrangements regarding pricing and tariffs supportive of affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
This thesis has identified a number of fundamental issues with the governance structure relating to 
pricing and tariffs which undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain. 
A Damaging Narrative 
A fundamental issue facing affordability of energy in Great Britain is the narrative of 'affordability = 
low prices'. This narrow understanding of affordability not only channels the policy solutions that are 
put in place, but also serves to crowd out other narratives which may be more beneficial to 
improving the affordability of energy. This 'affordability = low prices' narrative is beneficial for 
policy-makers because it is easy to communicate, and allows policymakers to work within a narrow 
policy area, delivering low cost policies. It also supports policies which may be achieved within the 
electoral timetable, are coherent with the long-standing supply-side approach to policy-making, and 
can be used to support political projects in other areas – e.g. development of new nuclear power 
and fracking. A central part of the ‘affordability = low prices’ narrative is that low prices are best 
achieved through facilitating a competitive retail market with which consumers engage with. This 
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means that engagement in the market through switching becomes a prerequisite to accessing the 
lowest prices, resulting in a partial passing of responsibility for accessing affordable energy to the 
consumer. This is particularly detrimental for those who are unengaged in the energy market who 
can pay in excess of £300 more a year for energy than their engaged counterparts (CMA, 2015b), a 
significant number of whom are on low-incomes, the elderly, or those who are otherwise vulnerable 
(OFGEM et al., 2014). This straddles research questions one and two as focus on prices directs action 
away from energy efficiency. 
Insufficient Consumer Representation 
It has been demonstrated that consumers are under-represented in the governance structure of the 
energy system in Great Britain, and this has a negative impact on both general affordability, and fuel 
poverty. Twenty-five years after the release of Professor Brenda Boardman’s first book defining the 
concept of fuel poverty (Boardman, 1991), in spite of the constant presence of a consumer advocacy 
body, the creation of new institutions such as the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, and the changing of 
the primary duty of OFGEM in 2000 to that of protecting the interests of consumers (HMG, 2000a), 
most recent figures available at time of writing show millions of households continuing to face fuel 
poverty (DECC, 2015a). 
It appears that there is no single body with broad oversight of long-term affordability, or the 
institutional capacity to put pressure on the government and OFGEM to ensure that it is built into 
the system in a holistic sense. This issue straddles both Research Question One, and Research 
Question Two – in that this lack of representation has facilitated both pricing, and limited action on 
energy efficiency. 
Retail Markets, Tariffs & Charges 
Regulations affecting tariffs and charges currently undermine affordability of energy for domestic 
consumers and is designed around the needs of suppliers, rather than the needs of consumers. Tariff 
structures reward higher levels of demand, something associated with high income households (CSE, 
2015). This is likely to worsen with the removal of a number of the RMR regulations meaning that 
falling block tariffs may now be reintroduced in the market. Low-priced tariffs may also now be 
offered exclusively to new consumers, forcing customers to engage more fully in the market to 
access the lowest prices. Changes to the regulations affecting price comparison websites will lead to 
reduced transparency in the retail market owing to there no longer being required to show the 
whole of the market, and being allowed to offer exclusive deals. This limits opportunities for those 
who are unable to use the internet to access the best deals. In addition, the charging of VAT, and 
224 
 
levying social and environmental policy charges on all units of energy consumption is highly 
regressive.  
Despite over fifteen years of full retail competition, the retail market is not functioning effectively. 
There are a significant number of unengaged consumers on high-priced standard variable tariffs 
subsidising those that are on lower-priced fixed tariffs. This has a negative impact on affordability 
because it means large numbers of consumers are paying high prices, many of whom are likely to be 
on a low income or otherwise vulnerable. There is also an inherent conflict in that consumer 
engagement is relied upon to drive competition in the retail market, but it is in suppliers’ financial 
interests to discourage their customers from engaging. Also, a well-functioning retail market is relied 
upon to provide suppliers with an incentive to pass through cost savings such as from falling 
wholesale markets. However, without that there is limited pressure on them to do so – this 
undermines affordability of energy for domestic consumers. 
Wholesale Transparency & Institutional Capacity 
Affordability is significantly undermined by a lack of institutional capacity, particularly within 
OFGEM. The private nature of PPAs and OTC trades in the wholesale market means that OFGEM is 
unable to monitor the majority of the trading activity which takes place, leaving the regulator unable 
to ensure that reductions in wholesale costs are passed through to end consumers. Competitive 
pressure from the retail market would usually be relied upon to encourage suppliers to pass through 
costs savings, however as set out above, there is a high level of unengagement in the energy retail 
market. Without this competitive pressure, and with OFGEM unable to examine trading behaviour, 
there is little to ensure that suppliers pass cost savings on to consumers – with potentially significant 
negative implications for affordability of energy for domestic consumers.  
In addition to issues in the wholesale market, it is also not clear that OFGEM has sufficient capacity 
to accurately monitor the costs faced and profits made by suppliers in order to ensure pricing is fair 
to consumers. Furthermore, the high levels of returns realisable by network companies suggests that 
they are able to leverage the asymmetry of information between themselves and OFGEM (who sets 
their regulated returns). This leads to inefficiently high network costs, which in turn leads to higher 
prices for consumers – undermining affordability of energy. 
 
Overall 
The presence of a damaging narrative, insufficient consumer representation, arrangement of retail 
markets, tariffs, and charging, and issues relating to the wholesale markets and OFGEM’s lack of 
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institutional capacity demonstrate that on balance the current governance structure relating to 
pricing and tariffs is not supportive of affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great 
Britain.  However, these do present significant opportunities for improvement. 
2. Are current governance arrangements regarding domestic energy-efficiency supportive of 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
This thesis has identified a number of fundamental issues with the governance structure relating to 
domestic energy efficiency which undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great 
Britain. 
A damaging narrative: Affordability = Low Prices 
The presence of a narrative focussed on affordability of energy for domestic consumers delivered 
through promotion of low prices based on market mechanisms undermines progress on energy 
efficiency. This is because a focus on prices directs action away from energy efficiency. This straddles 
research questions one and two. 
Suppliers’ Responsibility for Energy Efficiency 
Energy efficiency policy inevitably reduces the market for supply of energy. Therefore, it is not in 
suppliers’ inherent interests for energy efficiency policies to be successful or ambitious. In spite of 
this, suppliers are chosen as the conduit for delivery of energy efficiency measures. This means the 
only motivation that suppliers have for meeting the obligation is the threat of sizeable sanctions for 
failing to meet their obligations. These fines, whilst helping to ensure compliance, have the potential 
to be harmful to domestic consumers if passed on through consumers’ bills. Although threat of these 
fines may drive suppliers to deliver measures, this does not mean they will support stronger targets 
or strive to maximise societal good, simply to deliver the very minimum number of measures 
necessary to avoid sanctions. It is also not clear that suppliers have sufficient institutional capacity to 
deliver measures to those who need them most. Finally, the involvement of energy suppliers in the 
delivery of energy efficiency measures appears to limit the development of successful policy because 
it gives them political power over the development of policies which are against their interests to be 
successful.  
Anti-Regulatory Ideology 
It appears that an anti-regulatory ideology has led to weak energy efficiency standards for the 
private rental and new-build sectors. Both of these sectors are affected by the ‘principal-agent 
problem’. The private rental sector is of particular importance because this tenure has some of the 
lowest standard of properties, thermally speaking. The new-build sector should also be targeted 
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because it is significantly more cost-effective to construct a property to a high standard, than to 
retrofit additional measures later in the property’s life.  
Lack of Demand-Side Influence 
It is evident that those with an interest in greater deployment of energy efficiency measures are not 
able drive this agenda forward effectively. The interests of the supply-side are supported by 
suppliers and generators who are able to act as a coordinated group, whereas demand-side interests 
are made up of a large number of different institutions from different industries, with less clearly 
aligned goals. This is exacerbated by a prevailing supply-side bias in policymaking, and contributes to 
the limited level of support for ambitious energy efficiency policy among policymakers.  
Insufficient Consumer Representation 
It is evident that consumers are under-represented in the governance structure of the energy system 
in Great Britain, and this results in a lack of action on affordability, particularly relating to fuel 
poverty. There is no single body with oversight of long-term affordability, or which is able to hold the 
represent consumers’ needs effectively. This issue straddles both Research Question Two and 
Research Question One – in that this lack of representation has led to both limited action on energy 
efficiency, and regressive pricing structures. 
Institutional Capacity 
It is evident that affordability is significantly undermined by a lack of institutional capacity, 
particularly within BEIS. It is not clear that BEIS has the capacity to design effective energy efficiency 
policy, as evidenced by the shortcomings of the ECO and CERT, and the significant failings of the 
Green Deal. This is particularly problematic for future supplier obligations as a mechanism for 
delivering energy efficiency. If policymakers misalign policy design with optimal social outcomes, as 
occurred with regard to CFLs and loft insulation, this can have a negative impact on affordability.  
Overall 
It is evident that the current governance arrangements affecting domestic energy efficiency are, on 
balance, not supportive to affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain. Suppliers’ 
reasonability for energy efficiency, a damaging narrative, an anti-regulatory ideology, a lack of 
demand-side coordination, insufficient consumer representation, and limited institutional capacity 
within BEIS come together to undermine progress on energy efficiency in the domestic sector. 
Although there are some areas such as appliance regulations which are supportive of affordability, 
such policies are the exception rather than the rule. The shortcomings in the governance structure 
do however present a number of opportunities for improvement. 
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3. What lessons may be learned from the Danish system of energy governance which may be 
beneficial to affordability of energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain? 
There are a number of features of the Danish system of energy governance which would be 
beneficial if they could be emulated in Great Britain. Some of these features such as the need for 
strong building standards are highlighted by other research questions. 
Energy Efficiency as a Pillar for Economic Growth 
Denmark has also demonstrated that energy efficiency, as well as bringing significant benefits for 
consumers, can be a significant source of economic growth in the form of large successful companies 
such as Danfoss and Velux. If policymakers in Great Britain were to understand this value, and 
nurture expertise in this area, technologies could be exported, and jobs could be created, both 
among energy efficiency technology companies, and installation firms - a sector dominated by SMEs. 
Both of these could support strong long term economic growth (Cambridge Econometrics, 2012). 
This would create significant economic interests in, and so giving additional political salience to, 
institutions which are supportive of high energy efficiency standards. 
Long-Term Policy Stability 
At the heart of energy policy-making in Denmark is the long-term perspective that is taken. Policies 
and goals are set over long periods of time, and are set out clearly. This is possible because of the 
presence of three things. The first is the cross-party consensus which in part grows out of a 
proportional representation voting system – this produces a multi-party system of coalitions which 
necessitate creating cross-party consensus around policies. The second is the mature relationship 
between the government and companies in the energy sector. Many targets and policies are 
negotiated between the firms and the government; this gives firms ownership of policies that are 
put in place, meaning the amount of pressure to get such policies changed is lessened. Thirdly, large 
firms such as Velux and Danfoss have significant vested interests in ambitious energy efficiency 
policy, and so leverage their power in favour of continuing high standards. 
In addition to greater institutional capacity and fostering a more powerful demand-side, significant 
benefits could be gained in Great Britain from supporting the forming of cross-party consensuses 
around energy policy. This may necessitate changes in the electoral system to one which paves the 
way for a greater level of consensus, such as proportional representation, or through the 
development of a new institution to support the building of consensus, such as the CEPC in the IGov 
Framework (Mitchell et al., 2016). Creating stability in this way could bring significant benefits to 
Britain, where such uncertainty is noted as having a significant negative impact on firms in the 
energy sector (Watson et al., 2014). This could support firms to develop innovative business 
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practices which could deliver significant financial savings to consumers in the long term (See: 
National Infrastructure Commission, 2016). 
Ideology supporting Energy Efficiency Regulation, Backed by Finance and Information 
High standards of energy efficiency retrofitting are commonplace in Denmark owing to an ideology 
which is supportive of the use of strong regulations. These are backed by a widely-available, low-
cost, familiar mechanism of finance to pay for energy efficiency improvements (Nykredit, 2015a). 
This is supported by measures to reduce informational barriers to successful retrofit through its 
online 'case-bank' and 'Bedre Bolig' advisors (Danish Energy Agency, 2014c). If the interventionist 
ideology present in the wholesale market in Great Britain could be brought into the domestic sector, 
a similar package of regulation and affordable finance backed by readily available information could 
be introduced in Great Britain. This would be highly beneficial to affordability of energy if it were 
widely deployed across Great Britain (taking inspiration from the KfW in Germany and the HEEPS 
Loan scheme available in Scotland). Information could be delivered through local authorities, as part 
of their new role as facilitators of energy efficiency. 
Valuing the Demand-Side 
Finally, one of the most important factors in the Danish governance structure which supports 
affordability is a high degree of commitment to energy efficiency from policy-makers. Since the oil 
shocks of the 1970s, energy efficiency has lain at the heart of energy-policy in Denmark. This has 
created an environment of knowledgeable policy-makers, and businesses that have built themselves 
on strong regulations. If a similarly meaningful commitment to energy efficiency could be cultivated 
among the policy-makers in Great Britain, replacing the bias for supply-side policymaking, much 
could be achieved to support affordability. This relates closely to the need to change the narrative 
from that of a price focus, to one which focuses on high levels of energy efficiency (discussed below). 
Overall 
There is much that can be learned from Denmark which would be beneficial to affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers in Great Britain. This thesis has demonstrated that standards of 
affordability of energy in Denmark are high, and that this is large part may be attributed to a 
governance structure which is supportive of high standards of energy efficiency in the domestic 
sector. There are many lessons that may be learned from studying the Danish governance structure, 
these include the creation of long-term policy stability; and ideology supporting the use of regulation 
backed by affordable finance and clear information; the understanding that energy efficiency can 
deliver economic growth delivering political salience to demand-side institutions; and a strong 
governmental commitment to energy efficiency as part of demand-focussed policymaking. 
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4. How might the governance structure in Great Britain be reformed to improve affordability of 
energy for domestic consumers? 
In addition to the lessons that can be taken from Denmark, the research has highlighted a number of 
other reforms to the governance structure in Great Britain which could significantly improve 
affordability of energy for domestic consumers.  
A New Narrative 
The replacing the 'affordability = low-prices' narrative with 'affordability = high efficiency', focussing 
on high standards of end-use efficiency, would be highly supportive of affordability. This new 
narrative acknowledges energy as fundamentally unique, and not as a 'normal good'. This framing 
would create opportunities for nuanced energy debate, in which demand-side actors have a greater 
role. The understanding of these actors as essential for delivering affordable energy will help to 
increase their political salience, whilst helping to constrain the power of supply-side interests. This 
greater policy emphasis on energy efficiency could also lead to increased understanding of its 
importance by the general public, helping to reduce some of the barriers to take-up. Such a solution 
does not imply that levels of unit prices are not important, but that replacing the current narrative of 
‘affordability = low prices’ to one of 'affordability = high efficiency' would support policies which 
more effectively reflect the context of the energy sector in Great Britain.  
Reformed Retail Markets, Tariffs & Charging 
Tariffs should also be reformed to reflect best value for consumers, rather than suppliers. This could 
be effectively achieved through changes to the tariff rules such as the introduction of a market-wide 
regulation requiring rising block tariffs, which as well as improving access, also incentivises lower 
levels of demand. Removing VAT (if possible following the UK’s departure from the EU) and 
environmental and social policy charges from bills entirely, or only charging them on higher levels of 
consumption, would be considerably more progressive. Price regulation should also be introduced 
alongside RBTs to dictate the maximum breadth between the most expensive tariff and cheapest 
tariff that a supplier offers. This will limit the extent to which consumers who do not switch subsidise 
those who do. Rules affecting price comparison websites should also be altered to ensure they show 
the whole of the market, and do not host exclusive tariffs – so to improve transparency and not to 
create additional barriers to switching. 
A New Consumer Representative 
This thesis has shown that there is a lack of well-resourced consumer representation in the energy 
sector in Great Britain. In spite of OFGEM's primary duty to protect the interest of consumers, and a 
number of consumer advocate organisations being present in the energy sector, the interests of 
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consumers remain under-represented. This could be remedied with the creation of a new institution 
with a deep understanding of the energy industry, better able to offer policy critique and help 
ensure that policies are written that will serve the best interests of consumers. It should have a 
broad remit, including areas of policy that lie outside BEIS’s responsibilities but which have a direct 
impact on affordability of energy, such as building regulations. The new institution, along with local 
authorities and a growing energy efficiency sector, could also begin to act as a counterbalance to the 
power of institutions which can be obstructive to improvements in affordability, such as some 
energy suppliers and the National Landlords Association. This will allow consumer protection to 
become a central pursuit of policy-making, beyond the limiting belief that the interests of consumers 
are necessarily best served through efficiently operating markets. 
Local Authorities to Deliver Energy Efficiency 
Passing the responsibility of overseeing deployment of energy efficiency measures from energy 
suppliers to local authorities is likely to be supportive of better deployment. Local authorities are 
well positioned to become facilitators of energy efficiency deployment – both to offer direct support 
to fuel poor households, and offering information to households that do not qualify for direct 
support. This is due to their deep understanding of their regions, high levels of trust from 
consumers, opportunities for forming partnerships with other organisation such as charities, and 
collaborating with other local authorities to improve delivery. Local authorities should be given the 
freedom and resources to maximise deployment of measures in whichever way is most appropriate 
for their region.  
More Interventionist Ideology  
Fostering a new, more interventionist ideology is proposed, as this would support deliver of tighter 
energy efficiency regulations in the private rental and new-build sectors. This would also increase 
the likelihood of development of the proposed rising block tariff structure. In future regulation 
should focus more on outcomes for consumers, than on an anti-interventionist, pro-market 
approach to policymaking. This is consistent with the shift in narrative from ‘Affordability = Low 
Prices’ to ‘Affordability = High Efficiency’.  
Expanded Institutional Capacity 
It is evident that a number of institutions in the energy system in Great Britain lack the capacity to 
carry out their responsibilities as effectively as is necessary. If OFGEM was given legal powers to 
audit the internal trading and pricing activities of suppliers, and invest in expanding its capacity to 
understand the operation of network companies, affordability would be considerably better 
supported. If BEIS were able to develop its understanding of energy efficiency policy, it too would be 
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in a stronger position to deliver more effective policy in this area. It is also important that 
government as a whole is able to develop the ability to produce joined-up policies which take 
account of the policies designed in different areas of government, such as in the case of the winter 
fuel payment which crosses the boundaries between BEIS and DWP. 
Overall 
There are many viable changes to the governance structure which may be introduced in order to 
address many of the current issues which undermine affordability of energy for domestic consumers 
in Great Britain. The need to foster a new narrative where affordability of energy is closely 
associated with levels of energy efficiency has been shown to be of particularly high importance. In 
addition to this, the need to reform retail markets; introduce a new consumer representative; 
replace energy efficiency obligations in the hands of local authorities; foster a new ideology 
supporting use of regulation to support energy efficiency; and expand institutional capacity have all 
been demonstrated to be important steps in the delivery of affordability of energy for domestic 
consumers in Great Britain. 
8.4 - Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis makes contributions to a number of areas of the literature. Firstly, although there is much 
in the literature relating to barriers to affordability and drivers of fuel poverty, there is little which 
specifically examines the role of governance in these issues. Therefore, this thesis increases 
understanding in these areas. This thesis addresses a gap in the literature pertaining to the impact of 
governance on the structure of charges in the energy bill, tariffs, or the retail energy market. Much is 
also understood relating to the barriers to deployment of energy efficiency measures, however 
there is little too in this area relating to the role that the governance structure plays as a facilitator 
or barrier, therefore this thesis contributes to the energy efficiency literature. Energy has become an 
inherently political topic in Great Britain in recent years. This thesis has highlighted how actors can 
place political pressure on policy-makers, and the role that narratives and ideologies can play in 
steering energy policy in relation to affordability. This thesis therefore connects with the politics 
literature. Finally, this thesis works as an effective case study for the governance literature, 
demonstrating how governance can have a direct impact on a broad range of outcomes and 
practices of that system. 
8.5 - Limitations of Research & Future Areas of Study 
As with any academic study, this PhD project faced some limitations. There was an inherent 
limitation around the solo-nature of the project. A greater budget, or a broader scope to the 
research would have allowed for more researchers to be involved. When coding and analysing data, 
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this was carried out in a random order, and transcripts were revisited to allow critique of the codes 
that had been initially assigned. At every stage reflexivity was observed, however it is inevitable that 
having a greater number of researchers involved may have subtly altered the research process. 
As with all research, time and budget both placed limitations on the research. More of both of these 
would have allowed more interviews to be carried out, particularly in Denmark. Time was carefully 
managed, particularly during the interview stages to ensure that interviews fit around each other. 
However, there was an inherent limit to the number of interviews that could viably be carried out in 
a single day, not only for logistical reasons, but also to ensure that interviewer fatigue did not 
encroach on quality of the interview process.  
There is an inherent limitation in any research which sets out to understand a dynamic system by 
carrying out research over a relatively in a short space of time. Since the completion of data-
gathering, a number of policy changes have taken place in the area. Although none of these appear 
to resolve issues identified in the research, or depart from the 'affordability = low prices' narrative, it 
would be untrue to say that nothing has changed. Carrying out future rounds of interviews to 
examine how the governance landscape has changed, and what effect this has had would be a 
natural avenue for future research.  
This thesis considered affordability in the whole of Great Britain. However, owing to the additional 
interviews that would have been required to build up a detailed picture of policies which were 
unique to devolved administrations, research focussed primarily on GB-level policies. Therefore, in 
future, greater richness of understanding could be gained from carrying out in depth comparisons of 
the governance structures that have grown up in Scotland and Wales, particularly with regard to the 
HEEPS loan and equity loan schemes, and the role of local authorities in delivering the area-based 
element of the HEEPS, and the Nest scheme. This could both shed light on the effectiveness of these 
policies, and give greater insight into the situation in Great Britain as a whole.  
Although income was considered in this thesis, it formed context rather than being specifically 
examined. This is because income is generally affected by economic and welfare policy, and 
therefore by-and-large lies outside the realms of energy policy. This however may have affected the 
possible policy solutions examined. An opportunity for future research would lie in examining the 
interaction between social policy affecting income, and the specific issue of affordability of energy.  
This project did not closely examine the impact of individuals' behaviours, considering it as an 
external factor to the governance system. However, the interaction between different groups of 
individuals' behaviours and the governance system, such as by means of voting behaviour, could 
represent a valuable avenue for future research. 
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Finally, cultural differences between Great Britain and Denmark may affect how easily transferrable 
some of the lessons from Denmark may be. The research shows that Denmark has a long tradition of 
investing in energy efficiency measures, therefore it is possible that the general population may be 
more accepting of high standards and stringent policies in this area than the British population. 
Similarly to individuals' behaviours, the impact of culture was not closely considered. This could be 
achieved either by means of an additional international comparison to examine if lessons learned in 
Denmark are replicated elsewhere, or if Denmark is a truly unique case. Alternatively, carrying out a 
sociological study among a sample of the population in Denmark to establish attitudes to energy 
efficiency could also offer some insight into the role that Danish culture plays in energy policy.  
8.6 - Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has demonstrated how energy is simultaneously an essential good, a highly-politicised 
issue, and a serious concern for millions of people. A number of the governance-level barriers to 
improving the affordability of energy in the domestic sector in Great Britain have been highlighted, 
and possible solutions to address them have been proposed. Ultimately however, there is no escape 
from the fact that in 2016, in the fifth largest economy in the World, with one of the most developed 
literatures on fuel poverty, such a thesis should not be necessary. Millions of people face the daily 
choice between feeding their children, or keeping them warm. Something has to change.
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Appendices 
Appendix A - History of the Energy System 
Electricity 
For much of its history, the electricity industry in Britain was owned and operated by the state. 
However, it was privatised in 1989 by the Electricity Act (HMG, 1989) among the wave of widespread 
privatisation that defined the eighties. This made way for the first incarnation of an electricity 
market in a privatised system, The Pool. The Act also established licenses for the new suppliers and 
generators, created a new regulator, OFFER (now OFGEM) (Helm, 2003), and created the electricity 
consumer committees (precursors to energy watch) (HMG, 1989).  
The Pool was a compulsory day-ahead market. This was operated by National Grid, whereby 
generators would bid to supply National Grid for each settlement period the following day. Bids 
were stacked in price order (merit order) and the last unit taken set the clearing price for all 
generators that were selected (Newbery, 1998; Helm, 2003). Regional monopolies for supply – the 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) were initially maintained, with competition introduced 
gradually, starting with larger consumers, but by 1998 the whole market, including domestic 
consumers, was open to competition (CMA, 2015e). When Labour came to power in 1997 there was 
a clear ambition to make the system 'work better', to better serve social objectives, and it's 
dedication to competitive markets as a means to doing that were clear (Pearson and Watson, 2010). 
In 1999, a report on pool prices was published concluding that the current trading arrangements 
facilitated the exercise of market power. This led to the 2000 Utilities Act (HMG, 2000a) which 
eventually led to the replacement of The Pool with the New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) 
in 2001, featuring 'fully liberalised bi-lateral contracting and voluntary spot trading' (Karakatsani & 
Bunn, 2008).  
NETA was designed, as far as was possible, to treat the trade of electricity like that of any other 
commodity (Helm, 2003). NETA was based on the principal of bilateral trading arrangements where 
suppliers contract with generators to cover the demand of their consumers. The designers of NETA 
were worried that there would not be sufficient motivation for suppliers to do this, and so 
introduced the balancing mechanism - a punitive charging system to ensure that this was carried 
out. This in turn acted as an incentive to vertically integrate (CMA, 2015k; Karakatsani and Bunn, 
2008), the implications of which are explored below. NETA was later extended to cover Scotland in 
2005, leading to its relabelling as the 'British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements' 
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(BETTA) (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2011). BETTA is the market arrangement which is 
in place today (DECC, 2015h). 
Gas 
Much like electricity, privatisation of the gas sector began in the 1980s with the 1986 Gas Act (HMG, 
1986), as in electricity this established both the licences required for industry activities, and the gas 
consumers council. Initially British Gas was responsible for both the supply of gas and for gas 
transmission around the UK, however a 1993 report from the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(now the Competition and Markets Authority) highlighted this as a conflict of interest. This led to a 
separation of duties of supply and transmission and creation of one business handling supply - 
Centrica (still operating in the supply market as 'British Gas') and another for transmission - Transco 
(now National Grid Gas plc) (CMA, 2015e). Competition in the gas supply market was introduced in 
stages, which concluded was concluded in 2000 with all domestic consumers being able to switch 
gas supplier (CMA, 2015e). Initially, as in electricity, price caps were put in place to protect 
consumers while competition developed. These were removed by OFGEM in 2002 (CMA, 2015e).  
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Appendix B – Targeting and Eligibility 
Table 4 - The existing fuel poverty policies, the types of eligible households and the data used to determine eligibility, 
Source: (NatCen Social Research and CSE, 2014) 
Scheme Target Households Data/Proxies Used 
Warm Home Discount  
(Core Group) 
• Old age pensioners  
• Low income pensioners 
• Pension Credit 
Warm Home Discount 
(Broader Group) 
• Vulnerable low income  
• Vulnerable disabled  
• Vulnerable with children 
• Varies across suppliers 
Cold Weather Payment • Low income pensioners  
•  Low income disabled / 
family with a disability  
• Low income family with 
children 
• Pension Credit  
• Income Support,  
• Income-based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance  
• Income-related 
Employment and Support 
Allowance 
• Universal Credit  
• Child Tax Credit  
• Pensioner and Disability 
Premiums 
ECO Affordable Warmth 
Group (AWG)  
 
and  
 
ECO Carbon Saving 
Communities Obligation 
(CSCO) –Rural Element 
• Low income pensioners 
• Low income disabled / 
family with a disability  
• Low income family with 
children 
• Pension Credit  
• Income Support  
• Income-based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance  
• Income-related 
Employment and Support 
Allowance  
• Child Tax Credit  
• Working Tax Credit  
• Pensioner Premium  
• Disabled Child premium 
•  Disability premium 
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ECO Carbon Saving 
Communities Obligation 
(CSCO) 
• Households living in 25% 
most deprived areas 
• Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
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Appendix C - Electricity & Financial Flows - Enlarged
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Appendix D - Gas and Financial Flows - Enlarged 
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Appendix E - EDF Energy PPA Paper-trail 
EDF operates a range of retail tariffs called the 'blue' tariffs. For customers on these tariffs, EDF will 
'make sure we buy enough electricity generated from a low-carbon nuclear source to match every 
unit of electricity we estimate our Blue customers use' (EDF, 2015).  
To support this claim, EDF contracted PWC to carry out an independent audit on these tariffs (EDF 
and PWC, 2014) which showed that under the terms of a power purchase agreement, EDF Energy plc 
is entitled to receive 80% of the electricity produced by EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd. EDF 
energy plc is EDF's UK supply arm, and EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited is the firm that owns 
and operates all of EDF's nuclear plants in the UK - formerly British Energy (London Stock Exchange, 
2011).  
The reason that it is only 80%, is because the holding company 'Lake Acquisitions' which owns 'EDF 
Energy Nuclear Generation Limited' is a part ownership share between EDF (80%) and Centrica (20%) 
(Centrica, 2009).  
The fact that this PPA alone is sufficient to more than meet the demands of EDF's domestic 
customers, and all but meet the needs of the business consumers is demonstrated in EDF's 
consolidated segmental statement (EDF, 2013). This shows EDF's share of the nuclear output for 
2013 to be 48 TWh, and demand from domestic consumers to be 15.2 TWh, and demand from non-
domestic customers to be 37.6TWh (totalling 52.8TWh). Output from EDF's non-nuclear generation 
is shown to be 24.9 TWh but no PPA information could be found relating to this plant.  
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Appendix F - Green Deal Institutional Arrangements 
 
Source: (GDORB, 2012, p.26)  
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Appendix G - Supplier Obligations Timeline 
• 1994-1998 - EESOP1 - Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance 
• 1998-2000 - EESOP2 
• 2000-2002 - EESOP3 
• 2002-2005 - EEC1 - Energy Efficiency Commitment  
• 2005-2008 - EEC2 
• 2008-2012 CERT - Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
• 2009-2012 CESP - Community Energy Saving Program 
• 2013 - 2015 - ECO1/1.2 
• 2015-2017 - ECO2 
• Post-2017 - ECO: Help to Heat 
Above is a timeline of the evolution of the supplier obligations in Great Britain. The Energy Efficiency 
Standards of Performance (EESOP) were the first supplier obligations in Great Britain and were 
initially developed and managed by OFFER and the Energy Saving Trust. This was replaced by the 
energy efficiency commitment (EEC), and later the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT). The 
Community Energy Saving Program was introduced alongside CERT slightly later. Both of these were 
finally replaced with the ECO in 2012.  
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Appendix H - ECO Target Calculation - Calculating a Supplier's Obligation 
 
 
 
  
 A = Total value of sub-target in period36 
 T = Total amount of electricity or gas (as applicable) supplied during the notification period 
 by all suppliers and calculated using the 'Tx' Formula Below, excluding volumes supplied by 
 suppliers with a zero obligation.  
 Tx = Amount of electricity or gas supplied during notification period, (calculated using below 
 formula) 
 
(1) Tx - If the amount of electricity supplied = 400<E<800 GWh, or volume of gas = 2000<G<4000 
then use formula: 
   
 
 C = Amount of electricity or gas notified by the supplier or group 
 D = In the case of an electricity supplier, 400GWh of electricity; or in the case of a gas 
 supplier, 2000 GWh of gas. 
 
(2) Tx - the amount of electricity supplied >800 GWh, or volume of gas >4000 then use figure as 
notified. 
(OFGEM, 2014a) 
  
                                                          
36 'A' is divided in two to reflect both gas and electricity licences. 
 
Tx = (C-D)*2 
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Appendix I - History of Consumer Representation  
With the privatisation of the electricity industry, The Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES) 
established 12 regional Electricity Consumer Committees (ECCs), with boundaries that mimicked the 
boundaries of the Public Electricity Suppliers (PES), each with a chair, also elected by the DGES. 
These bodies represented the rights and concerns of the electricity consumers in their region. The 
chairs of the ECCs met together on a regular basis on the National Consumers' Consultative 
Committee (NCCC). This was a statutory body which reviewed issues in the electricity sector 
affecting consumers. Here the chairs of the ECCs were able to exchange views with each other, and 
with the Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES). The chairs of the ECCs also formed the 
National Electricity Consumers Council (NECC), a non-statutory body which allowed the chairs of the 
ECCs to discuss and respond to national issues affecting electricity consumers, without the presence 
of the DGES (Simmonds, 2002).  
Consumer representation in the Gas industry at the time was established by the secretary of state 
for Trade and Industry in the form of the Gas Consumer Council (GCC). Owing to the national 
structure of the privatised gas industry (i.e. it was privatised almost completely whole, rather than 
into pieces like the electricity sector), most of the work of the GCC happened at a national level, 
although regional offices were created (Simmonds, 2002).  
The 2000 Utilities Act (HMG, 2000a) replaced the ECCs and the GCC with The Gas and Electricity 
Consumer Council (Energywatch), a central body representing consumer interests. This was a 
national body with a series of regional offices (albeit fewer than under previous incarnations) and 
within each regional office operated area teams. Energywatch had greater powers to demand 
information that in predecessors, both from industry firms, and from OFGEM itself. Any refusal to 
provide information by firms was referred to OFGEM, and any refusal by OFGEM to supply 
information was referred to the secretary of state. The Utilities Act also reclassified OFGEM's 
primary responsibility as to protecting the interests of consumers - this gives rise to inherent overlap 
between the responsibilities of OFGEM and Energywatch, this required the drawing up of a 
memorandum of understanding between the two bodies as to how areas of overlapping 
responsibility would be handled (Simmonds, 2002).  
In 2008, Energywatch was combined with Postwatch and the National Consumers Council to become 
Consumer Focus (Consumer Futures, 2014), however just three years later BIS began consulting on 
its combination with the Citizen's Advice Bureau, suggesting that multiple consumer advocacy 
organisations was both inefficient and confusing for consumers (BIS, 2011). In 2012, it was 
announced that this would go ahead. In 2013 the advice-giving services that formerly existed under 
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consumer focus were transferred to CAB, leaving behind the restructured Consumer Focus (under 
the new name Consumer Futures) as a temporary Regulated Industries Unit, which was then 
absorbed into CAB a year later (Consumer Focus, 2013). 
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Appendix J - Detailed Breakdown of Bill Costs  
 
Outlook for Costs That Make Up Domestic Electricity Bills, Period: March 2014 - April 2015  
Source: After OFGEM, 2015a 
 
Wholesale costs 
 
   - Electricity  £    227  
   - Unbilled volumes  £      7  
   - Electricity imbalance costs  £      1  
TOTAL  £    235  
Network costs 
 
   - Electricity network (transmission)  £     34  
   - Electricity network (distribution)  £    111  
   - Balancing (BSUoS)  £      6  
 TOTAL   £    151  
Environmental and social obligation costs 
 
   - Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs)  £     40  
   - Energy Companies Obligation (ECO)  £     20  
   - Feed in Tariffs (FiTs)  £     10  
   - Warm Home Discount  £      6  
   - Government-funded rebate -£     12  
   - CfD 
 
TOTAL  £    65  
Supplier Costs 
 
   - Operational (inc. meters and smart meters)  £     76  
   - Depreciation and amortisation  £      4  
   - Supplier Pre-tax margin   £     49  
TOTAL  £     129  
VAT  £     29  
    
Total (average customer bill)  £    609  
  
 
NB. This is the most recent data available of its sort, this is because in May 20125, Ofgem suspended 
publication of the supply market indicator data. 
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Outlook for Costs That Make Up Domestic Gas Bills, Period: May 2014 - April 2015  
Source: After OFGEM, 2015a 
 
Wholesale costs 
 
   - Gas  £    342  
   - Unbilled volumes  £      9  
   - Gas reconciliation by difference  £     16  
   - Demand forecast error  £     16  
TOTAL  £    383  
Network costs 
 
   - Gas network (transmission)  £     13  
   - Gas network (distribution)  £    138  
   - Total   £    151  
Environmental and social obligation costs 
 
   - Gas Energy Companies Obligation (ECO)  £     20  
   - Warm Home Discount  £      6  
 TOTAL   £     27  
Supplier Costs 
 
   - Operational (inc. meters and smart meters)  £     93  
   - Depreciation and amortisation  £      4  
   - Supplier Pre-tax margin   £     67 
TOTAL  £     164  
VAT  £     36  
    
Total (average customer bill)  £    761 
  
 
NB. This is the most recent data available of its sort, this is because in May 20125, Ofgem suspended 
publication of the supply market indicator data. 
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Outlook for Costs That Make Up Domestic Dual Fuel Bills, Period: April 2014 - March 2015  
Source: After OFGEM, 2015a 
Wholesale costs 
 
   - Gas  £    342  
   - Electricity  £    226  
   - Unbilled volumes  £     16  
   - Gas reconciliation by difference  £     16  
   - Demand forecast error  £     16  
   - Electricity imbalance costs  £      1  
TOTAL  £    617  
Network costs 
 
   - Gas network (transmission)  £     13  
   - Gas network (distribution)  £    138  
   - Electricity network (transmission)  £     34  
   - Electricity network (distribution)  £    111  
   - Balancing (BSUoS)  £      6  
 TOTAL   £    302  
Environmental and social obligation costs 
 
   - Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs)  £     41  
   - Energy Companies Obligation (ECO)  £     40  
   - Feed in Tariffs (FiTs)  £     10  
   - Warm Home Discount  £     12  
   - Government-funded rebate -£     12  
   - Electricity CfD 
 
 TOTAL   £     92  
Supplier Costs 
 
   - Operational (inc. meters and smart meters)  £    170  
   - Depreciation and amortisation  £      8  
   - Pre-tax margin  £     93  
TOTAL  £    269  
VAT  £     64  
    
Total (average customer bill)  £   1,346  
  
NB. This is the most recent data available of its sort, this is because in May 20125, Ofgem suspended 
publication of the supply market indicator data.  
249 
 
Appendix K – Codes for Interviews 
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